About WISCOMP

Initiated in 1999, WISCOMP is a project of the FOUNDATION FOR UNIVERSAL RESPONSIBILITY, in New Delhi, India. It is a South Asian initiative that works at the confluence of peacebuilding and security studies. Gender concerns provide the leitmotif of its programs.

International Relations Theory and Non-Traditional Approaches to Security

International Relations Theory and Non-Traditional Approaches to Security is the outcome of an academic research project undertaken by Dr. Siddharth Mallavarapu. Awarded by WISCOMP for academic research, media projects and special projects, the Scholar of Peace Fellowships are designed to encourage innovative work by academics, policymakers, defence and foreign affairs practitioners, journalists, NGO workers, creative artists and others. The fellowships are seen as an important step to encourage work at the interface of gender and security, conflict resolution and peace. These studies are expected to provide information about problems pertaining to security, promote understanding of structural causes of conflict, suggest alternatives and encourage peace initiatives and interventions.

Twenty Seventh in the Perspectives series, this monograph addresses one of the core concerns of contemporary International Relations theory namely, how to incorporate ‘non-traditional’ concerns of security into the mainstream discourse. It examines the receptivity of different intellectual traditions in the discipline to these concerns. The author begins his analysis with the Realist discourse in the post cold war period and provides an overview of “traditional” conceptualizations of security. He then moves on to provide a succinct summary of the Liberal and Constructivist discourses, examining the receptivity of each of these streams to security formulations that move beyond survival of the sovereign state towards addressing individual well being and global sustainability.

This is an important work which provides thought provoking analyses of the extant approaches to security and engages the reader with an explanation of competing claims. It will be an invaluable resource book for those interested in exploring the evolving area of scholarship broadly labeled as “non traditional security”.

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International Relations Theory
and
Non-Traditional Approaches to Security

Siddharth Mallavarapu
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Non-Traditional Approaches to Security

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Siddharth Mallavarapu
Foreword

The Scholar of Peace Fellowships awarded by WISCOMP for academic research, media projects and special projects are designed to encourage original and innovative work by academics, policy makers, defense, and foreign policy practitioners, NGO workers and others. The series WISCOMP Perspectives in conjunction with WISCOMP Discussion Papers brings the work of some of these scholars to a wider readership.

This work addresses a keenly debated issue in contemporary International Relations theory and praxis – the need to rethink conventional ‘state centric’ formulations of security. This debate which began at the end of the Cold War reshaped the contours of discourse on security studies and interrogated some traditional presuppositions. In addition, processes of globalization yielded a growing recognition that human existence was not only threatened by inter-state conflicts but by intra-state civil strife, state perpetuated suffering and state malfeasance and nonfeasance on provision of basic human needs. This change reflected in the increasing focus on the ‘non traditional’ concerns of energy security, food security, health, environmental security, trafficking in drugs and small arms and financial crimes.

The author examines the receptivity of Realist, Liberal, and Constructivist streams of thought to issues that move beyond the ‘sovereign’ state, towards concerns for individual well being and global sustainability. He puts the epistemology and theoretical boundaries of the intellectual traditions that have shaped international politics to rigorous scrutiny, to yield insights on the ‘space’ for inclusion of issues that fall under the broad rubric of ‘non-traditional security’ concerns.

The author maps the contours of the Security discourse and identifies the areas where ‘non traditional’ concerns have already been assimilated and where newer concerns may find entry. He begins his analysis by recounting state-centric Realist formulations of security and argues that their exclusive focus on military power, state interests and territoriarity makes Realist discourse a less likely candidate for incorporating human needs, social welfare, identity concerns or
epidemiology (especially that of AIDS) within its theoretical perspective. However, he is not dismissive of the traditional emphasis on state survival. He avers that the state is likely to play a key role in the provision of security, irrespective of the manner in which it engages. The arguments compel the reader to delve deeper into the underlying assumptions of the classical Realist discourse, even if to critique and unscramble them.

The author also engages with, two important constituencies—South Asian and feminist theorists—that have challenged the ‘mainstream’ security discourse. While a rigid binary categorization of traditional and nontraditional security or hard and soft security has been a standard used by Western scholars, it has not found favor with feminists and South Asian theorists. The author envisions theories of International Relations along a continuum validating a confluence of multiple explanatory frameworks that can provide opportunity for constitution and then reconstitution of a shared meaning of the essentially ‘contested content of security’. He acknowledges that this constitution in order to have meaning can learn from a gender critique of security studies. Innovative research on security issues which respects diversity and which foregrounds perspectives of women and the hitherto marginalized in the traditional security matrix is an essential part of the process of attaining ‘human security’.

To buttress the research and praxis efforts of WISCOMP, this work adds a cogent analysis of the contemporary extant literature on the security discourse in International Relations theory and is a step towards creating awareness on the debates surrounding the process. It presents the epistemology of various traditions in the discipline and their conceptualizations of ‘security’ in a succinct form for easy access and comprehensibility. It consequently raises important questions for contemporary International Relations theory on human security concerns—both in the context of research and implications for policy and praxis. This work can prove a valuable resource for students and scholars engaged in the many dimensions of ‘unscrambling’ the concept of security.

The WISCOMP Team
Introduction

This study deals specifically with how International Relations as a discipline has engaged the question of non-traditional security after the end of the Cold War. My interest is specifically confined to degrees of receptivity exhibited by Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism to rethink conventional assumptions about security. It would be naïve not to explicitly acknowledge the influence of Realism in shaping our dominant imagination of conceiving security in purely statist terms.1 While the question of state survival is crucial, more recent approaches examine anxieties not related merely to state structures but to notions of individual well being as well.2 How safe do we feel as human beings in our daily social existence? What access do we have to clean drinking water, electricity, food, education, religious belief, and public health? While these may be viewed as fairly straightforward issues of universal human concern it is still crucial to recognize that this inflection in our understanding of security is not merely academic but could have a much more direct bearing on the ‘quality of lives’ we lead.3 Perhaps more instructive at this stage is a perusal of disciplinary history to look at how the sub-field of Security Studies framed our mainstream assumptions about security and what has prompted more recent shifts in normative focus.

A useful point of entry into this intellectual lineage is the debate that took place over the content of the field of Security Studies after the end of the Cold War. Stephen Walt, echoing the orthodoxy in the discipline, argued that ‘military power is the central focus of the field’.4 Sensitive to the internal logic of development in the field, Walt argued that it would not be in the interest of the field to lose its ‘intellectual coherence’ as a result of pressures to make the definition of security more inclusive. His philosophical commitment to a scientific standpoint to examine political life was evident in his admonition to students of the discipline to furnish the requirements of the scientific canon. This translated into a plea for ‘careful and consistent use of terms, unbiased measurement of critical concepts, and public documentation of theoretical and empirical claims.’5 Further this was premised on a
cumulative evolutionary perspective on the growth of knowledge within a field and celebrated ‘the marriage between security studies and social science.’ Thus a pragmatic instrumental social engineering impulse was seen as explicitly warranted by the demands of Security Studies. The question of national security remained at the core of the project because what ultimately mattered was state survival. Walt believed that this focus should not be the responsibility of only those at the helm of affairs but should form the focus of inquiry of those also who are opposed to narrow constructions of security. To capture his sentiment in this matter it is useful to register his claim that ‘[t]he persistent belief that the opponents of war should not study national security is like trying to find a cure for cancer by refusing to study medicine while allowing research on the disease to be conducted solely by tobacco companies’. In effect, Walt while gesturing that alternative viewpoints on security are worth exploring, ends up gravitating invariably to his core interest of ‘[u]nder what conditions should states employ military force and for what purposes?’

In marked contrast to Walt’s narrow construal of core concerns in Security Studies, Edward A.Kolodjiez made a persuasive case for subjecting the state itself to a much closer scrutiny and remains extremely wary of the project of reducing the mandate of social sciences to serve as the ‘handmaiden of Grand Strategy.’ He also is wary of the strong tendency to privilege the policymaker’s ‘relevant’ perspective over all else often at the expense of wider normative conceptualizations of security. Particularly revealing in Kolodjiez’s critique of Walt is his reminder of ‘...the amazing ethnocentrism of the survey, alluded to earlier in its omission of European and Third World theorists and in its survey of Cold War literature’. As a consequence of this parochialism, he argues, Security Studies is reduced to ‘American security studies’.

Of greatest value however in Kolodjiez’s critique of Walt is his case for more not less active engagement with normative issues related to force and political community. In Walt’s scheme ‘[t]he contesting claims of rival normative theories of human behavior are no less dismissed in the proclamation of a dubious realism, congenial to the rationalization of violence and coercive threats. Once strapped into the essay’s normative straitjacket, the security analyst is exempt from the personal
and professional responsibility of questioning the limits of the theory except to perfect his or her expectations of state behavior based on realist norms.\textsuperscript{78}

Kolodziej also takes issue with the realist tendency to focus on the external determinants of insecurity to the neglect of domestic factors. In particular, questions of internal civil strife and state legitimacy also come within the locus of interests of this perspective. Equally critical of the ‘historical myopia’ of policymakers fixated on short time horizons, Kolodziej is inclined to endorse the proposition that ‘[f]rom an even wider analytic perspective, as a global society of peoples and states gropes toward a provisional world order, what historians and social scientists have until now characterized as interstate wars may well be viewed as a long chain of civil strife within what may progressively be viewed as a slowly emerging global system’.\textsuperscript{9}

Even in terms of the realist inheritance, Kolodziej argues that Walt caricatures this tradition and is unwilling to re-cast the question of security in a new parlance. Larger normative issues of welfare and democratic participation are of equal import in Kolodziej’s revisionist reading of Security Studies. Skeptical of the ‘renaissance’ label that Walt hinges onto contemporary expressions of the field, Kolodziej prophetically enquires if this is truly ‘a renaissance or merely emerging from the dark ages?’ Supportive of a multidisciplinary approach, Kolodziej rejects any attempt to strip security issues of their moral and legal dimensions. This is a complete rejection of Walt’s ‘philosophically restrictive notion of the social sciences [that] would confine the security scholar to testing propositions largely specified by state power brokers, policymakers, and managers of violence.’ Ultimately, for Kolodziej ‘the security problematic is truly global and inescapable.’

The debates over the content of the discipline of Security Studies have also had an impact on how security has come to be viewed in the South Asian context. Of particular relevance to our inquiry is an edited book by Dipankar Banerjee, which brings together a spate of responses from scholars in different parts of South Asia specifically responding to the ‘challenges’ posed by Security Studies in this part of the world.\textsuperscript{10} Jayadeva Uyangoda makes a rather scathing indictment of social science pursuit in South Asia that tends to collude with the State.\textsuperscript{11} He observes
that ‘...the problem with security studies... is that one is discursive prisoner of the nation state narrative of human fate’. Arguing strongly for an informed historical grounding of the modern nation-state, Uyangoda remains extremely skeptical of the ‘fetish’ over borders that characterize the South Asian security discourse. He remains critical of the violence of the modernity project and underlines the non-naturalness of the state as a political community. The state is rendered as a ‘historically contingent’ facet of human existence and not an eternal way of imagining political being. Unfortunately, however Uyangoda notes with regret that this caution has not greeted accounts of the modern nation state and on the contrary there has been a tendency to valorize the ‘modern’ in South Asia. Thus the only way out of the present impasse for Uyangoda is to acknowledge that the ‘de-sanctification of territorial borders would open up unprecedented possibilities for a new paradigm of security in South Asia.’

In another thoughtful account of the state of Security Studies in India, P. R. Chari identifies a similar Western bias, which Kolodziej emphatically recorded in respect of Walt’s framework. Chari identifies five disturbing features that have characterized the development of Security Studies in India. First, he observes that there are very few institutions of repute that rigorously approach the field; Second, there is a tendency to be strongly conformist for fear of treading on the toes of the powerful; Third, those within the system have rarely spent time to reflect on decision-making or other facets of the administration of security in the country; Fourth, academics and policymakers seem to belong to incommensurable worlds with no common bridge or shared space and finally, theory has suffered even in the realm of Security Studies in the Indian context. Perhaps more illuminating from our point of view is Chari’s anticipation of the growing importance of non-traditional threats to security in the post Cold War era. He observes ‘...the narrow view of security does not reflect the realities underlying national and regional security within the international system. Issues like the struggle for resources embedded in the pursuit of energy security, food security and more lately, environmental security. Apart from that, the security implications of regional global problems associated with overpopulation, such as, environmental degradation and resource depletion, forced migrations, international terrorism,
ascendancy of non-state actors in drugs, arms, money-laundering and financial crime organizations; and the growing linkages between governance and international security, reflect the more complex verities of international security.\textsuperscript{14}

Two other reflections are particularly relevant to understand the resonance of the Security Studies content debates that have animated the discipline of International Relations in recent years. W. Lawrence Prabhakar also makes the charge of ‘ethnocentric’ bias in his intervention on the state of the field in India. He argues that there has been a tendency to liken Western conditions as a \textit{prima facie} assumption when thinking about security issues.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, while conceiving the democratic realm it is assumed that liberal democracy as the global norm actually obtains in the developing world as well as that security threats emanate largely from outside the sphere of the state. On the contrary most incisive accounts of the security problematic in various theatres of the developing world note the importance of resolving internal legitimacy questions that pose the most serious threat to third world security.

Further, Prabhakar observes that while Indian security thinking has been state centric, South Asian Security problematic have tended to be India-centric. Advocating an interdisciplinary approach, Prabhakar also rejects adhocist approaches that have characterized past Security Studies efforts and also recommends ‘lateral mobility’ between government and academia in order to make the conversation more productive in the short run and valuable in the long run.\textsuperscript{16} V. R. Raghavan in similar vein envisions a far more pressing need to address non-traditional security issues in South Asia ranging from ethnic conflicts, to small arms, narcotics and financial crimes committed by capitalizing on recent technological innovations.\textsuperscript{17} Of particular pertinence is his suggestion that military/economic tradeoff calls for greater attention in the visible horizon.

Another affirmation of the seriousness with which non-traditional threats to security are coming to be viewed in South Asia is manifest in a series of useful contributions on security in the post Cold War era in an edited book by Rajesh Basrur.\textsuperscript{18} Security here is conceptualized more broadly to include military, economic and explicit quality of life evaluations. The conceptual cluster is cast in the following terms:
Military security: the security of life of the national community from external threats. These may be nuclear, conventional or sub conventional (in the form of low intensity conflict);

Economic security: the security of people’s material well-being, which encompasses basic needs (employment, food, shelter and clothing) as well as access to education, health, and in general a decent standard of living; and

Security of quality of life: environmental stability, cultural security (in terms of identity/way of life and opportunity for cultural self-expression), and political security (political community, democracy and human rights) in a political system legitimated by popular acceptance.19

Basrur treads cautious ground in his denunciation of the state as a source of insecurity. While critical of the state’s capacity to ‘abrogate human rights in the name of order’, he nevertheless observes that in the South Asian setting ‘...the state remains the principal agency through which security can be obtained.’

Of considerable value is the parallel counsel of Mustafa Kamal Pasha that we cannot avoid a politics of engagement with the state as the key element in South Asia. Pasha is also critical of scholars who tend to romanticize the autonomy of civil society in post-colonial states. Candidly stated he observes ‘[i]n South Asia, as elsewhere in the postcolonial Third World, not only does the state cast a long shadow on civil society, but civil society itself is the site of reproduction of statist projects. Despite its apparent innocence, civil society in South Asia shows the imprint of the historical constitution of the state’. He further reminds us that it is misplaced to attribute goodness to civil society and wrongdoing to all actions of the state. In the ultimate analysis he argues that ‘...if the security complex is situated in neither the state nor civil society but in their mutually constitutive relations, new sites for rethinking of South Asian security may become more plausible.’ 20

To conclude, I shall reiterate a final point. Non-traditional threats are likely to assume a greater salience in the context of globalization.
As Theodore C. Sorensen sums up this line of thinking when he writes ‘[t]he global community has become too small, ...and the destinies of its members too intertwined for any nation to think in... narrow traditional terms’. Or as Jessica Tuchman Mathews argued that ‘[g]lobal developments now suggest the need for... broadening the definition of national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues’. 

Have these developments supplanted completely traditional ways of conceiving security? If anything it is important to extract how different International Relations theories have come to view these developments. Without prejudging levels of receptivity to new ways of thinking about security, I shall attempt to capture the central tenets of each theoretical strand and argue why they tend to view non-traditional security in a particular idiom of their choosing. All of theory involves a conscious political choice built on processes of inclusion and exclusion. What do these theories accept and reject in their script on security? This merits further inquiry and hopefully promises to yield relevant insights to the project of widening our notion of what may legitimately be treated as a security concern.
Realism and Non-Traditional Approaches to Security

It is no accident that students of International Relations are inevitably drawn to what realists think about diverse issues in the field especially given the centrality assigned to it by the mainstream. The literature on non-traditional threats to security is also no exception and has been subject to realist skepticism.\textsuperscript{24}

Non-traditional security is intrinsically cast as divergent from ‘traditional’ or ‘realist’ approaches to security. This chapter focuses on the central tenets of realism and the implications this carries for an appreciation of non-traditional threats to security. Stephen Walt in a recent survey of the resilience of realism in International Relations reminds us that there are several competing strands of realism.\textsuperscript{25} However, there is often agreement about some core issues that in fact permit us to treat these diverse strands as a cluster or family of realisms in the first instance.

Again as far as the disciplinary mainstream projections indicate in International Relations, we need to be attentive in particular to the claims advanced by Hans Morgenthau in his classic \textit{Politics Among Nations}. As we proceed ahead, I seek to examine his six principles of political realism and pose for our readers, inferences it may carry for a realist reading of non-traditional security. I then pursue the work of Kenneth Waltz and elaborate some of his central claims and examine how they differ from classical realism. Eventually, I reiterate the same question in the context of structural realism with regard to the potential connotations it is likely to carry for a non-traditional understanding of security.

Traditionally, if you were a realist puritan schooled in the Western canon, in all likelihood you would systematically begin with perusing the work of the well-known historian Thucydides. The \textit{Melian Dialogue} qualifies as an interesting conversational prelude to the Peloponnesian War involving the Spartans and Athenians. The Athenians in dogged pursuit of a victory affirm what constitutes a truism in the realist subconscious. Assuming mutual consensus they indicate to the Melians that ‘since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.’\textsuperscript{26}
The emphasis on strength and the equivalence of morality with the normative stance of the strong also finds echo in the work of another well-known realist figure Edward Hallet Carr. Reflecting on the world in the inter-war years, Carr wrote that

[It]heories of international morality ...are the product of dominant nations or group of nations. For the past hundred years, and more especially since 1918, the English-speaking peoples have formed the dominant group in the world; and current theories of international morality have been designed to perpetuate their supremacy and expressed in the idiom particular to them. France, retaining something of her eighteenth-century tradition and restored to a position of dominance for a short period after 1918, has remained for these reasons outside the charmed circle of creators of international morality. Both the view that the English-speaking peoples are monopolists of international morality and the view that they are consummate international hypocrites may be reduced to the plain fact that the current canons of international virtue have, by a natural and inevitable process, been mainly created by them.\(^{27}\)

Carr also recognized the natural tendency towards status quoism by the major powers considering that it was in their interest to retain dominance and acquiesce in the current order. He observes in this context that

[It]he doctrine of the harmony of interests thus serves as an ingenious moral device invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged groups in order to justify and maintain their dominant positions. But a further point requires notice. The supremacy within the community of the privileged group may be, and often is, so overwhelming that there is, in fact, a sense in which its interests are those of the community, since its well being for other members of the community, and its collapse would entail the collapse of the community as a whole. In so far, therefore, as the alleged harmony of interests has any reality, it is created by the overwhelming power of the privileged group, and is an excellent illustration of the Machiavellian maxim that morality is the product of power.\(^{28}\)

Carr also like most realists paid special attention to military power as well as territoriality.
The Predispositions of Classical Realism

To return to our original project, the work of Hans Morgenthau is representative of the classical realist strand and continues to present to many scholars a reliable and plausible appreciation of the workings of international politics. What did theory mean to Morgenthau? According to Morgenthau, the purpose of theory was ‘...to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible.’ He went on to identify six cardinal principles of political realism, which continue to be applied by students and practitioners of world politics alike in their attempt to decipher patterns relating to contemporary political developments in the international domain.

Morgenthau places a special emphasis on reason as a rudder that helps us formulate theoretical propositions of some value in International Relations. He invokes the word ‘rationality’ to convey a basic premise that international politics is ‘...governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.’ He casts international politics as primarily a realm of inter-state relations where foreign policies become the site to understand the dynamics governing this sphere. He argues that ‘...we must approach political reality with a kind of rational outline, a map that suggests to us the possible meanings of foreign policy.’ So the theory of realism in International Relations is concerned ultimately with ‘...the testing of rational hypothesis against the actual facts... of international politics.’

The second premise that serves as the basis of the classical realist understanding is that ‘the concept of interest is defined in terms of power. The purpose of reducing power to interests is to do with Morgenthau’s understanding of theory as primarily a means to simplify complex realities through selected rational criteria. Objective laws are reflected, therefore, in the universal articulation of interests by states consonant with their power requirements and capacities. By focusing on specific elements, Morgenthau believes he saves us from a hopeless and frustrating search for explanation. He observes,

[t]he contingent elements of personality, prejudice and subjective preference, and of all the weaknesses of intellect and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course. Especially when foreign policy is conducted under the conditions of domestic control, the need to marshal popular emotions to the support of foreign policy cannot fail to impair the
rationality of foreign policy itself. Yet a theory of foreign policy
which aims at rationality must for the time being, as it were,
abstract from these irrational elements and seek to paint a picture
of foreign policy which presents the rational essence to be found
in experience, without the contingent deviations from rationality
which are also found in experience.\(^\text{30}\)

Perhaps most illuminating for scholars in the field of International
Relations is Morgenthau’s counsel to avoid certain distractions that
litter the passage to serious political analysis. He writes ‘*[w]hen the
human mind approaches reality with the purpose of taking action, of
which the political encounter is one of the outstanding instances, it is
often led astray by any of four common mental phenomena: residues
of formerly adequate modes of thought and action now rendered
obsolete by a new social reality; demonological interpretations of reality
which substitute a fictitious reality – peopled by evil persons rather
than seemingly intractable issues – for the actual one; refusal to come
to terms with a threatening state of affairs by denying it through illusory
verbalization; reliance upon the infinite malleability of a seemingly
obstreperous reality.’\(^\text{31}\)

The third claim that classical realists assert is that ‘...interest defined in
terms of power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it
does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for
all.’ However, while asserting that interests remain the universal yardstick,
Morgenthau is willing to concede that ‘...the contemporary connection
between interest and the nation-state is a product of history, and is
therefore bound to disappear in the course of history.’ Classical realism
thus is willing to factor in history seriously while still trying to derive
universally applicable distillates from the entire human experience.

The fourth proposition that classical realists advance is that prudence
remains an integral facet by which to evaluate all of politics. Morgenthau
writes ‘*[t]here can be no political morality without prudence; that is,
without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral
action.’\(^\text{32}\)

While making a plea for ‘moderation of moral judgment’, Morgenthau
asserts the need for all political realists to be ‘...able to judge other
nations as we judge our own, and, having judged them in this fashion,
we then are capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of
other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own.’\(^\text{33}\)
Finally, Morgenthau believes that his version of realism represents a ‘distinctive intellectual and moral attitude to matters political.’ He hopes that the sophistication of economics as a discipline will be suitably emulated by international politics in the not so distant future.

What does Morgenthau’s classical realist theory of international politics portend in terms of receptivity to non-traditional approaches to security? One of the central premises of classical realism is its delineation of international politics as largely a domain of inter-state relations. Morgenthau’s primary concern is to derive a theoretical scheme to access motivations guiding state behaviour. He arrives at the notion of ‘interest as power’ as a generic aspiration of all states. When he refers to security in the classical realist scheme we are indeed referring to state security. However, Morgenthau is keen to historically locate statehood as a contingent phenomenon with no definite predictable future and is also willing to argue that national survival represents a circumscribed morality. If we understand non-traditional threats to security as representing non-military threats what would be of interest to classical realists is how they may impact on state behavior and assessments of well-being.

For classical realists the state undoubtedly remains the axis of reference from which to gauge new developments in international politics. However, classical realists also tend to maintain a distinction between ‘high politics’ and ‘low politics’. While the former deals with military issues the latter is seen as dealing with softer economic issues. Non-traditional security issues are located more naturally within the ‘low politics’ category. Classical realists privilege ‘high politics’, are interested in ‘low politics’ only if it has a bearing on high politics. This also emerges from their privileging the state as the key referent to security. Thus while classical realists would be willing to acknowledge non-traditional threats to security, the yardstick by which they evaluate this impact would be largely drawn from the perspective of its impact on the state.

Having stated this, Morgenthau however acknowledges unlike many of his intellectual successors that realism has a strong normative dimension to it. He is willing to concede ‘...contingent deviations from rationality which are also found in experience’ while at the same time arguing that the demands of theory construction require it to focus on rational aspects of politics. However the important issue here to my mind is the existence or non-existence of receptivity to other normative
inclusions in our assessment of security. Morgenthau for instance was not averse to some positive developments in the evolution of international legal safeguards for civilians involved in war as well as with regard to the treatment of prisoners of war. He observed, with ‘...the logical outgrowth of the conception of war as a contest between armed forces, the idea developed that only those who are actually able and willing to participate actively in warfare ought to be the object of deliberate armed action. Those who were no longer engaged in actual warfare because of sickness, wounds, or because they had been made prisoners of war or were unwilling to be made prisoners ought not to be harmed. This tendency towards the humanization of warfare started in the sixteenth century and culminated in great multinational treaties of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Practically all civilized nations have adhered to these treaties.’36

The reason why I have presented this extract is to suggest the availability of normative space for a consideration of notions of individual well being in conflict as also in peacetime. Classical realists are more likely to be less dismissive of non-traditional threats to security out of hand. While access to clean drinking water, food, housing, a clean environment and sustainable livelihoods may not seem imminent national security concerns but they nevertheless could pose problems engendering a crisis of legitimacy if the state fails to deliver on a large scale. Morgenthau also admitted candidly that theories could only approximate reality. They were characterized by inclusions and exclusions and could never surmount actual experience. Therefore one expects rigorous classical political realists to keep the theoretical space open for new threats to be factored into our security analysis.

The Predispositions of Structural Realism

The work of Kenneth Waltz introduces an extremely influential version of realism referred to as Structural Realism or Neo-Realism. He is best known for his book *Theory of International Politics* that was published in the late seventies.37 It is probably relevant to ask at this juncture in what respect does Waltz differ from his intellectual predecessor Morgenthau and how has Structural Realism so successfully usurped the classical realist influence.

To begin with, what does Waltz make of theory construction? According to Waltz, ‘a theory is a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity. A theory is a depiction of the organization of a
domain and of the connection among its parts... The infinite materials of any realm can be organized in endlessly different ways. A theory indicates that some factors are more important than others and specifies relations among them. In reality, everything is related to everything else, and one domain cannot be separated from others. Like Morgenthau, Waltz is willing to concede that all of theory building involves some form of reductionism as well as abstraction. Regarding the functions of theory, Waltz observes that ‘[t]heory isolates one realm from all others in order to deal with it intellectually. To isolate a realm is a precondition to developing a theory that will explain what goes on within it.’ He adds ‘[t]heories are combinations of descriptive and theoretical statements. The theoretical statements are nonfactual elements of a theory. They are introduced only when they make explanation possible. The worth of a theoretical notion is judged by the usefulness of the theory of which it is a part.’

The fundamental criticism Waltz advances against Morgenthau’s classical realist approach is that it ‘…confused the problem of explaining foreign policy with the problem of developing a theory of international politics.’ Further, Waltz rejects the view that power needs to be viewed as an end in itself. He argues that ‘...the ultimate concern of states is not for power but security.’ What one may recognize as the strengths of classical realism is treated as inadequacies in the neorealist account of the world. Waltz for instance is critical of Morgenthau’s willingness to acknowledge the role of the contingent element in politics. This amounted in his view to a ‘dampen[ing] of his theoretical ambition.’

How does one encapsulate the basic worldview of neorealism? According to Waltz, ‘[f]rom the vantage point of neorealist theory, competition and conflict among states stem directly from the twin facts of life under conditions of anarchy: States in an anarchic order must provide for their own security, and threats or seeming threats to their security abound. Preoccupation with identifying dangers and counteracting them becomes a way of life. Relations remain tense; the actors are usually suspicious and often hostile even though by nature they may not be given to suspicion and hostility. Individually, states may only be doing what they can to bolster their security. Their individual intention aside, collectively their actions yields arms races and alliances.’ Further ‘[n]eorealist theory ...shows that it is not necessary to assume an innate lust for power in order to account for the sometimes fierce competition that marks the international arena. In an
anarchic domain, a state of war exists if all parties lust for power. But so too will a state of war exist if all states seek only to ensure their own safety."  

It is useful to have a firm sense of the central premises and overarching preoccupations of structural realists in order to subsequently account for their receptivity or lack of it to non-traditional approaches to security. While I do not go into the nuts and bolts of how a structural realist would react to specific non-traditional security issues my interest here is confined to the overall position they assign to non-traditional security concerns in their scheme of things.

Waltz treats structure as an ingredient of the international system. While the structure ‘...makes it possible to think of the system as a whole’ what also remains pertinent is that the structure is further composed of units namely states. Articulating a distinctly positional account of international politics, Waltz suggests that ‘[t]o define a structure requires ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another (how they are arranged or positioned).’  

It is the system that determines how units come to be arranged. Thus only changes in arrangements would in his view constitute structural changes.

Waltz further evolves three criteria by which to evaluate the workings of the international system. The first is to assess what the ordering principle of politics is. He posits hierarchy as the ordering principle in the domestic domain while identifying anarchy as the distinguishing criteria of the international system. This is a move that has serious implication for the way in which Structural Realists conceive of international politics more generally. Waltz writes in this context ‘[i]nternational politics is more nearly a realm in which anything goes. International politics is structurally similar to the market economy insofar as the self-help principle is allowed to operate in the latter.’

The second distinguishing element is the ‘character of units’. According to Waltz in terms of predisposition all states are ‘like units.’ They all seek to ensure their survival and adopt means best suited to this objective. Structural realists assign an unparalleled place to states as political units and view international politics through the lens of the state. While recognizing inequity as an evident state of affairs in international politics they argue that ‘[s]o long as the major states are the major actors, the structure of international politics is defined in
terms of them." Further '[s]tates set the scene in which they, ... choose
to interfere little in the affairs of nonstate actors for long periods of
time, states nevertheless set the terms of intercourse, whether passively
permitting informal rules to develop or by actively intervening to change
rules that no longer suit them. When the crunch comes states remake
the rules by which other actors operate.'

To illustrate state endurance, Waltz points out that '...one may be struck by the ability of weak states
to impede the operation of strong international corporations and by the
attention the latter pay to the wishes of the former.'

Waltz also does not envisage non-state actors dislodging state centrality in the near
future. Thus while admitting to a ‘functional similarity of states’, Waltz
operates with a strict sense of the sovereign as well. He observes '[t]o
say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will
cope with its internal and external problems, including whether or not
to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its freedom by
making commitments to them. States develop their own strategies, chart
their own courses, make their own decisions about how to meet
whatever needs they experience and whatever desires they develop.
It is no more contradictory to say that sovereign states are always
constrained and often tightly so than it is to say that free individuals
often make decisions under the heavy pressure of events.'

A third though vital facet of the Structural Realist universe is the
attention bestowed on 'distribution of capabilities.' According to Waltz,
'[t]he structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of
capabilities across the system’s units.' By capabilities, Waltz has in
mind both strategic and economic capabilities. What however ultimately
matters will be the ‘combined capabilities’ of states. The United States
stands at the top of the pyramid of capabilities because it is preponderant
given its overall combination or strength of these resources.

Given this set of understandings regarding the international system,
how would Structural Realists assess non-traditional approaches to
security? It is not hard to discern the suspicion with which most
neorealists approach non-traditional security concerns. The primacy
accorded to state security provides the initial ground for skepticism
with regard to any effort to shift the referent of security.

The archetypal representation of the Structural Realist case for a narrow
Security Studies construct is the work of Stephen Walt. Walt noted that
the first generation of security studies scholars was clear in its
recognition that ‘...military power is the central focus of the field.'
He also remains extremely wary of more recent efforts by non-
traditional security analysts to widen the notion of security. He argues
that any such effort is going to sharply challenge the ‘intellectual
coherence’ of the field and further that ‘...it would be irresponsible for
the security studies community to ignore the central questions that form
the heart of the security studies field.’

The central questions however in the neorealist frame are always going
to be animated by state security. Does this imply that attempts to
introduce human security and factor in the environment and economic
concerns are going to be rebuked by structural realists? In terms of
dominant inclinations it is not hard to register disbelief among realists
that these concerns merit serious attention almost parallel to that
assigned to state security. After the formal end of the Cold War,
neorealists were in a mood to rethink some of the assumptions that
were treated as certitudes in the past. However, while the environment,
human rights, guarantee of political and civil liberties have become
rather mainstream in some respects, realists would be rather wary of
allowing them to be part of the same conversation as state security.
These concerns they would argue have a rather different resonance
from military and external threats to national security, however defined.

Walt in almost complete condescension of non-traditional security
discourse observes that ‘...issues of war and peace are too important
for the field to be diverted into a prolix of self-indulgent discourse that
is divorced from the real world.’ The maximum space a realist of this
hue is willing to concede is ‘...research on alternative grand strategies.’

How would non-traditional security position itself be taken seriously
by the political mainstream in International Relations? It is rather clear
that the state in the realist idiom has to be taken very seriously by
scholars working on non-traditional security. While constantly invoking
new normative ground non-traditional security analysts may have to
demonstrate to realists how these concerns are likely to impact the
state both in the short and long run. There is considerable thought that
must go into these issues specifically from within the South Asian
context. Considering the postcolonial state in South Asia is rather
powerful in terms of its sway over the public imagination, civil society
too does not really have an autonomous existence.

Any gesture to incorporate non-traditional security approaches in
mainstream International Relations will be faced by the pessimism of
realism. Realists are apprehensive of the prospects of human progress and argue that power will remain an endemic interest in all politics. It is hard to fathom human security concerns receiving more than rhetorical short shrift from realists in International Relations. They are likely to be far more obsessed with major power ambitions and would be interested in the bearings of economic forces on military ‘high politics’.

There are two relevant illustrations of the realist focus that may serve to remind us what elements are seen as important from this perspective. A standard realist defence progresses on the following lines:

Let me begin with the assumption that states seek a high measure of security. This is not to claim that security is unambiguous or that it is the only value. Indeed, rather than pay the price of destruction in war, states have surrendered in the hope of regaining their autonomy later (partly through the effort of others). They have also peacefully (and not so peacefully) submerged their political units into those of others or joined together to form larger units in the belief that doing so would better serve a variety of political, social and ideological goals. But if security is rarely the only one objective, even more rarely can it be ignored. Of course security has been defined differently by different actors, and the routes to it can be multiple and contested, but the desire for security is the bedrock explanation for why international politics exists at all. That is though, it is easy to take for granted the fact that no unit has come to dominate the entire international system, this outcome needs to be explained. The desire for security, coupled with the knowledge that one’s current allies may be one’s adversaries in the future and that the current adversaries may provide future support generates many of the constraints that maintain the international system because self-protection dictates that states do not want their allies excessively aggrandized or their adversaries excessively diminished.55

States are viewed by realists as more or less permanent fixtures unlikely to be displaced by the vagaries of time. Jervis asserts that ‘[t]he state has proven remarkably resilient in the face of multiple social forces and the insistence of scholars that its importance is rapidly waning. ...Of course, the fact that previous obituaries of the state were premature does not mean that they are not warranted now.’56 The most realists are willing to concede is to examine how decision-makers at the helm
of affairs make their decisions. In a somewhat more critical vein, Jervis points out that

> arguing that states are the central actors does not tell us which interests and policies they pursue. The question looms particularly large in the security field: even though it may be true that all states want a high measure of security, some strive for other goals, especially expansion of various kinds, in addition to or even at the expense of security. Furthermore, even if security is the prime objective, this does not tell us – or statesmen – what behaviour will reach it. For example, belligerent policies are likely to decrease rather than increase the state security when other states are satisfied with the status quo; conciliatory policies, effective under those circumstances, will decrease the state’s security if others are striving to expand. This would not be a problem if statesmen could tell whether others were – or will become expansionist. But they cannot, in part, because realism and other theories of foreign policy offer insufficient guidelines on this score. It is therefore not surprising that students of security policy have been quick to see that realism needs to be supplemented by an understanding of the ideas that decision makers use to guide them to their goals.157

While classical realists like Morgenthau were willing to concede normative space to moral issues their advice was ‘that ethical and political behavior will fail unless it takes into account the actual practice of states and the teachings of sound theory.’ Neorealism is far more dismissive of the ethical/moral trope and does not engage in any serious fashion with that terrain at all and concentrates on the ‘distribution of capabilities’ and resultant positioning strategies adopted by their states.

Structural Realists are not however without their critics. Even within realism one may account for internal differences. Mohammed Ayoob brings to bear what he refers to as a subaltern realist perspective in order to explain the security dilemmas of the third world. He however also continues to privilege state security as a value in itself. He observes ‘[b]ecause it is the state that is (or, where it is not, is supposed to be) engaged in the authoritative allocation of social values within territorially defined political and administrative entities, it becomes the primary referent of security in my definition.158 Of particular relevance to our project of understanding how non-traditional security figures in this narrative we need to observe what the representative realist voices perceive. Ayoob writes.
The definition of security advocated here is therefore explicitly political in character. So defined, the concept of security must be used in the relatively restricted sense of applying to the security of the state – both in terms of its territory and its institutions – and of those who profess to represent the state territorially and institutionally. In other words, security or insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities, both internal and external, that threaten to, or have the potential to, bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional and regimes. According to this definition, the more a state and/or regime – and often it is very difficult to disentangle issues of state security from those of regime security in the Third World where most states in the system are located – falls toward the invulnerable end of the vulnerable invulnerable continuum the more secure it/they will be. Other types of vulnerability, whether economic or ecological, become integral components of our definition of security only if they become acute enough, to take on overtly political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions or regime survival. In other words, debt burdens, rainforest decimation, or even famine do not become part of the security calculus for our purposes unless they threaten to have political outcomes – as they may in certain instance – that either effect the survivability of state boundaries, state institutions, or governing elites or dramatically weaken the capacity of states and regimes to act effectively in the realm of politics, both domestic and international.  

Why do all realists see state security as essential? They argue ‘...that without the provision of political order by the state every other form of security is likely to remain elusive, or at best, ephemeral.’ While one may concede the importance of this we must guard against being fixated on this notion alone.

Realism has also often been criticized for its ethnocentric provenance concerned largely with great powers often to the neglect of middle and smaller powers according to Waltzian logic. Carlos Escudé also points out that “[m]ainstream International Relations Theory looks at international order and disorder exclusively from the perspective of the ‘leading states,’ thereby ignoring many essential factors. Peripheral states must be included in theory-building efforts that focus on the world order. This will not strengthen general theory but it will also lead to the formulation of a subset of concepts, explanatory hypotheses,
and normative judgments specifically applicable to peripheral states, that is, states relatively devoid of power resources. I call these subsets ‘peripheral theory’ although it should be noted that I see them as falling under the ‘umbrella’ of general theory.” Escudé also rejects Waltz’s claims ‘...that there is no functional differentiation of states.’

**Conclusion**

If one were to answer the question as to how realism views non-traditional approaches to security we could argue that on the whole realism remains skeptical of their claim to be treated on the same normative platform as seriously as state security. Realists are extremely wary as a theoretical collective to shift the referent of security from the state to the people and remain committed to an analysis of state behaviour in terms of strategic capabilities and choices that present themselves to states based on their location in the international system. Their interest in non-traditional security concerns would increase only if it has a direct bearing on state security. Despite internal differences about the validity of various strands of realism the consensus seems to be against a widening of the concept of security and a commitment to traditional ways of perceiving the international system and the aspirations of the major actors primarily through the lens of the state. As Escudé succinctly remarks, ‘[T]he attribution of an anarchic structure to that order is an important conceptual error that peripheral realism tries to correct.’ Perennial suspicion of the motives of other states in an anarchic environment in mainstream realism prevents any serious elevation of non-traditional security concerns as equally critical to the lives of the people residing within these states.
The Liberal Project and Non-Traditional Security

An important strand of International Relations theory is Liberalism. The intent of this Chapter is to explicate the main tenets of liberalism and examine how this relates to their conceptualization of non-traditional security. I would like to argue that certain incarnations of liberalism (especially its Kantian variant) are well disposed to identifying and developing non-traditional approaches to security. Political liberalism manifests as liberal democracy and economic liberalism manifest as capitalism have a long and influential lineage and continue to dominate political preferences in the contemporary world. This makes it important for us to understand why liberalism tends to cast security in a particular idiom.

Liberal International Relations Theory

According to Michael W. Doyle it is not easy to identify a simple ‘canon’ in the context of liberalism. When we think of liberal commitments we rightly assume a preference for upholding the right to private property, respect for the autonomy of an individual, a privileging of language of rights translating into an emphasis on political and civil liberties and a respect for equity as a public value. These liberal values have not come about naturally but as a result of concerted struggles over a number of centuries. Liberalism itself has a troubled history and continues to be subject to several critiques. It has been seen as complicit with imperialism in the past and its espousal of universal values generates a great deal of skepticism particularly in the post-colonial world. However, we need to stress that liberalism also does not represent a single monolith but has had several incarnations. These distinctions are worthy of our attention if we are to ascertain from which prior strand contemporary liberal claims derive their intellectual lineage as well as inspiration every so often.

Doyle makes a distinction between Liberal Pacifism, Liberal Imperialism and Liberal Internationalism. Liberal Pacifism is most closely associated with the work of Joseph Schumpeter. The main contention of liberal pacifists is that ‘[d]emocratic capitalism leads to peace.’ Schumpeter’s thesis is an influential one, although it has been
subject to empirical scrutiny and does not necessarily hold true in all cases. Schumpeter builds his argument on the premise that capitalist’s value free trade and would not like to resort to collective violence that disrupts conditions facilitating free trade.

This is an argument that resurfaces persistently in contemporary liberal discourse. An influential body of liberal theory asserts that increasing economic interdependence between states diminishes the possibility of conflict. Even in the South Asian context, a similar argument has been bandied around in the context of regional cooperation especially between states known for their history of rivalry, India and Pakistan. A non-traditional analyst of security could envisage a useful resource in Schumpeter without being oblivious of the historical shortcomings of his work. The privileging of the economic dimension over the purely military is likely to be welcomed. Such an emphasis does not derogate from a state’s minimalist focus on military security. However, Schumpeterians are unlikely to endorse huge military spending, as this would be a sheer folly from their perspective assuming the unlikelihood of war between states. State energies are better concentrated in building economic ties with neighbors and potential adversaries and concentrating on lowering barriers to free trade rather than reproducing military anxieties. Schumpeter’s drift of argument is not without its critics. Doyle captures these disagreements eloquently:

[the discrepancy between the warlike history of liberal states and Schumpeter’s pacifistic expectations highlights three extreme assumptions. First, his ‘materialistic monism’ leaves little room for noneconomic objectives, whether espoused by states or individuals. Second, and relatedly, the same is true for his states. The political life of individuals seems to have been homogenized at the same time, as individuals were rationalized, individualized, and democratized. Third, like domestic politics, world politics are homogenized. Materially monistic and democratically capitalist, all states evolve toward free trade and liberty together. Countries differently constituted seem to disappear from Schumpeter’s analysis. ‘Civilized’ nations govern ‘culturally backward’ regions.]

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The intellectual lineage of liberal imperialism is attributed to Niccolo Machiavelli. To many the name rings a strong realist provenance but Doyle places him in the liberal mould given his stated preference for a
republican form of government though informed by expansionist zeal. In terms again harking back to traditional realism, Doyle summarizes the Machiavellian worldview: ‘We seek to rule or, at least, to avoid being oppressed. In either case, we want more of ourselves and our states than just material welfare (materialistic monism). Because other states with similar aims thereby threaten us, we prepare ourselves for expansion. Because our fellow citizens threaten us if we do not allow them either to satisfy their ambition or to release their political energies through imperial expansion, we expand.’

Machiavelli according to Doyle argues that there is an imperative to expansionism in the interests of curbing both competitive advantage to external states and internal dissension within, due to perceived inadequacies in political strength. The expansionist zeal is in some contrast to the earlier Schumpeterian variant of liberalism. Machiavelli’s liberal argument is unlikely to find universal agreement even among liberals today. While the search for markets is a constant one, imperial projects of the earlier age would today be strongly resisted and normatively unpalatable. No liberal state can voice its expansionism in terms of an imperial yearning for territory and conquest. However, Machiavelli may have gestured to what implicitly conditions contemporary liberal endeavors as well. Historically, liberal imperialism has been borne out by reality in the case of Rome and Athens during the period of Thucydides. Some may argue that American unilateralism both in the past and in the present smacks of a similar imperial character that Machiavelli was alluding to many years ago.

Probably the best-known inflection in liberal thought is represented by the legacy of Immanuel Kant. His liberal cosmopolitanism still frequently informs contemporary conversations on world politics. Deriving from Kant, it has been argued that liberal democracies do not go to war with each other. This has not however been the case in their encounter with non-liberal democracies. Thus the notion of a ‘separate peace’ among liberal powers holds sway even today.

Kant is an important thinker and recent work on non-traditional security also draws from his legacy. Perhaps most important from this perspective is Kant’s idea of ‘perpetual peace.’ What does this really imply?
Perpetual peace, for Kant, is an epistemology, a condition for ethical action, and most importantly, an explanation of how the ‘mechanical process of nature visibly exhibits the purposive plan of producing concord among men, even against their will and indeed by means of their very discord’...Understanding history requires an epistemological foundation, for without a teleology, such as the promise of perpetual peace, the complexity of history would overwhelm human understanding. ...Perpetual peace, however, is not merely a heuristic device with which to interpret history. It is guaranteed, Kant explains in the ‘First Addition’ to *Perpetual Peace*... to result from men fulfilling their ethical duty because it is only under conditions of peace that all men can treat each other as ends, rather than means to an end...\(^72\)

The emphasis on human beings as ends and not merely means in the economic value chain of production has generated considerable interest best reflected in the work of Amartya Sen.\(^73\) The UNDP Human Development Reports are a tribute to this idea that Kant is associated with.\(^74\) In a sense therefore Kant becomes a natural ally normatively to those keen to document non-traditional approaches to security. His concern for peace and his liberal cosmopolitan outlook only endear him further to this constituency.

The choice therefore even within the liberal continuum is between the strands outlined earlier in this chapter. To make the choice particularly stark liberals can choose between endorsing the Machiavellian macho liberalism that advocates expansionism or express their support for Kant’s quest for ‘perpetual peace’. The complicity of liberalism with imperialism at a particular juncture in our history has not been easy to erase from our memories. Do imperial projects continue to still have a lease of life? Perhaps it is crucial for us to appreciate that ‘[p]reserving the legacy of the liberal peace without succumbing to the legacy of liberal imprudence is both a moral and strategic challenge.’\(^75\)

Another liberal twist in the tale in more contemporary international theory considerations was the ‘complex interdependence’ theory propounded by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. What was at stake was the construction of an ‘ideal type’ distinct from the realism that had preceded it. The following assumptions marked complex interdependence:
1. *Multiple channels* connect societies, including informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among non-governmental elites (face to face through tele-communications); and transnational organizations (such as multinational banks or corporations). These channels can be summarized as interstate, trans-governmental, and transnational relations.

2. The agenda of interstate relationships consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy. The *absence of hierarchy among issues* means, among other things, that military security does not consistently dominate the agenda.

3. Military force is not used by governments towards other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails. It may, however, be important in these governments’ relations with governments outside the region, or on other issues. Military force could, for instance, be irrelevant to resolving disagreements on economic issues among members of an alliance, yet at the same time be very important for that alliance’s political and military relations with a rival bloc.76

This effort clearly was a bold attempt to move away from the claims of realism that had hitherto monopolized our theoretical imagination in the discipline of International Relations. To argue that military power was not all that mattered itself was a huge move given the opposition that it would encounter in the discipline. The need to investigate ‘multiple channels’ threw up a whole range of actors which claim further scrutiny. Complex interdependence theory was also keen to unravel elements of state decision-making and the non-governmental impact that was being exercised across different issue-areas. The rejection of hierarchy within issues also appears as a radical step, theoretically. Non-traditional security stands to gain particularly from this idea because it is keen to dispel the chronic obsession with military security that has gripped much of the security community. This also meant that if livelihoods were threatened due to economic or environmental reasons they would still be considered legitimate areas of ‘security’ concern in the discipline.
The central thrust of the complex interdependence theorists was to remind us that as the complexity of actors and issues in world politics increases, the utility of force declines and the line between domestic policy and foreign policy becomes blurred; as the conditions of complex interdependence are more closely approximated, the politics of agenda formation becomes more subtle and differentiated. Complex interdependence theorists were also not unaware of the ‘asymmetries’ that influenced interdependence.

Liberal theorists have laid a special emphasis on three values in particular. These are ‘freedom’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘progress’. Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew in a historical overview of the liberal project identify important trends. They argue in this context that

1. Since the late eighteenth century, liberals have believed that international relations are evolving (or probably will evolve) gradually and irregularly along lines that will promote greater human freedom conceived in terms of increases in physical security, material welfare, and opportunities for free expression and political influence (i.e. human rights).

2. International liberals believe that peace, welfare and justice are realized significantly through international cooperation, although they differ on the nature and strength of the cooperation that is likely to occur. Cooperation can include an acceptance of moral norms, adherence to international law, or collaboration through international organizations. While Kant was an important early exponent of this position, it did not become a central thesis in the thinking of the majority of all liberals until after World War I.

3. Liberals believe that peace, welfare, justice and cooperation are being driven by a number of inter-dependent forces that we view as aspects of the process of modernization. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, liberals were aware that the scientific revolution and the liberal intellectual revolution were promoting a profound transformation in international relations. Without elaborating at much length, it may be argued that freedom is essential to a conceptualization of non-traditional security. If we do regard development as a ‘widening of human choice’ implicit in it is a
notion of free choosing. Marxists are likely to disagree with liberals about the possibility of free choice as they would argue that economic and social structures already condition and constrain choice to a considerable extent. However from the liberal perspective it may be argued that ceteris paribus human beings are faced with choice under certain circumstances. Sen’s capability approach brings this out most explicitly. He argues,

[They include, of course, the basic freedoms of being able to meet bodily requirements, such as the ability to avoid starvation and undernourishment, or to escape preventable morbidity or premature mortality. They also include the enabling opportunities given by schooling, for example, or by the liberty and economic means to move freely and to choose one’s abode. There are also important ‘social’ freedoms, such as the capability to participate in the life of the community, to join in public discussion, to participate in political decision-making and even the elementary ability ‘to appear in public without shame.’ (a freedom whose importance was discussed by Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations).]

What are some of the ‘underlying assumptions’ that frame liberal thought? It is important not to misrepresent any of these as they form the core of liberalism.

Four important premises have been advanced in this context.

1. Liberal international theory’s conceptualization of progress in terms of human freedom and the importance attributed to liberal democracy, free trade, cognitive changes, communications, and moral norms all indicate that liberals regard individual human beings as the primary international actors. Liberals view states as the most important collective actors in our present era, but they are seen as pluralistic actors whose interests and policies are determined by bargaining among groups and elections.

2. Liberals view the interests of states as multiple and changing and both self-interested and other regarding … The interests of states (or priorities among interests) are viewed as changing because liberals see individuals’ values and the power relations among interest groups evolving
over time. Also, most liberals regard states’ policies as other regarding to some extent since they believe that the growth of liberal democracy increases people’s concern for other humans. These ideas can be traced back to Locke, Rousseau and Kant.

(3) Liberals believe that human and state interests are shaped by a variety of domestic and international conditions. Ultimately they are determined by bargaining power among interests groups, but these groups’ definitions of their interests are affected by a host of factors.

(4) The relative influence of patterns of interests and coercion on international outcomes evolves over time – with the impact of patterns of interests growing. In the early stages of modernization, coercion based on power relations has an important influence. But as liberal democracies, interdependencies, knowledge, inter-national social ties, and international institutions grow noncoercive bargaining and international patterns of interests have an increasing impact.81

It is important to recognize that liberals do not discount power altogether. We have already touched upon certain strands of liberalism in the previous sections. To add to this liberal repertoire we need to make mention of cognitive, sociological and institutional liberalism which are regarded as important in the contemporary context.82

Cognitive Liberalism

Liberals of this persuasion place a heavy emphasis on the role of ‘education, reason and knowledge’ in the shaping of the political process. Mention may be made in this context of ‘Enlightenment liberalism’ that was responsible for the privileging of human reason in the establishment of a modern world.83 While Mitrany’s work is in this vein, more recent work by Peter Haas on epistemic communities is also informed by a similar belief system. Epistemic community scholarship has focused on the influence of knowledge-based communities in influencing policy in specific issue-areas. Thus the role of international physicians and lawyers in bringing about a legal opinion on the question of nuclear threat or use would qualify as a valid research design in this framework. Zacher and Mathew retain an
element of skepticism with regard to scholarship tracking cognitive liberalism. They observe ‘[h]ow reason, learning, and knowledge may shape the values and interests of actors, change priorities, conduce toward cooperative solutions, and ultimately affect the nature of international relations is an area that is intuitively persuasive but highly elusive as a scholarly enterprise.’

Sociological Liberalism

This strand is concerned with aspects of international and national society that have a bearing on international politics. Of particular interest would be the communications, organizational linkages and patterns of cultural homogeneity that have a wide impact. The work of Karl Deutsch, Burton, Rosenau, Willets and Taylor has been identified with this stance. Zacher and Mathew retain their skepticism with regard to this liberal inflection as well. They point out that ‘[t]he growth in international communications and transnational actors, the rising interest in the impact of cultural patterns, and the globalization of business and industry are trends that are likely to make the concerns of sociological liberals important areas for future research. However, since changes in these factors tend to be gradual and their influence difficult to discern, research on sociological integration is not likely to have the dramatic impact on academic thinking that research on some of the other strands will.’

Institutional Liberalism

Institutions matter to a large extent in the liberal framework. It is perhaps important to clarify what the term means to liberals. An ‘...institution may refer to a general pattern or categorization of activity or to a particular human constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized.’ The liberal interest in institutions stems from the accent they place on cooperation. There is a consensus among liberals of this strand that ‘[i]nstitutions enhance cooperation by improving the quality of information, reducing transaction costs, facilitating trade-offs among issue-areas, facilitating enforcement of accords, and enhancing states ethical concerns.’

A great deal of recent liberal attention has been invested on the concept of regimes in particular. ‘International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area.’ A distinction we need
to bear in mind with regard to the institutional literature is the distinction that is now being maintained between rationalist and reflectivist perspectives. Robert Keohane succinctly captures some of this tension:

Rationalistic research on international institutions focuses almost entirely on specific institutions. It emphasizes international regimes and formal international organizations. Since this research program is rooted in exchange theory, it assumes scarcity and competition as well as rationality on the part of the actors. It therefore begins with the premise that if there were no potential gains from agreements to be captured in world politics – that is, if no agreements among actors could be mutually beneficial – there would be no need for specific international institutions.

In contrast, reflectivists argue,

[i]nternational institutions are not created de novo any more than are economic institutions. On the contrary, they emerge from prior institutionalized contexts, the most fundamental of which cannot be explained as if they were contracts among rational individual maximizing some utility function. These fundamental practices seem to reflect historically distinctive combinations of material circumstances, social patterns of thought, and individual initiative-combinations which reflect conjunctures rather than deterministic outcomes, and which are themselves shaped over time by path dependent processes.

To reiterate, if one were to put together an inventory of the basic premises of liberalism it would include the following:

1. Human nature is essentially ‘good’ or altruistic and people are therefore capable of mutual aid and collaboration.

2. The fundamental human concern for the welfare of others makes progress possible (that is, the Enlightenment’s faith in the possibility of improving civilization was reaffirmed).

3. Bad human behavior is the product not of evil people but of evil institutions and structural arrangements that motivate people to act selfishly and harm others – including making war.

4. War is not inevitable and its frequency can be reduced by eradicating the anarchical conditions that encourage it.
5. War and injustice are international problems that require collective or multilateral rather than national efforts to eliminate them.

6. International society must reorganize itself institutionally to eliminate the anarchy that makes problems such as war likely.

7. This goal is realistic because history suggests that global change and cooperation are not only possible but empirically pervasive.91

Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons raise some fundamental questions concerning recent liberal forays in accounting for institutional politics. They notice for instance that ‘...scholars today are turning once again to models of domestic politics to suggest new questions and approaches to the study of international institutions.’92 This is also not an arena beyond normative scrutiny. In fact ‘[n]ormative questions also rise to the top of the agenda once we recognize the lock-in role of institutions. If they do in fact solidify a position of cooperation preferred by the most powerful, we should question the ethical status of institutions, turning our attention to equity, as well as efficiency, questions.’93 It is evident that still a glaring lacunae remains. This has ‘...been its intense focus on proving that institutions matter, without sufficient attention to constructing well-delineated causal mechanisms or explaining variation in institutional effects.’94

**Non-Traditional Security and Liberalism**

Liberal underpinnings inform a considerable extent of non-traditional security literature. Although expressing disagreement with the skewed focus of neoliberalism the work of Mahbub-ul-Haq and Amartya Sen speaks to certain universal liberal values. The core premise on which human development reports have been built has been the individual at the center of intellectual attention. As Haq himself notes:

- Development must put people at the center of its concerns.
- The purpose of development is to enlarge all human choices, not just income.
- The human development paradigm is concerned both with building up human capabilities (through investment in people) and with using those human capabilities fully (through an enabling framework for growth and employment).
Human development has four essential pillars: equality, sustainability, productivity and empowerment. It regards economic growth as essential but emphasizes the need to pay attention to its quality and distribution, analyses at length its link with human lives and questions its long-term sustainability.

The human development paradigm defines the ends of development and analyses sensible options for achieving them.95

What is the underlying philosophy of the human development approach? ‘It is fair to say that the human development paradigm is the most holistic development model that exists today. It embraces every development issue, including economic growth, social investment, people’s empowerment, provision of basic needs and social safety nets, political and cultural freedoms and all other aspects of people’s lives. It is neither narrowly technocratic nor overly philosophical. It is a practical reflection of life itself.’96

Building on the notion of human agency, Sen develops a capability approach that has a vision of a liberal order. Sen writes ‘Human beings are the agents, beneficiaries and adjudicators of progress, but they also happen to be directly or indirectly—the primary means of all production.’97

It is important to acquire a clear grasp of Sen’s worldview. He argues that ‘[a] functioning is an achievement of a person; what he or she manages to do or to be, and any such functioning reflects, as it were, a part of the state and of that person. The capability of a person is a derived notion. It reflects the curious combination of functionings (doings and beings) he or she can achieve.’98

A useful dimension that is introduced in this context is that of gender inequalities. Sen writes,

[f]or example, despite the fact when men and women are treated reasonably equally in terms of food and health care (as they tend to be in richer countries, even though gender biases may remain in other-less elementary – fields), women seem to have a greater ability to survive than men, in the bulk of the developing economies, men outnumber women by large margins. While the ratio of females to males in Europe and North America tends to be about 1.06 or so that ratio is below 0.95 for the Middle East
(including countries in Western Asia and North Africa), South Asia (including India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) and China. While disagreeing in part with another well-known liberal voice John Rawls, Sen nevertheless is greatly appreciative of his work. He observes in this context:

Rawls is much concerned that the fact that different people have different ends must not be lost in the evaluative process, and people should have the freedom to pursue their respective ends. This concern is indeed important, and the capability approach is also much involved with valuing freedom as such. In fact, it can be argued that the capability approach gives a better account of the freedoms actually enjoyed by different people than can be obtained from looking merely at the holdings of primary goods. Primary goods are means to freedoms, whereas capabilities are expressions of freedoms themselves.

A consistent liberal project has been to evolve cross-cultural indices to evaluate various aspects of human endeavor. Martha Nussbaum, whose work partakes of Sen’s capability approach although with important caveats, also argues against invoking cultural relativism for jettisoning the worthiness of such a project. While both Sen and Nussbaum draw heavily from Aristotle, Nussbaum writes ‘Sen has focused on the role of capabilities in demarcating the space within which quality of life assessments are made; I use the idea in a more exigent way, as a foundation for basic political principles that should underwrite constitutional guarantees.’ While recognizing the ‘intellectual and political’ difficulties that cross cultural indices pose, Nussbaum believes ‘that certain universal norms of human capability should be central for political purposes in thinking about basic political principles that can provide the underpinning for a set of constitutional guarantees in all nations.’

In order to bolster her project, Nussbaum considers three kinds of criticisms that are leveled against the universalist liberal conception. She begins with the culturalists and rejects a full blown relativism. Nussbaum observes ‘[a]s a normative thesis about how we should make moral judgments relativism has several problems. First, it has no bite in the modern world, where the ideas of every culture turn up inside every other, through the internet and media. The ideas of feminism, of democracy, of egalitarian welfare, are now ‘inside’ every known society.'
Many forms of moral relativism, especially those deriving from the cultural anthropology of a previous era, use an unrealistic notion of culture. They imagine homogeneity where there is really diversity, agreement or submission where there is really contestation.  

The second criticism that is advanced is referred to as the ‘argument from the good of diversity.’ According to this strand, ‘...our world is rich in part because we don’t all agree on a single set of categories but speak many different languages of value.’ Nussbaum here asserts that ‘...the argument gives us good reasons to preserve types of diversity that are compatible with human dignity and other basic values; but it does not undermine and even supports our search for a general universal framework of critical assessment.’

The third line of criticism she addresses against such a universalist thrust is the ‘argument from paternalism.’ Those who are committed to this position argue that ‘[p]eople are the best judges of what is good for them, and if we prevent people from acting on their own choices, we treat them like children.’ Nussbaum takes issue with Veena Das on the question of cultural exceptionalism. Das advances her argument from an anthropologically informed cultural relativist standpoint arguing that a section of women in India do not necessarily approximate the Western woman’s notion of individual interests when it comes to the consumption of food and in contrast peg their notion of satiation in relation to how the entire family’s food requirements are met. Nussbaum seeks to refute this argument from a liberal universalist standpoint that does not recognize an inability to factor in individual interests prior to that of the collective social unit – in this instance, the family.

The notion of human security is an integral component of human development as envisaged by its original advocates. What are some of the principal dimensions of the human security project?

These include:

- New concepts of human security that stress the security of people, not only of nations.
- New strategies of sustainable human development that weave development around people, not people around development.
- New partnerships between the state and the market, to combine market efficiency with social compassion.
New patterns of national and global governance, to accommodate the rising tide of democracy and the steady decline of the nation-state.

New forms of international cooperation, to focus assistance directly on the needs of the people rather than only on the preferences of governments.\textsuperscript{108}

We've already mentioned Kant while discussing the liberal inheritance. It has been argued that ‘[a]t base, human security is a manifestation of Kantian internationalism and cosmopolitanism that is unsatisfied – not \textit{dissatisfied} but \textit{unsatisfied} with a traditional interpretation of power politics.’\textsuperscript{109}

While the liberal worldview foregrounds human security, this is not to suggest that those committed to the human development perspective accept all the central claims of the neoliberals. In terms of similarities it may be mentioned that ‘individual choice’ is safeguarded in both perspectives. The fact remains that ‘[b]oth human development and neo-liberalism emphasize the need for human rights and for a democratic state as key elements of governance. But neo-liberalism tends to propound a minimal state while human development stresses the importance of a core of state functions.’\textsuperscript{110}

However there remain more glaring differences in approach as well. ‘The most fundamental difference between the human development and the neo-liberal approaches is one of underlying philosophy. Human development rests on the foundations of capabilities and functionings, while neo-liberalism is based on the utility approach to well-being.’\textsuperscript{111} The former prides itself of a truly interdisciplinary perspective while the latter belongs to the economics orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{112}

The emphasis on human rights in the human development paradigm may also be viewed as a dimension of its basic liberal predisposition. The Canadian approach to human security also shares a similar commitment of placing the individual as the chief referent of human security.

The recent UNDP report of 2004 which talks at length of multiculturalism yet again partakes of a discourse that has animated the liberal thought process in recent years. It factors the existence of cultural liberties as an integral dimension of human development. It observes ‘Human development requires more than health, education,
a decent standard of living and political freedom. People’s cultural identities must be recognized and accommodated by the state, and people must be free to express their identities without being discriminated against in other aspects of their lives. In short, cultural liberty is a human right and an important aspect of human development – and thus worthy of state action and attention."113 This is closely allied to a notion of democracy as well. As the UNDP report states, ‘[w]hat is important from the human development perspective is to expand human freedoms and human rights – and to recognize equality. Secular and democratic states are most likely to achieve these goals where the state provides reasonable accommodation of religious practices, where all religions have the same relation to the state and where the state protects human rights.’114

Conclusion

My intent in this account has been to show that liberalism and non-traditional security approaches share a lot of common ground. Liberalism would be fairly receptive to a project of non-traditional security that at base mirrors the liberal worldview. The emphasis on freedom, rights, choice, placing the individual at the center of analysis and an affirmation of democracy are liberal values. There is however a distinction we may maintain between liberalism generally and a more recent neoliberalism that is built on rational choice methods of measurement and concentrates on utility evaluations. They both share a debt to the ‘liberal economic tradition.’ 115 However, the human development perspective is viewed as more inclusive. Richard Jolly observes, ‘[t]he power of the human development paradigm is that it focuses on fundamentals and explores subjects often neglected by the neo-liberal paradigm. These include the non-economic factors, the issues beyond the market such as intra-household income distribution and gender inequalities, the human concerns of the aged and the socialization of young children. All these are important in recognizing human values and strengthening human capabilities. However, they do not fit easily or reasonably into the neo-liberal worldview, with its insistence on maximizing returns and ensuring market efficiency.’116 Thus while the liberal project has a lot to offer in terms of normative support to non-traditional security approaches it also needs to be evaluated critically for its historic inclusions and exclusions.
The Copenhagen Innovation in Security Studies

A Conceptual Study

An interesting conceptual effort in the sub-field of security studies greeted scholars in International Relations close to a decade after the end of the Cold War. Seeking to build on the political space opened up with systemic transformations under way; the Copenhagen Research Group sought to widen the concept of security. I am referring here specifically to the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde in a jointly co-edited effort titled ‘Security: A New Framework for Analysis.’

My primary intent in this chapter is to explicate the fundamental goals of this newly inaugurated conceptual project of securitization and desecuritization in security studies. In the process, I examine the principal theoretical ally (Constructivism) in International Relations sympathetic to such a project, and pursue some of the implications of this conceptual literature in the South Asian instance. The relationship between the state and civil society and the response existential threats warrant in South Asia are briefly evaluated in the context of the predominant inclinations of the Copenhagen Research Group.

Rethinking Security Studies

Conventional treatments of security are often fixated upon the military factor in most assessments. A cursory glance into the literature spawned by the field of strategic studies during the Cold War will reveal the elaborate military bean counting that dominated thinking in the discipline. Security was viewed largely as an issue of military force to be resolved in terms of an objective assessment of strategic capabilities. Undoubtedly, the theoretical rationale for such a widely employed epistemology lay in Waltzian structural or neo-realism. Traditionalists like Stephen Walt argued that security needed to be viewed as ‘the study of threat, use and control of military force.’

The Copenhagen Research Group positions its study as a critique of this dominant approach to security. It consciously seeks to make more
inclusive the content of security and view it as ‘...a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues.’\(^{121}\) In terms of a lineage, the exponents of this group are honest to acknowledge the efforts of several critics of this traditional approach during and after the end of the Cold War. While supportive of such efforts, the Copenhagen Research Group sought to address the charge of ‘intellectual incoherence’ that often was advanced against any such attempt in the past.\(^{122}\) What clearly emerges from a close reading of the literature is a desire to retain a part of the original traditional core of security while simultaneously making a gesture to widen our ambit of understanding with regard to what may be treated as a legitimate security concern. How successful this resolution was is a matter of debate. However, what cannot be denied is the emergence of an interesting effort to offer a way out of the disciplinary impasse that seemed insurmountable in the past.

Of principal analytical concern in the project was a distinction erected between the concepts of politicization and securitization. While I deal ahead in the chapter at some length with what the processes of securitization and desecuritization entail and how they differ from politicization, at this point in our inquiry, I concentrate on the theoretical moves made to arrive at a more inclusive understanding of security. The Copenhagen Research Group observes in this context that their principal quest remained first, ‘how to identify, what is and what is not a security issue’ and secondly ‘how to identify and distinguish security actors and referent objects.’\(^{123}\) The intent of this effort was to dispel misgivings articulated earlier by traditionalists that attempts to develop more inclusive notions of security eventually culminated in ‘...voiding the security concept of any meaning.’\(^{124}\) Buzan, Waever and Jaap are keen to impress upon us that ‘...securitization studies aim to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions (i.e. what explains when securitization is successful).’\(^{125}\)

The authors of the Copenhagen approach to security studies also wrestle with the ‘level of analysis’ question that plagues all theoretical efforts in the discipline of International Relations. While acknowledging the significance of identifying the relevant level of analysis for their study, Buzan, Waever and Jaap privilege a sectoral approach to the study of security and argue that ‘levels are simply ontological referents for where
things happen rather than sources of explanation in themselves. 126 They evince a strong interest in the regional dynamics of security built on a premise that the post-Cold War setting assumes a far 'more regionalized character' than was the reality prior to this. 127

Another facet with regard to the fundamental goals of this approach to security is to advance a relational perspective in International Relations. What this translates to in terms of the Copenhagen project is to ascertain ‘...in the process of securitization, ...for whom security becomes a consideration in relation to whom.’ 128

Advocates of a more inclusive notion of security do not wish to sidestep the question of the political future with regard to their project. They normatively align themselves with those willing to treat non-conventional threats more seriously and recognize that ‘...the criterion for answering the levels question is ultimately political.’ 129 From this perspective attention needs to be bestowed on ‘...what constellation of actors forms on [an] issue.’ 130 It is explicitly political in its effort to dislodge simple ‘objective’ claims of the ‘dominant discourse’ and is keen to keep ‘...open the possibility of problematizing both actual securitization and the absence of securitization.’ 131 Further, it also privileges a social rather than technical approach to understanding security. They emphatically assert in this context that ‘...the ultimate locus of securitiveness is social rather than the technical, and it is between a securitizing actor and its audience in reference to something they value.’ 132

Finally, the Copenhagen school engages the idea of constitutive social practice that leaves its imprint on security. Security in other words comes to be conceived in a certain fashion depending upon prevailing practices. They remain committed to ‘...the basic idea of security as a specific social category that arises out of, and is constituted in, political practice.’ 133

Methodological Commitments

In terms of its theoretical underpinnings, the Copenhagen school relies heavily on Social Constructivism to elucidate its methodological choices. Constructivism has been treated more as an approach to the study of international politics rather than a full-fledged theory. 134 However, it is important to state some basic assumptions and proclivities of the Constructivist school in order to better appraise the securitization literature.
The fundamental claim of Constructivism is that ‘...social relations make or construct people-ourselves-into the kind of beings we are.’\textsuperscript{135} Constructivists emphasize the ‘relational’ nature of political identity and retain a strong inclination to establish intersubjectivity. The accent on intersubjectivity is especially pertinent to the efforts of the Copenhagen school. They clearly treat ‘...security as a particular type of intersubjective politics.’\textsuperscript{136} At the outset of their project, Buzan, Waever and Jaap state their preference for ‘...an explicitly social constructivist approach to understand the process by which issues become securitized.’\textsuperscript{137}

Nicholas Onuf, Alexander Wendt and John Gerard Ruggie are among the better known exponents of the Constructivist approach. Wendt in a provocative article titled ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’ challenges some of the principal claims of neorealism and problematizes notions of anarchy and self-help.\textsuperscript{138} Drawing attention to an affinity between neorealism and neoliberalism in terms of their firm commitment to rationalism, Wendt posits Constructivism as straying from the beaten path.\textsuperscript{139} He argues that Constructivism is anchored in ‘...a cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction, rather than a rationalist-behavioral one in which they are exogenous.’\textsuperscript{140}

Constructivism also places a premium on political ‘process.’ In terms of an epistemology, ‘[a] fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them,’\textsuperscript{141} Such an understanding feeds into a critique of neorealist theory. Wendt points out that ‘[s]tates act differently towards friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not.’\textsuperscript{142} Further, Wendt while not totally discounting ‘distribution of power’ calculations nevertheless acknowledges that it is ‘distribution of knowledge that constitute their [states] conceptions of self and other.’ He treats anarchy and self-help as ‘institutions not essential features of anarchy.’\textsuperscript{143}

Constructivism is predisposed to examine the social bases of identity and interests and rejects simple neorealist axiomatic claims in this regard. It does not for instance assume a permanent ‘portfolio of interests’ with regard to states and is attentive to establishing the broader social context in which identities and interests are being played out.\textsuperscript{144} In terms of a lens to understand security, this implies that ‘social threats
are constructed, not natural.' While threats are sometimes presented as ‘objective’, Wendt argues that such a perception transpires only after a social system has been duly ‘constituted.’ The principle of sovereignty too that forms the overarching bedrock of the modern nation-state edifice is in reality ‘...an ongoing accomplishment of practice, not a once-and-for all creation of norms that somehow exists apart from practice.’ Constructivists like to lay special emphasis on the dynamic aspects of a social environment and assert ‘...that through practice agents are continuously choosing now the preferences [they] will have later.’ Constructivists like Wendt also argue that change in the international environment could be reflected in the emergence of a new ‘nascent social consensus’ but it presupposes that actors are in fairly regular touch with each other and they ‘must be dissatisfied with preexisting forms of identity and interaction.’ Change is also manifest in the recognition that ‘since actors do not have a self prior to interaction with an other; how they view the meanings and requirements of this survival … depends on the process by which conceptions of self evolve.’ This reinforces the central contention of Constructivist thinking that ‘social configurations... are intersubjective constructions.’ Thus in the ultimate analysis to Wendt a central plank of the Constructivist approach is to meticulously examine ‘...the relationship between what actors do and what they are.’

In terms of a lineage, Ruggie traces the original Constructivist inheritance to the work of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. In terms of a philosophical anchorage, Ruggie believes that ‘...constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life.’ While acknowledging that any attempt to unpack identities must take cognizance that ‘...power and interests are deeply implicated’, Ruggie argues that ‘...a core constructivist research concern is what happens before the neo-utilitarian model kicks in.’ A useful distinction in Constructivist literature also hinges on an appreciation of ‘constitutive’ as opposed to merely ‘regulative’ rules. While ‘[r]egulative rules are intended to have causal effects ...Constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up a particular class or consciously organized social activity – that is to say, they specify what counts as that activity.’

Constructivists also emphasize the role of ‘collective intentionality’ in social life and the need to arrive at a more layered historical assessment of even political structures. They are supportive of a project aimed at the ‘unbundling of territoriality’ and acknowledge agency in the desire
to tap into and help interpret the meanings and significance that actors ascribe to the collective situation in which they find themselves.” It clearly rejects positivism as a value worth supporting in theory and practice. Ruggie also makes a distinction between different strands of Constructivism. These include a Neo-Classical Constructivism (with which he affiliates with) a Post-Modern Constructivism that is far more interested in discerning hegemonic ‘regimes of truth’ and finally a Naturalistic Constructivism of the kind associated with the work of Wendt. Constructivists like Ruggie are modest in their own knowledge claims and are convinced that ‘...no approach can sustain claims to monopoly on truth.’

While there are some overlaps between the sensibilities of Constructivism and Critical Security Studies, the Copenhagen school is less willing to embrace the claims of the latter than the former. At least two fundamental distinctions are worthy of reiteration here. Critical Security Studies advocates are far more receptive to the idea of the possibility of change emerging from the background assumption that ‘...things are socially constituted.’ The Copenhagen school deriving from the Constructivist effort argues that ‘...even [the] socially constituted is often sedimented as structure and becomes so relatively stable as practice [and] that one must do analysis on the basis that it continues, using one’s understanding of the social construction of security not only to criticize this fact but also to understand the dynamic of security and thereby maneuver them.’ Secondly, while Critical Security Studies strikes common cause with more ‘radical’ politics that demands a ‘...wholesale refutation of current power wielders.’ Constructivism stops at conceding that ‘[s]ecurity is an area of competing actors, but is a biased one in which the state is generally privileged as the actor historically endowed with security tasks and most adequately structured for the purpose.’ Thus it is important not to conflate completely the sensibilities of Constructivism and Critical Security Studies as far as the Copenhagen school is concerned.

The Logic of Securitization and Desecuritization

Conceptually what do the words securitization and de-securitization connote? The word security has a special resonance in international politics, as the Copenhagen school is aware of. Security traditionally conceived bears clear links to power politics. Buzan, Waever and Jaap view security as ‘...a special kind of politics or as above politics.’

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Securitization is viewed in this framework as a heightened form of politicization. In terms of a strategy, ‘a successful securitization... has three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules.’

Securitization is treated as a ‘speech act.’ What does this imply? All speech acts are performative in the sense ‘...that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action – it is not normally thought of as just saying something.’ J.L.Austin in his classic work *How to Do Things with Words* specifies the conditions that surround any speech act:

(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,

(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked,

(B.1) the procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and

(B.2) completely

(Γ.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of criteria consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves and further

(Γ.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.

Speech act requires a set of ‘facilitating’ pre-requisites and these encompass both ‘internal-linguistic grammatical’ protocols as well as an external dimension that invests certain social actors with a ‘position from which the act can be made.’ All speech acts are premised on an appreciation of the actors and audiences involved.

Conceptually, further sets of distinctions in this context are also useful to bear in mind. While a locutionary act is to be treated as having
‘a meaning’, an illocutionary act rests on ‘force in saying something’ and perlocutionary acts are those that induce ‘certain effects by saying something.’ \textsuperscript{169}

How does this translate in the realm of security? The Copenhagen school attempts to transpose this thinking into an analysis of what security speech acts may involve. Thus from this vantage position,

[t]he way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization. \textsuperscript{170}

Buzan, Waever and Jaap are keen to maintain a distinction between a securitizing move and actual securitization. They argue that not all-securitizing moves inevitably result in securitization. This begs the question as to what criteria we may then employ to mark the ‘threshold’ of successful securitization or its failure. \textsuperscript{171} The answer according to them lies ultimately in the audience endowing the original securitizing move with unquestioned sanctity. The process of securitization is ultimately a transaction between the securitizer and his audiences. The securitizer has to impress upon his audience that the referent object’s survival is a matter that permits certain extraordinary emergency measures that would transcend all bounds of the normal. Thus securitization involves moving an issue beyond the pale of public debate and scrutiny given the unique demands of the issue. Besides audiences lending legitimacy to acts of securitization, Buzan, Waever and Jaap also envisage that ‘[a] better measure of importance is the scale of chain reactions on other securitizations: How big an impact does the securitizing move have on wider patterns of relations?’ The Copenhagen school further points out that in terms of ‘social resources’ securitizing actors rely on the logic of prioritization alone to demand a special status for the survival of a chosen referent object. Rhetoric is an inevitable accomplice to the project of securitization. Thus ‘...a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action ‘because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy the failure)...’ is deployed to secure a special effect. \textsuperscript{172}
To reiterate the parallel with the speech act one merely needs to pay attention to their operationalization of the concept in security studies. Buzan, Waever and Jaap observe that

[i]n security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus by labeling it as *security*, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means. For the analyst to grasp this act, the task is not to assess some objective threats that ‘really’ endanger some object to be defended or secured; rather, it is to understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what it is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words something is done.173

All securitization presupposes a clear delineation of referent objects, securitizing and functional actors as well. By referent objects is understood ‘...things that seem to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.’ Securitizing actors are ‘actors who securitize issues by declaring something – a referent object – existentially threatened.’ Finally functional actors are ‘actors who affect the dynamics of a sector.’ They ‘...significantly influence decisions in the field of security.’174

When one reflects on securitizing actors in the current political setting the sovereign state appears to be the principal claimant to this role. However, the Copenhagen school believes that this is not an inevitable corollary that flows from this logic. They affirm that ‘[t]he link between politicization and securitization does not imply that securitization always goes through the state; politicization as well as securitization can be enacted in other fora as well.’175

Besides pointing out that different sectors have diverse conceptions of threats, Buzan, Waever and Jaap also concede the possibilities of ad hoc and institutionalized security scenarios. They argue that the recurring quality of a threat may result in it being securitized over the long duration.176

Securitization literature presents an interesting paradox in modern democracies. Given the inherently undemocratic nature of securitization one may be rather skeptical of its role. However, given the imperatives
of democratization, it is still required that ‘...one must legitimize in public why from now on details will not be presented publicly.’\textsuperscript{177} In other words secrecy in certain matters also requires public sanction in a democracy. The Copenhagen school is emphatic in its explicit approval that ‘at some point it must be argued in the public sphere why a situation constitutes security and therefore can be legitimately handled differently.’\textsuperscript{178}

I have not dwelt so far on the ambivalent relationship between politicization and securitization that Buzan, Waever and Jaap engage in their reformulation of the Security Studies agenda. While politicization is often equated with opening choices in a domain that had hitherto been closed, securitization is informed by the obverse logic of closing a domain off from further public scrutiny. The whole idea of securitization is ‘...to present an issue as urgent and existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics...’. However, securitization can also be viewed according to the members of the Copenhagen school as ‘a further intensification of politicization.’ They are also willing to concede that it may be viewed as ‘opposed to politicization.’ This explains the ambivalence and tension that separates and brings together politicization and securitization. Normatively, however Buzan, Waever and Jaap are inclined to be critical of the closure that securitization brings about. They unambiguously note that ‘...security should be seen as negative, as a failure to deal with issues of normal politics.’ They are particularly alive to state excesses that may be generically committed in the guise of a national security. An illustration of this is evident in their acknowledgement that ‘[n]ational security should not be idealized. It works to silence opposition and has given power holders many opportunities to exploit ‘threat’s for domestic purposes, to claim a right to handle something with less democratic control and restraint.’\textsuperscript{179}

In the event an issue has been securitized the Copenhagen school as an ‘optimal-long range option’ posits de-securitization. Conceptually, de-securitization represents ‘...the shifting of issues out of the emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere.’\textsuperscript{180} De-securitization assumes that an issue that was already securitized now needs to be scaled down from its high pedestal and subject to further public deliberation. Thus securitization and de-securitization are closely related concepts and must be treated as intrinsic parts of the conceptual baggage of the Copenhagen Research Group.
State and Civil Society in South Asia

Attention on civil society as a concept in South Asia appears to have largely emerged from a disgruntlement with the role of the state. An overview of recently articulated Indian positions on civil society distinctly echo this sentiment. According to the postcolonial script civil society may be viewed as an ‘institution’ that “…embod[ies] the desire of [an anti-colonial nationalist] elite to replicate in its own society the forms as well as the substance of western modernity.” Liberals are more predisposed to highlight the ‘primacy to rights’ logic that must underpin any notion of civil society. What emerges clearly from scholarship in political theory is that civil societies are indispensable features of any modern democracy. To Gurpreet Mahajan “[t]he civil society exists to protect life and liberty and it places an obligation upon its members to share that goal and to act and realize it in society. As such, what binds the members of civil society together are not ties of kinship but the common concern for the welfare and freedom of all.” While the state and civil society were originally not conceived as adversaries, Mahajan argues that such a position could only be upheld in an authoritarian polity. In the classical Hegelian thinking both the state and civil society were posited ‘as two moments of ethical life that were imbued by the spirit.’ To reinforce an earlier point the separation of state and civil society appears to have surfaced with increasing disappointment with the modern state.

An illustration of this may be found in Mahajan’s reading of the Indian setting. She argues that in India the state has been “…unresponsive, if not hostile, to the basic rights of the common man. Indeed with a large repertoire of coercive apparatuses the state frequently violates and suppresses the essential liberties of the people. Against such an undemocratic and elitist state, civil society is placed as an arena where marginalized protest and struggle for their essential human and democratic rights.” While critical of a rigid conceptual autonomy being maintained in practice, Mahajan is supportive of the Hegelian project that emphasizes ethical pursuit for both the state and civil society.

Dipankar Gupta echoes a similar commitment to locate civil society strictly within the confines of a democratic state. While critical of postcolonial cultural critics who would like traditional indigenous understandings of democratic participation to be privileged over the hegemony of the modern nation-state, Gupta argues that “…
of civil society is to be saved, and along with it the freedom accorded to citizenship, it can only be done through the constitutional democratic state and not by intermediate institutions outside it, or through traditional forms ‘before’ it.¹⁸⁷

A further vindication of the significant presence of the post-colonial state in South Asia is illustrated in yet another description of civil society primarily through the lens of the state. Neera Chandhoke observes in this context that

...the domain of civil society is delineated by the state itself. And states simply happen to have their own notions of what is politically permissible and what is socially permissible. And whereas these notions will enable some sections of civil society, they will necessarily disable others. State action therefore, possesses momentous consequences for civil society in as much as it has the power to lay down the boundaries of what is politically permissible. It simply has the luxury of shaping the structure of civil society organizations to a formidable extent.¹⁸⁸

How does the securitization/desecuritization literature connect with these assessments of the state and civil society in India and the larger South Asian context? While the state clearly has the power and the legitimacy to decide which issues to securitize and de-securitize, one is far more skeptical of civil society exercising a similar influence in South Asia. The Copenhagen school does in fact envisage the possibility of other forums enacting the politics of securitization and de-securitization. While one may witness securitizing moves being advanced by civil society with regard to some issues this will not necessarily translate into successful securitization.¹⁸⁹ Will civil society in the first place wish to securitize issues in the manner that securitization demands? The whole idea of civil society is to politicize issues and open up public choice on controversial questions. Securitization by its very grain is against the democratic impulse inherent in civil society interventions. While prioritization would be a critical normative project, civil society would still like to retain room to deliberate publicly on the best strategies to eliminate poverty or minimize environmental damage or diminish the possibility of nuclear conflict in the subcontinent.

Thus regular politicization of issues rather than intense politicization of the kind envisaged by securitization are more likely to be the order
of the day. Civil society does actively empathize with social constituencies facing existential threats. The question of livelihoods and survival may necessitate urgent intervention by the state. However, even in these instances successful securitization would depend on a willingness of the audiences (state or the market in this instance) to endorse fully the claims of the securitizer. Secondly even the actual execution of the project would need to be scrutinized by a citizen’s committee or like body with its feet firmly planted in the public domain. Thus, I am doubtful if securitization would be viewed as either desirable by civil society or in the event it is, if it can be successfully carried through in a domestic postcolonial setting. The looming presence of the state to ultimately arbitrate these moves and in practice live up to its commitments can scarcely be discounted.

Conclusion: The Demands for Politicization in South Asia.

The Human Development Report in 1997 while reflecting on ‘The Politics of Poverty Eradication’ affirmed unequivocally the value and significance of ‘democratic space’ in bringing about a genuine difference to the lives of the people. It stated:

> ending human poverty requires an activist state to create the political conditions for fundamental reform. Above all, this requires a democratic space in which people can articulate demands, act collectively and fight for a more equitable distribution of power. Only then will adequate resources be invested in human development priorities, and access to productive assets becomes more equitable. Only then will macroeconomic management be more pro-poor, and markets provide ample opportunities for the poor to improve their standard of living.\(^{190}\)

David Ludden in a contribution to another insightful collection of articles on ‘agrarian environments’ remarked rather candidly:

> development discourse is public debate and shared knowledge. But who participates? Who talks and listens? Who is developing and who is becoming developed? These are now central questions. Social movements and their allied scholars assert the right of the poor and marginal people to participate, to produce development knowledge, and to control development, rather than merely fight or criticize the power of the state. Broadly inclusive participation
is now the accepted norm. Unaccountable planning and elitist control – by corporations, state officials, and technical experts – is no longer acceptable. Democratic development is widely promoted, much more by scholars and activists than governments and funding agencies. This research argues that local experience; local knowledge and local participants should play a more prominent role in development than grand theories, state interests and world markets. How to make this happen is not clear. But clearly scholars can contribute by reporting, analyzing, and debating development, by making public the information that people need to participate.¹⁹¹

Normatively it is not hard to discern where moral sensibilities reside at the current juncture. The quest for more inclusive notions of democracy warrants a close scrutiny of what may be securitized and what needs to be de-securitized. Securitization in the Copenhagen framework is also not represented as a virtuous end point of all politics. In fact Buzan, Waever and Jaap are wary of what may pass of under a regime of securitization. They have provided us with a conceptual map however to take non-traditional threats to security more seriously without appearing utopian or woolly headed. Successful efforts to ban landmines, to arrive at a legal determination of nuclear threat or use are among instances where states have found themselves willing to engage with change. It is critical however to retain vital choice to engage why certain issues are perceived to merit public insulation while some others are best kept within the public fold. The issue is not merely of fundamental ramification to our understanding of security but ultimately will influence the quality of democracy we live in.
Traditional and Non-Traditional Security:
An Ongoing Conversation

The intent of this chapter is to conclude with a ‘state of the art’ assessment of how the conversation between adherents of traditional notions of security and the advocates of a non-traditional approach appears to be evolving at this political juncture. It is not hard to discern that there is a considerable eclecticism in terms of the responses that the latest inflection in the sub-field of Security Studies has generated. I intend flagging the principal areas of contention and argue where and why different strands of International Relations theory are likely to be located on the continuum. While discussing dominant proclivities of diverse strands of International Relations theorizing, I would also like to speculate briefly on where the promise of the more recent approaches really obtains and what are the unresolved loose ends. I remain conscious of the well-established premise that gender imbricates security discourse in more ways than one and I end with examining what theorists attentive to the role of gender are claiming about the nature and content of security.

Principal Concerns

One of the fundamental insights of critical social and political theory is the need to eschew new binaries. Traditional versus non-traditional security represents a classic illustration of the problem. There is clearly increasing recognition that besides purposes of analytic heuristics, the distinction between these two categories is far fuzzier in the real world. It would be a fallacy therefore to quarantine traditional and non-traditional security in two separate hermetically sealed boxes.

Different theories of International Relations also bring to bear different insights that enhance our understanding of these discourses. In terms of human security, Amitav Acharya fleshes out the following theoretical implications. He argues that

[r]ealisms can tell us much about material conditions at the national and systemic level that encourage or inhibit the diffusion of human security ideas and practices. It can address questions related to the impact of hegemonic power on human security, as well as the
relationship between national security tools (e.g. defence spending) and the resources needed to promote human security. Liberalism and liberal-institutionalism help our understanding of how human security can be promoted through interdependence, democratic transformation, and international institutions. Critical theories have already enriched our understanding both of how states can threaten the security of the individual and the role of global civil society in the promotion of human security. Constructivist insights are important in understanding how human security ideas are promoted by global norm entrepreneurs and how shifts in the global ideational structure can help or hinder prospects for human security.¹⁹³

Perspectives on security are thus colored in International Relations depending upon the theoretical provenance of varying conceptions of security. Those who tend to view security in largely conventional terms often privilege a realist understanding of the world. However we must maintain a distinction between classical realism and structural realism or neo-realism. Recent scholarship is pointing to areas of convergence between classical realism and contemporary constructivism.¹⁹⁴ It however cannot be denied that realism places a special accent on material aspects of power and this has a bearing on the dominant conception of security. Any conventional strategic audit in International Relations will tend to skirt the more complicated question of how perceptions are shaped and rather tend to concentrate on ‘bean counts’ of strategic assets and capabilities vis-à-vis other states in the international system. The primary referent of security in the realist framework is the state. Realists are likely to pivot their attention on this variable, however with increasing realization that threats to the state have increased manifold and they do not necessarily emerge from other state actors alone. Issues of environmental decay, resource scarcities, economic want, and internal civil wars now increasingly register their presence on the realist canvas primarily because they may undermine in direct and indirect ways the legitimacy of the state. Realists have thus widened their interest to take cognizance of the impact of non-state actors on the mainstream political process.

An area that also has caused considerable consternation among realists relates to the potential use of the discourse of non-traditional security to promote projects of humanitarian intervention. Realists remain skeptical of the possibility of abuse for instance of the rationale of
human security to imperil traditional assumptions regarding non-intervention and state sovereignty. Thus those who seek to undermine non-statist alternatives tend to argue that dominant states are merely tactically using apparently benign constructs to impose their hegemony on lesser-privileged states.

Realists have also been particularly critical of the conceptual flab that accompanies attempts to broaden conceptions of security. They argue that long ‘laundry lists’ of what states ought to take care of do not in any sense provide any reasonable policy vector to state functionaries. Thus there is a need to determine what remain the core or essential interests of all states. The realist skepticism about broadening the concept of security comes from another quarter. It relates to the idea that not all issues merit securitization. There are certain issues that are seen as more urgent and must be closeted from the processes of long and sustained deliberation intrinsic to democratic processes because of the need to arrive at timely decisions based on political expediency while most others must not be classified according to them as security issues in the first place.

How would liberal institutionalists respond to these concerns? Liberals place a much higher premium on the role of international institutions and envisage the possibility of fine-tuning the existing architecture for global governance. They would be willing for instance to concede the possibility of evolving common norms on the conduct of warfare. They would argue that such norms would be in the interest of both the dominant powers and the weaker states as well. Thus liberals place an emphasis on interdependence built on notions of reciprocity and trust. This is quite different from the realist worldview where conflict is endemic and the international structure promotes a kind of political Darwinism that favors the survival of the fittest.

Another dimension of the liberal engagement with the world of security is their emphasis on democracy as a significant political context in which claims of security need to be evaluated. Ultimately what constitutes an area of legitimate security concern will be a product of democratic deliberation and will be a part of the social contract the citizen enters vis-à-vis the state. Thus issues relating to the quality of life – access to minimal health facilities, education and housing are seen as vital to preserve the quality of life of the citizenry. While liberal institutionalists also look at the state as the primary referent of security,
they are particularly keen to safeguard individual rights and freedoms and would explore possibilities of reinforcing these patterns of cooperation through international institutions. In other words they are not fixated with issues of conflict alone in the international system.

Critical theorists unpack the assumption that states are necessarily guarantors of human well-being. They would argue that states by virtue of the power, authority and legitimacy that accrues to them as a political community have on occasion betrayed this trust through acts of arbitrary violence and deprivation of human dignity. Thus critical theorists are particularly receptive to placing human beings as the central referents of a dynamic security discourse – and would also be alive to the workings of the categories of race, culture, and location and would simultaneously engage the possibility of shaping emancipatory politics when it comes to disenfranchised groups. The role of civil society groups becomes particularly crucial, as they are vital to alerting public conscience to any glaring violations of acceptable standards of behavior both in the national and international arena and also depending on the issue-area involved where the need arises re-design standards of acceptability through acts of politics.

Constructivists in marked contrast to the neo-realisists who tend to focus exclusively on material configurations of power tend to privilege ideas in terms of the role they play in shaping the world we inhabit. Thus security for Constructivists is ultimately a social construct. Constructivists are not oblivious to the workings of material power but tend to privilege the socially contingent over realism’s ahistorical certitudes regarding human nature and the sources of human motivation. The analogy between human nature and state behavior is not readily acceptable to Constructivist assessments of security. Thus security within this frame of reference is viewed as a dynamic concept that is subject to constant change and will vary in its scope depending on the historical mix of factors that throw up certain dominant ideational understandings.

The emphasis on ‘norm entrepreneurs’ is not accidental to the Constructivist project. Constructivists would argue that but for a systematic campaign the landmine ban would not have been attainable and similarly racial equality would not have stood a chance if we accepted a static ontology of the world. The role of critical actors (these could include dominant states) who can ‘tip’ the scales of history and
change the terms of how we conceive a particular event, episode or historical moment and become important to systematically catalogue. Constructivists have not shied away from empirical work on hard questions of security to demonstrate how socially constructed our understanding of security is and how changing ideational configurations could result in a new socially constructed conceptions of what constitutes the ‘common sense’ specific to the time and age we inhabit.

Thus it is not hard to see why there tends to be such diversity of political opinion when it comes to conceptualizing security. The challenge is to consider whether different theoretical perspectives are entirely incommensurable or alternatively if there is some areas of convergence that one may discover that could serve as the beginning of a more engaged conversation. It is a safe premise to believe that no single theory has a monopoly over truth claims. It then becomes important to examine the evidence that is marshaled to bolster different strands of argumentation regarding the content of security.

Roland Paris in a provocatively titled article ‘Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?’ gets to the heart of the dilemma posing scholars sensitive to non-traditional attributes of security. He argues that the ‘broad sweep and definitional elasticity’ that has come to characterize reflections on non-traditional security are not very helpful. Drawing attention to the UNDP characterization of human security he identifies seven elements. These include ‘(1) economic security, (e.g. freedom from poverty); (2) food security (e.g. access to food); (3) health security (e.g. access to health care and protection from diseases); (4) environmental security (e.g. protection from such dangers as environmental pollution and depletion); (5) personal security (e.g. physical safety from such things as torture, war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, drug use, suicide and even traffic accidents); (6) community security (e.g. survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups as well as the physical security of these groups); and (7) political security (e.g. enjoyment of civil and political rights, and freedom from political oppression).’ While these elements cover considerable ground, this is precisely what constitutes the problem for Paris. While the original article was written in Fall 2001, a special issue of Security Dialogue three years later on the subject of ‘What is Human Security’ elicited the same reaction from Paris where he argues that human security still remains an ‘inscrutable’ concept and the challenge really is to arrive at greater precision.
Paris is not alone in pointing a finger at those conceptualizing non-traditional security as an extremely difficult project given the lack of consensus on core security issues. Not everybody however shares either the pessimism of Paris or his view that that there is no easily identifiable core set of issues that bring together eclectic sensibilities together in a conception of security. Ramesh Thakur for instance points out “‘Realists’ could legitimately argue that only a lean conception of security can provide an effective policy tool to cope with the mean enemies of the international jungle. They should get real. In many countries, the state is a tool of narrow family group, clique or sect. The majority of today’s conflicts are internal, government or territory. ‘Real’ security threats are sector-specific.”

One strategy of further refinement over what constitutes the core content of security seeks to draw a distinction between threats and vulnerabilities. To sample various vulnerabilities that are likely to face most states in the future the following are illustrative:

1. different levels of population growth in various regions, particularly between the developed and the developing world;
2. the impact of climate change due to increased temperatures, decline in perspiration, and rising sea levels;
3. the scarcity of water in specific regions (such as the Middle East) for drinking and irrigation;
4. the decline in food production and the need to increase imported goods;
5. progressing soil erosion and desertification; and
6. increased urbanization and pollution in ‘megacities’ around the globe...

Astri Suhrke also tries to identify in explicit terms what the primary sources of vulnerability are likely to be. He draws attention to three constituencies in particular. These include:

1. victims of war and internal conflict;
2. those who live close to the subsistence level and thus are structurally positioned at the edge of socio-economic disaster; and
3. victims of natural disasters.
In another effort to critique attempts by the Copenhagen School to widen the concept of security, Olav F. Knudsen argues that security studies is bound to flounder if we focus attention away from the state. Knudsen makes the case that the state is an exceptional form of political community that performs functions and takes on forms that are unparalleled. These conceptions encompass the view that the state is,

- the major collective unit processing notions of threat;
- the mantle that cloaks the exercise of elite power;
- the organizational expression that gives shape to communal ‘identity’ and ‘culture’;
- the chief agglomeration of competence to deal with issue areas crossing jurisdictional boundaries;
- the manager of territory/geographic space – including functioning as a ‘receptacle’ for income; and
- the legitimizer of authorized action and possession.\(^208\)

It is probably facile to imagine that those who are making the case for more inclusive conceptions of security are unaware of either the significance of the state or its resilience as a form of political community. However, the fact that the state has itself been responsible for generating insecurity among people as a consequence of its callous indifference to the living conditions of the ordinary citizen that there is an effort to anchor the state in a larger normative and ethical framework.\(^209\) What critics of traditional security frames of reference are objecting to is the effort to subsume non-traditional security concerns under the rubric of realism.\(^210\)

The question of humanitarian intervention is a case in point. According to Nicholas Thomas and William T. Tow we need to examine “…what makes people ‘secure’.” According to them, ‘human security can... be considered as a valid paradigm for identifying, prioritizing and resolving emerging transnational security problems.’ In their opinion, human security is best suited to affecting a successful resolution of ‘internal developmental and external threat components.’\(^211\) They offer two empirical instances of humanitarian intervention; the first in Haiti by a US led coalition in 1994 and subsequently in East Timor by an Australian led coalition in 1999. However, their critics Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald argue that Thomas and Tow commit three fallacies.
They first do not recognize adequately that states remain part of the problem and not the solution, secondly, that they tend to privilege a ‘death by politics’ over a ‘death by economics’ and finally they allege that the authors work with a very limited conception of the ‘transnational.’ In a telling indictment Bellamy and McDonald hold that

[a] discourse of human security that does not delegitimize states when they act as agents of human insecurity, does not devalue sovereignty when it protects the perpetrators of human wrongs, or does not challenge the moral value of an international economic system and structure of states that creates and perpetuates most of the globe’s insecurity has, at best, a very limited utility.”

Thomas and Tow in an equally defiant response acknowledge that ‘...the state can be a critical determinant of human security or insecurity. However, it is hardly the exclusive, or even primary determinant of oppression against individuals that…critics would make it out to be.’

Their anxieties pertain to the possibility that alternative conceptions of security are eventually ‘co-opted by realism.’ I would argue however that this anxiety is not completely misplaced. Non-traditional security conceptions both in ideational and material terms are plagued by certain asymmetries. This is especially true in post-colonial societies. The larger than life role that states play in the postcolonial imagination result in a reluctance to subject them to critical scrutiny beyond a threshold – and the bar is not really very high to begin with. This is further compounded by the fact that expectations of the state are very high in these societies. Over the next few decades this may increasingly change with a greater role being played by non-state actors (NGOs and private initiative). However given the current state of affairs it is unlikely that the state is likely to yield much ground to any other claimant for a share of its widely enjoyed legitimacy.

A part of the dilemma stems from the fact that while the state is the principal source of insecurity in certain situations, it also sometimes could serve as the principal savior. It is a fallacy to caricature the state as completely sinister and it is equally dangerous to believe the obverse – namely, that the state is purely benign. The truth of the matter lies somewhere in the middle. States perform extremely useful functions and they also abuse the authority that is politically sanctioned. Thus, while modern democracies institute a system of checks and balances
against arbitrary uses of power, the challenge remains to apply the rule of law equally in all situations.

In another interesting debate regarding the re-conciliation of traditional and non-traditional security, P. H. Liotta argues that to privilege one dimension to the exclusion of the other can only spell disaster. The metaphor of the recursive ‘boomerang’ is invoked in order to capture the idea that the danger of neglecting any dimension would only come back to haunt ruling elites if they do not sufficiently factor their relative importance right at the outset.

Liotta catalogues different facets of non-traditional security that have claimed the attention of scholars. These encompass

- **basic human needs** as emphasized by the UNDP, which stresses basic/critical economic, food, health, personal, environmental, cultural and political security;

- **an assertive/interventionist focus**, best illustrated by the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo, in which action is based on protecting citizens from state state-sponsored aggression, and which contravenes principles of state sovereignty, advocates individual sovereignty, and creates international criminal tribunals to establish connections between human rights and the maintenance of international peace and security;

- **a social welfare/developmentalist focus**, which fundamentally views development as essential to long-term prosperity but also respects cultural diversity while recognizing that peace, development and democratization are interlinked; and

- **new security**, which addresses ‘non-traditional’ security issues and ‘uncivil society’ with a focus on epidemiology (especially that of AIDS), drugs, terrorism, small arms, inhumane weapons, anti-personnel landmines, cyber-war, and human trafficking.214

While Liotta’s attention to the need to balance varying conceptions of security is useful, he also falls into the trap of erecting new binaries. He seeks to draw a distinction in this context between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security that only complicates the picture further. While the former are premised on ‘state-to-state power relationships’ the latter in his assessment ‘involve multiple transnational aspects.’215 Such a binary also invites a critique from Brooke A. Smith Windsor who in ‘A Reply
Liotta argues that “particular problems arise, however, with the author’s very treatment of terrorism. Early on, we are advised that non-traditional ‘soft’ security... with its ‘transnational aspects’ encompasses terrorism. On the other hand, traditional realist based notions of threats to security are later described as states and ‘non-state actors in [the] post-Cold War period.”216

However, more relevant from our perspective is the attempt by Liotta to systematically arrive at taxonomy of diverse conceptions of security. Classifying them in terms of ‘tradition and origin’, ‘forms of security’, ‘focus’, ‘risk’ and ‘threats to security’ he contributes to streamlining our thinking on the contested content of security.217 Beginning with conventional realist approaches, Liotta argues that realists tend to focus on national security, rely on state-centrism, and focus their attentions on safeguarding sovereignty and ‘territorial integrity’ while apprehensive about the potential threats ‘other states’ as well as non-state actors pose in the contemporary world. He then introduces the category of ‘traditional and non-traditional, realist and liberal based’ scholars who argue that forms of security are ‘social’ and their focus remains on social collectivities – these encompass nations, societies, classes and political interest groups as well. They remain apprehensive about safeguarding ‘national unity’, ‘quality of life’ and ‘wealth distribution’. The perceived threats emerge from states itself and they remain skeptical of the role of migrants and aliens in their domestic societies.

Two other contrasting perspectives are also provided for in the Liotta framework. These include ‘non-traditional liberal based’ conceptions of security as well as ‘non-traditional, potentially extreme’ orderings of security. In the former ideal type, the emphasis is on human security – there would be an appreciation of safeguarding the interests of ‘individuals, mankind, human rights, rule of law’ while what could imperil security is anything that threatens human survival, and conceptions of ‘identity and governance.’ The threats could emerge from the state, processes of globalization and ecological transformations. According to the latter ideal type, safeguarding environmental security remains a paramount concern, the emphasis is on preserving ecosystems and anything that threatens ‘global sustainability’ would constitute a security threat. Thus human beings could be threatened by resource scarcities, ‘war and ecological’ devastation.
In terms of a future course of action, Windsor argues that there is very little in terms of guidance from Liotta’s account about how the future is evolving. While conceding the value of placing on the table differing conceptions of security, Windsor points out that Liotta still does not inform us about ‘...the precise ends and means we should be aiming to balance and the degree to which this should be done.’ He argues ‘[t]he boomerang construct clearly has value in conceptualizing the requirement in policymaking to carefully weigh various interests and agendas – sometimes even convergent ones – and the means by which they may be achieved, but in this instance offerings of clear direction on an appropriate trajectory for the 21st century security policy remains elusive.’

How far is this criticism valid? Liotta in another piece also observes that we need to be cautious about dismissing any approach to security as irrelevant. There is a blurring according to Liotta between the boundaries of conventional traditional security concerns and more recently arrived at conceptions of non-traditional security threats. In this context he observes, ‘[r]ather than dismissing human security outright, a larger examination of what forms of security are relevant and right among communities, states, and regions, and which even might apply to a global rule-set along with what types of security are not relevant – seems appropriate and necessary. If this occurs, a truly remarkable tectonic shift might take place in the conduct of international relations and human affairs.’

However, there does appear to be agreement among some scholars that we have reached a point in the discourse where there is a new consensus on what implications efforts to broaden security carry. Don Hubert for instance points out that ‘...differences have narrowed. The UN Secretary-General, the Human Security Commission and the Human Security Network all agree on the following: that the focus in the first instance is on individuals rather than states; that globalization and the changing nature of armed conflict are creating new vulnerabilities; that ensuring safety from violence is an integral part of the agenda; and that human security requires a rethinking of state sovereignty.’

In line with attempts to evolve more clearly conceptual parameters to evaluate non-traditional security concerns Jeniffer Leaning draws attention to three criteria. These include:
1. Relationships with location (sustainable sense of home and safety – providing identity, recognition, and freedom from fear);

2. Relationships with community (network of constructive social or family support – providing identity, recognition, participation, and autonomy);

3. Relationships with time (acceptance of the past and positive grasp of the future – providing identity, recognition, participation, and autonomy).221

**Gender and Security**

Another important dimension that underpins the discussion on security is the manner in which gender constructions inform security discourse. In a fascinating account of the complex normative terrain that accompanies reflections on gender and security, Heidi Hudson establishes certain salient connections between gender and conceptualization of security. Arguing that gender and security are ‘politically commensurable’ notions and not incompatible ideas, Hudson points out that ‘[f]eminist critiques of so-called natural or depoliticized gender dichotomies within state-centric discourse delegitimize discriminatory practices and institutions as socio-historical constructions and ‘repoliticize’ orthodox views on security by challenging the role of the state as the provider of security. **Gender is intrinsic to the subject matter and politics of security.**’222 (Emphasis self)

Critical of what is unconsciously subsumed under the category ‘human’, Hudson points out that there is a need to talk of differences stemming from gender without pretending that they do not exist or matter. Thus as far as Hudson is concerned ‘[h]uman security as a universalist tool of global governance must acknowledge differences in the degree to which the state leads or participates in the process of the protection and empowerment of individuals. The significance of location or context and the politics of identity for security are thus placed under the spotlight.’223 Thus identity remains a central plank along which gender constructions and their links with notions of security are clearly interlinked. It is also crucial to be cautious of over-determining the role of gender in analyses. Hudson points out that ‘[w]hile gender may not always be the most important factor, if taken as the unit of analysis
in the security discourse it reveals complex and fluctuating mix of interlinked gendered knowledge constructions and practices within all sectors of security and at all levels (e.g. physical violence).  

Another equally important dimension is the recognition of context and the need to establish the connections between the local and the global. Hudson reminds us that ‘[a] gender-sensitive concept of human security must … link women’s everyday experiences with broader regional and global political processes and structures.’ However the emphasis Hudson places on context sometimes is carried to an extreme. When Hudson argues that we need to be suspicious of the possibilities of the UNDP characterization of human security as potentially ‘Eurocentric’, she walks a thin line between celebrating cultural relativism and demonizing universal liberal aspirations.

Some of the ambiguities that surround accounts of gender and security are brilliantly brought to play by Miranda Alison in her discussion of the identity of the ‘female combatant.’ Alison deftly demonstrates that ‘...the expanded space some women attain in the context of war does not necessarily translate into postwar social changes beneficial to women; indeed the postwar remarginalization of female ex-combatants suggests that they ultimately figure as a threat to the nation’s ideological and political security and cohesion.’ Alison is also alive to the possibility that the state could itself become the principal source of insecurity to its people. She argues, ‘[i]n this case, it is the Sri Lankan state itself, even more than the broader Sinhalese ethno-national community, that is seen to pose the greatest threat to the cultural, political and economic security of the Sri Lankan Tamil community.’

Alison also brings to light some of the paradoxes that surround the emergence of the ‘female combatant’ in the Sri Lankan context. She observes, although their example of non-traditional behavior seems to have led some other Tamil women behaving less conventionally, for example by riding bicycles and motorcycles and wearing less-traditional clothing, there has also been a backlash against such behaviour both from within and without the movement in terms of attempts to impose dress restrictions on women, illustrating how internal concern with the societal/cultural security of an ethno-national group can result in threats to the individual security of women.  

Her account only brings to bear the role gender identity comes to play in even evaluating similar actions performed by men differently from
that of women. Pointing to areas of further investigation, Alison persuasively argues that '[t]he figure of the female combatant is often uneasily accepted, and the political violence such women participate in seems still to be seen as more shocking and less acceptable than comparable violence committed by men, indicating an underlying discomfort with such a challenge to gendered expectations (or established ideas of societal security) that may be widely cross-cultural.'

In another interesting illumination of the role of gender identity and its impact on security, Gunhild Hoogensen and Svein Vigeland Rottem argue that statist notions tend to discount the role of identity in assessments of security. However, they point out that '[w]here state security has sovereignty as its primary focus, societal security has identity. This is relevant when ‘significant groups’ within society feel threatened (by immigration, cultural imperialism and so forth). This, of course, complicates security adding not only another ‘legitimate’ voice to the security dynamic, but one which is determined on the basis of diverse identities and can therefore reflect diverse security needs.'

Hoogensen and Rottem make a broader plea to reject mainstream categories in International Relations scholarship that do not really reflect the centrality of identity in constructions of security. While supportive of a project of re-designing the foundations of security studies, they point out that it is important to ensure that ‘...a gender perspective informs all approaches to international peace and security.’ In the ultimate analysis, however, Hoogensen and Rottem recognize the dangers of privileging any single explanatory framework to the exclusion of all other points of view.

Conclusion

It can barely be doubted that there is an increasing acknowledgement across the board of the interrelatedness of threats and vulnerabilities both in terms of time and space. Barely a few decades ago, in the heyday of the Cold War years, it would be inconceivable to have spoken of non-statist referents of security. There is greater appreciation of the complex linkages that obtain between local, national, regional and global levels and the need to ensure security at various levels. The state still remains a key player, but the transformation is the
increased accent placed on a responsive state. It is only logical to ask, responsible vis-à-vis whom and the role of democracies and public deliberation only become increasingly relevant to inquire into what people at large stand to gain by certain conceptualizations of security. While the newly inaugurated discourse of security has considerable emancipatory potential, we need to be cautious about sliding into simplistic utopias. In terms of theoretical lineage, Critical theorists (Constructivists, Post-colonialists, Post-Modernists and Neo-Marxists) remain particularly sensitive to the transformative possibilities inherent at the current historical juncture while Liberals are also favorably inclined to broadening the notion of security.

The most formidable bastion of resistance to newer conceptualizations of security emerges from the traditional realist who remains suspicious of the motives behind any re-definition of security. However, the realist counsel on factoring material configurations of power are useful in terms of even moving ahead. Ultimately, the centrality of gender in the construction of security is pretty evident from the empirical scholarship on the subject and the challenge remains even here to avoid simple biologically determinist arguments and cultural essentialisms and simultaneously be open to eclectic sources of knowledge production. Any single strand of thought that claims a complete monopoly over truth does so to its own detriment.
End Notes


2 Most influential in this respect has been the work of Mahbub ul Haq. See for instance his essay “The human development paradigm” in Sakiko Fukuda Parr and A.K. Shiva Kumar, Readings in Human Development: Concepts, Measures and Policies for a Development Paradigm (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.17-34.

3 Of relevance here is the edited volume by Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, The Quality of Life (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, Fifth Impression 2002).


5 Ibid, p.222

6 Ibid, p.226


8 Ibid p.429

9 Ibid’ p.423


12 Ibid p.21


14 Ibid, p.50.


16 Ibid, pp. 77-78


19 Ibid, p.178
28 Edward Hallet Carr, ‘Realism and Idealism’ in Betts ed. Conflict After the Cold War...’, p.76.
30 Ibid, p.7
31 Ibid
32 Ibid, p.12
33 Ibid, p.13
34 Ibid
36 Ibid, p.254

38 Ibid, p.8

39 Ibid, p.10


41 Ibid p.91

42 Ibid, p.92

43 Ibid, p.80

44 Ibid, p.91

45 Ibid, p.94

46 Ibid

47 Ibid, pp.94-95

48 Ibid, p.96

49 Ibid, p.97


51 Ibid

52 Ibid, p.223

53 Ibid, pp.211-239


56 Ibid

57 Ibid


59 Ibid, p.130

60 Ibid, p.132

62 Escudé, ‘An Introduction to Peripheral Realism and Its Implications for the Interstate System...’, p.66.
63 Ibid, p.69
65 Ibid, pp.263-273
68 Ibid, pp.265-266
69 Ibid, p.267
70 Ibid, p.264
71 Ibid, p.268
72 Ibid, p.270
74 Mahbub ul Haq also (in addition to Amartya Sen) draws attention to the Kantian inheritance in ‘The Human Development Paradigm’ in Fukuda Parr and Shiva Kumar ed. Readings in Human Development, pp.17-34; esp. p.17.
77 Ibid, p.156
82 Apart from these strands Zacher and Matthew also discuss Republican Liberalism, and club Commercial and Military Liberalism under Interdependence Liberalism ‘in ‘Liberal International Theory...’ pp.120-137.
81 Ibid p.129
84 Ibid p.131
85 Ibid p.133
90 Ibid
93 Ibid
94 Ibid
96 Ibid, p.21
98 Ibid, p.5
99 Ibid, p.11
100 Ibid, p.7
102 Ibid p.35
103 Ibid, p.49
104 Ibid, p.50
105 Ibid, p.51
106 Ibid
107 Ibid, pp.56-59
111 Ibid, p.86
112 Ibid, p.90
114 Ibid
115 Jolly, ‘Human Development and Neo-Liberalism…’, p.84.
116 Ibid, p.90
118 See particularly in this context the chapter from the above cited co-edited book titled ‘Security Analysis: Conceptual Apparatus’, pp.21-47.
120 Cited in Buzan et.al, p.3
121 Buzan et.al p.vii
122 Ibid, p.2
123 Ibid, p.19
124 Ibid
125 Ibid, p.32
126 Ibid, p.5
127 Ibid, p.9
128 Ibid p.18
129 Ibid
130 Ibid
131 Ibid, p.40
132 Ibid

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135 Ibid, p.59
136 Buzan et.al, p.19
137 Ibid p.19
139 Ibid, p.129
140 Ibid, p.132
141 Ibid, p.135
142 Ibid
143 Ibid, p.132
144 Ibid, p.136
145 Ibid, p.141
146 Ibid, p.148
147 Ibid, p.151
148 Ibid, p.149
149 Ibid, p.151
150 Ibid, p.139
151 Ibid, p.143
152 Ibid, p.163
155 Ibid, p.231
156 Ibid, pp.236, 240
157 Ibid, p.240
158 Ibid, p.241
159 Ibid, p.242
160 Buzan et.al, pp.34-35
161 Ibid, p.35
162 Ibid
163 Ibid, p.37
164 Ibid, p.23
165 Ibid, p.26
167 Ibid, pp.14-15
168 Buzan et.al, p.32
169 Austin, How to do Things with Words...’ p.120.
170 Buzan et.al, p.25
171 Ibid, p.25
172 Ibid, p.26
173 Ibid
174 Ibid, p.36
175 Ibid, p.24
176 Ibid, p.27
177 Ibid, p.28
178 Ibid
179 Ibid, p.29
180 Ibid, p.4
182 Partha Chatterjee, ‘Beyond the Nation? Or Within’ in Elliot ed. Civil Society and Democracy...’ pp.134-144.
184 Ibid, p.174
185 Ibid, p.177
186 Ibid, p.183
187 Gupta, ‘Civil Society or the State...’, p.235.

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189 The Copenhagen School draws our attention to transnational environmental groups participating in ‘securitizing moves’ without this inevitably translating into successful securitization. Buzan et.al, pp.71-93.


192 For a classic illustration of the irrelevance of colonial binaries see Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983).


202 Ibid p.90


215 Ibid, pp.473-488


223 Ibid, p.157
224 Ibid, p.162
225 Ibid, p.164
226 Ibid, pp.165-166
228 Ibid, pp.448-449
229 Ibid, p.453
230 Ibid, p.459
231 Ibid, p.462
233 Ibid, p.162
234 Ibid, p.167