



The Restructuring Of Masculinities As A Dynamic In War And Peace

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Abstract

The author argues that 'Gender' as an area of research and action should be understood as belonging to men and studies of masculinity, as well as to women and feminist studies. The use of gender analysis for the formulation of development and peacebuilding policy is at a critical stage, in which capturing the dynamic of inter-relationship is crucial to building healthy and peaceful societies and futures. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly evident that laws and discourses pertaining to gender are central to the self-definition of political groups and, indeed, signal the political and cultural projects of movements and regimes. In particular, recent '(re) masculinisation' in war policy and behaviours shows how masculinity can be reconstructed, in this case highlighting the 'warrior' but in a new global landscape of extremes. This is cause for concern and warrants further research for informed response.

Author Profile

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Over the past few decades great strides have been made in 'mainstreaming gender' for development, relief and conflict transformation work; the phrase generally a reference to making visible the perspectives, needs and roles of women. This is significant and important, for it can be argued that for a long time these specific issue areas were marginalized or neglected in policy and practice.¹ Gender is at once a broad social and political issue, (frequently seen through lenses of participation, power, rights and/or status issues) and also an intimate and personal question of identity, role models, values and interpersonal behaviours. Each individual human being is born into a physical body which will 'gender-determine' how they are received and what is expected of them socially and culturally; at the same time pursuing their own growth and experience of sexuality and personal identity. The 'givens' in society - who wields power, who makes decisions, models of what men do and what women do -- will colour aspirations and expectations.

A growing field of research documents how men and women behave in, and are affected by war and collective violence. We know that in liberation wars, women frequently fight alongside men. It is clear that laws and discourses pertaining to gender are central to the self-definition of political groups and can signal the political and cultural projects of movements and regimes.²

Contradictions and complexities, of course, are a constant feature. The Maoist campaign in Nepal, for example, advocated a platform of gender equality as part of its resistance to feudal monarchy. Yet after the comprehensive peace agreement in Nepal it became evident that actual inclusion of women in informal and formal decision-making and/or official roles was far from the norm. The United Nations advocates for women at the negotiating table for peacemaking and passed Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 to support this (2000), but finding meaningful implementation is difficult. More recently in 2008 SCR 1820 was agreed upon. This resolution addresses

¹ See the Chair's Summary, *Peacebuilding Commission Working Group on Lessons Learned Gender and Peacebuilding: Enhancing Women's Participation*, 29 January 2008
www.un.org/.../peacebuilding/.../WGLL290108GenderPBCSummary.pdf

² Too neat a categorisation of 'men's business' and 'women's business' in armed conflict is deeply problematic. First, the complex question of gender becomes an over-simplified one which focuses solely on gender roles, giving the impression that these are static. Denying the 'male' roles that women take on in times of crisis; for example, the combatant roles which women have taken alongside men in liberation struggles (including those in Algeria, Zimbabwe, Aceh, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, and other) could be seen as an integral part of the processes by which women are often relegated to less-than equal socio-economic and political roles when war is over. In Aceh for example, many female former Free Aceh movement, *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM) combatants returned to their villages in shame to relative invisibility after the conclusion of a negotiated agreement. During the war in former Yugoslavia, in newly independent nationalist Croatia and Serbia, a previous constitutional commitment to women's equality under socialism gave way to a conceptualization of women as the bearers of sons to fight for nationalist struggles.

the severe, negative impact of sexual violence in conflict zones, as a profound security issue in itself.

We also know that in the discourse of many ideological struggles, women are relegated to symbolic roles of those who need protection, and as the birthing/bearer mothers of future fighters. They symbolize an idealized, weaker collective entity for which men fight, but may in the course of that fighting also become victims of sexual violence and rage.

Serious gender analysis takes into account the interplay of class, caste and familial relationships, seen against a backdrop of broad structure and power dimensions which determine hierarchy and mobility in society. Generally, feminist critiques define militarism as masculine, and development practice has taken the concept of 'gender' and applied it with a primary focus on women. That women's positions, interests and choices are influenced by their gender is widely recognized. The fact that men's situations and agency are similarly gender-influenced is less understood. The theme of domination, central to studies of patriarchy, is also relevant to subordinating hierarchies within masculinity itself, as vividly portrayed Robert Saviano's study of the Neopolitan Camorra.³ It is increasingly recognized that men are also victims of rape and physical intimidation during war (the latter subject remaining nearly taboo).⁴ 'Gender' as an area of research and action should be understood as belonging to men and studies of masculinity, as well as to women and feminist studies. This paper will first explore the possibility of 'multiple masculinities' which may challenge previously held monolithic views, to demonstrate the fluidity of identities and gendered interactions in society and more specifically in war. It will then raise questions about the global narrative and iconography/presentation of violent conflict during the first decade of this still new millennium. Very specifically it will interrogate possible mirroring of polarities in the 're-masculinisation' of war.

The author is mindful of the myriad of localized struggles set in specific contexts where men and women experience violence: inter-communal, against the state or by the state, or become caught between opposing armed forces which take their toll. This paper will focus rather on whether there is a cosmopolitan meta-narrative which transmits and fixes influential messages and images, and whether these in turn impact on a 'currency' of given interpretation.

'Multiple masculinities' refers here to cultural differences; to varieties of interpretation of masculinity within a given society; and to the way images and modern global

³ Robert Saviano, *Gomorra: Italy's Other Mafia*, trans., Virginia Jewiss (London : Macmillan, 2008) .

⁴ Note the pioneering work of Chris Dolan, for example "Collapsing Masculinities and Weak States" www.acord.org.uk/r-pubs-CollapsingMasculinities.doc

messages portray specific or dominant gendered themes and 'performance' which in turn influence the behaviour and choice of those who view them.

The notion of cultural difference in the shaping of masculinities is not new.⁵ In 2005 Jani de Silva published a seminal work, *Globalisation, Terror and the Shaming of the Nation: Constructing local masculinities in a Sri Lanka Village*⁶ De Silva calls her work 'an anthropological study of a particular kind of violent act—that which unfolds in a spectacular way—which took place in a Sri Lankan village'. Her focus is the abduction of twenty-two schoolboys from their homes by masked gunmen in late 1989; boys who were taken to an army camp, tortured and killed. By giving this event a localised context in time and place, with detailed, painstaking analysis, she 'explores the troubled nexus between globalization, acts of terror and the local construction of a new generation of masculinities in South Asia'. With an approach reminiscent of Paul Richards (1996) *Fighting for the Rain Forest*,⁷ she sheds light on behaviours we often find inexplicable. Part of her analysis rests on a detailed exposition of ancient and modern Sinhala masculine patterns and norms, in contrast to contemporary Western constructs of masculinity. The latter (revisited by scholars seeking to understand the break-down in laws of war and codes of military behavior⁸) was informed by ritual notions of valour and honour as in the custom of the 'dual' and notions of oppositional victory and defeat.

De Silva points to a different kind of masculine culture. Historically, 'in the absence of a martial nobility and valour-ridden codes of honour...agrarian values of material prosperity came to signify intrinsic human worth...the notion of status replaced that of honour (becoming) the defining trait of Sinhala hegemonic masculinity. Status however, is conveyed through a certain sedateness of bearing which did not lend itself to violence

⁵ Studies and stories abound, including personal narratives of being uprooted from one culture to another with the identity issues this brings. For contrasting introductions to the theme, see: Ravindra Rukhmini Pandharinath, Harish Sadani, S.N. Mukund and V. M. Geetali, eds. *Breaking the Moulds: Indian Men Looking at Patriarchy Looking at Men*, (Delhi: MAVA and Purush Uvach, 2007), Thokozani Xaba, "Masculinity and its Malcontents: The Confrontation between 'Struggle Masculinity' and 'Post-Struggle Masculinity' (1990-1997)," in *Changing Men in Southern Africa*, ed. Robert Morell (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press; London: Zed Books, 2001) Heather Ellis and Jessica Meyer ed., *Masculinity and the Other: Historical Perspectives* (Newcastle upon Tyne : Cambridge Scholars, 2009). See www.c-s-p.org/Flyers/978-1-4438-0151-5-sample.pdf . See also the work of Sikata Banerjee, such as "Armed masculinity, Hindu nationalism and female political participation in India: Heroic mothers, chaste wives and celibate warriors," *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 8 (1) (March 2006) : 62-83.

⁶ Jani de Silva, *Globalisation, terror and the shaming of a nation: constructing local masculinities in a Sri Lankan village* (Victoria, B.C. Canada: Trafford Publishing, 2005).

⁷ Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest. War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1996 and Oxford : James Currey publications, 1996). Richards refutes the thesis of the 'new barbarism' by offering a detailed analysis of why young men resorted to war, as rebels or soldiers, and puts behaviour in context for new insights.

⁸ Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience* (London: Vintage Press, 1998).

or to practices of risking the body.' Violence, if needed, was relegated to others lower in rank, in a male hierarchy built on deference rather than assertiveness, where status could not be openly contested and shaming rituals aimed at humiliating opponents.⁹

Attributes regarded as 'masculine' and 'feminine' can be possessed by either women or men, and are not fixed either between or within societies. Women's and men's gender identities and behaviour fluctuate and change in response to external forces, including colonization, globalization, and armed conflict. The socialisation of boys and young men is of vital importance in understanding the causes of conflict, allied to a recognition of the structural factors which are creating conflict in resource-poor situations or conditions of gross inequality. Thus de Silva offers a comparative framework extending to Northern Ireland, asking what factors contributed to the need for boys to become 'hardmen' (able to fight physically) and how this evolves to 'gunmen' - where the gun does the killing almost regardless of physical prowess. The notion of the 'hardman' carries with it toughness and physical prowess, at its best translated in to heroism. Its negative extreme however, veers towards what has been called essentialist 'patriarchal masculinity' which comes at a cost:

'Patriarchal masculinity cripples men. Manhood as we know it in our society requires such a self-destructive identity, a deeply masochistic self-denial, a shrinkage of the self, a turning away from whole areas of life, the man who obeys the demands of masculinity has become only half-human. . . To become the man I was supposed to be, I had to destroy my most vulnerable side, my sensitivity, my femininity, my creativity, and I had to pretend to be both more powerful and less powerful than I feel'.¹⁰

A central question can be: how is it that young boys today in Somalia, Italy or Northern Ireland --whose great-grandfathers lived male identities where poetry, music and song were considered attributes---will today opt for hardmen and gunmen identities? In Somalia recitation of oral traditions and original poetry was for generations central to male stature and respect. In Ireland the art of story-telling, music making and song have long been important for men. Folk traditions of southern Italy draw on the music of shepherds who used pipe and organetto playing to pass the time; and the songs of agricultural workers who sang as they toiled in fields and orchards. Love songs and serenades used poetry to woo future brides. Some of these distant, pre-urban memories survive in the art form of Italian opera, but are a far cry from generalized men's behaviours today. More often work and livelihoods demand being tough, and competition is strong for success and material reward. City streets are recruiting grounds for young men, where music and song are now coded as feminine in a patriarchal world. In Saviano's analysis the Italian Camorra functions not merely as a

⁹ op. cit de Silva p.27 and p. 235.

¹⁰ Roger Horrocks, *Masculinity in Crisis: Myths, Fantasies, and Realities* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), 25.

challenge to the state, but as a masculine, transnational, political entity in its own right, functioning both beyond and regardless of national governance.

In political theory it is argued that the State holds legitimate monopoly on violence and the use of force. Traditionally a standing army carries this function and role. The public display and potential or actual use of weapons is an intrinsic part of violent, militarized models of masculinity. If and when the State carries little legitimacy or relevance; or if longstanding grievances are not met and political agency is denied, one recourse is to demonstrate manliness through taking up weapons: "The specific 'message' conveyed by the display and use of weapons is dependent on the social and cultural environment....weapons are part of one notion of masculinity, a militarized view that equates 'manliness' with the 'sanctioned use of aggression, force and violence'. Weapons are used as status symbols but also as tools to achieve economic and social gains, wielding power over unarmed males and females. This can often be linked to a crisis of masculinity, when there is a 'fear of loss of male power and privilege' through social transformations, leading to a backlash in which 'traditional' gender roles are reinforced. The construct of the male warrior/protector relies on the suppression of others –" ¹¹

In 1990's civil wars such as those in Somalia, Sudan, Yugoslavia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines featured both gunmen as rebels and resistance or freedom fighters, but also mass media coverage of the effect of war on civilians, notably through displacement, forced migration and casualties. Globally this was an era of political disintegration, which also featured high profile humanitarian response. Armed violence, the political aims and victims of war featured in news coverage and response strategies. The sheer numbers of civilian casualties shocked and mobilized 'humanitarian' response on a new scale, and civil society groups organized around meeting the needs of victims as well as advocating for ways to end war. New activism exposed sexual violence and rape as a crime of war. Human rights groups from Bosnia to Aceh documented mass graves and summary executions, and a new wave of community based groups and non-governmental organizations organized for response to the needs of victims and an end to injustice. Internationally, the image of national armies (male warrior/protectors) was extended to a new articulation of 'humanitarian intervention' meant to emphasize rescue, provision of assistance for the needy, and redress of injustice. While these claims in themselves warrant close scrutiny, they retained a resonance at the end of the last century.

¹¹ See Henri Myrtinnen, "Disarming Masculinities"
ms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/.../06_Disarming+Masculinities.pdf –

Global Iconography

During the past decade the discourse has radically changed. Localized resistance movements and civil wars remain, all over the world. But global communications and mass media seem to have 'locked in' a vivid polarity between the developed world with its armies and high-tech weaponry, and a 'lesser-developed' realm of ideological warriors who are taking on not only a specific state but a world order itself. Within both the (West) USA and the (East) settings of jihadist groups, religious extremism has increased with comparable re-subordination of women—whether within US Christian evangelical circles or on the streets of Kabul. Whereas the threat of risk to its own civilian victims (following the 11 September, 2001 twin tower attack) was used to justify the US declared 'war on terror', the conduct of that war has meant disruption and death for thousands of other civilians who remain somehow invisible.

Nominally many national armies now feature women as well as men soldiers. In an eerie reversal of gender stereotypes, the Abu Ghraib prison torture revelations of 2004 featured a woman inflicting sexual humiliation on male prisoners in Iraq.¹² The worst type of excessive masculine domination behaviour was replicated, for all the world to see, by a female soldier. Doubtless thousands of women serve in the military with ethics and constructive demeanor, but it remains that the image of Lyndie England made a strong imprint of masculine soldiering behaviour devoid of honour. Honour is a quality most national militaries strive for, to build an ethos of respect and professionalism. However, the simple fact is that national militaries in the West find it increasingly difficult to recruit soldiers. Meanwhile the appeal of honour through religious dedication or commitment to purist anti-imperialism can recruit warriors informally, regardless of national borders and the limitations of state governance.

Ironically, notions of 'warrior' masculinity are highly visible in western mass culture. The urban warriors of today, whether dedicated to street crime, corporate profit, or sheer fashion awareness may be seen wearing military-style designer clothes and driving in luxury versions of military vehicles such as Land Rovers or Humvees. Camouflage patterns are a feature of clothing available to all income brackets, for both men and women. But the risk of putting real soldiers 'in harms way', felt acutely in Western capitals, contrasts sharply with the jihadist willingness to die for a cause. This risk has been mitigated in two pronounced ways: by recourse to the rapid rise of Private Military Security Companies PMSCs, and by substituting unmanned technology for soldier to soldier combat.

¹² The *Taguba Report* on the Treatment Of Abu Ghraib Prisoners In Iraq. Article 15.6 ' Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade' news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html

The history of companies like Blackwater (now known as Xe) is based on the private commodification of heavy battle-ready 'real men' whose toughness can literally be bought for battle and defense purposes. The exponential rise in their use is striking, as per the fact that in 2007 their presence as part of the occupation of Iraq was estimated to be close to 200,000 in comparison to the 160,000 uniformed personnel of national militaries occupying the country.¹³

The ethical, governance and economic implications of PMSCs are profound. The image they present is of the modern warrior with ruthless expertise in 'taking out' 'targets' and offering highly armed defence. Scholar Paul Higate thus points to the extreme masculinity portrayed by, and indeed performed by PMSCs: 'It is not simply that PMSCs have become increasingly important to how conflict is managed, but crucially - in contrast to regular militaries - their activities remain largely unregulated and their personnel almost entirely unaccountable. When seen alongside the perpetration of human rights abuses by a not insignificant number of private military contractors - including most notoriously the shooting of 17 unarmed Iraqi civilians in Najaf in September 2007.... it is possible to suggest that PMSCs represent a key moment of (re)masculinisation in the contemporary period.'¹⁴

Higate argues that the curiosity of critical scholars of gender 'should be sparked since the mobilisation of thousands of men trained in violence who go on to work in spaces of legal exception is a unique phenomena that can, at times, exacerbate the insecurity of those vulnerable populations forced to host them'.¹⁵ All over the world the private military industry engages men and masculinities in the buying and selling of force protection and offensive-defensive security.

According to Singer and Highgate¹⁶ PMSCs draw on a workforce of men from the majority and minority worlds. U.S. or British-run companies in Iraq tend to recruit veterans of elite forces including the Special Air Service (SAS), the Special Boat Service (SBS), the U.S. SEALs, Delta and Rangers. Global inequality is reflected within PMSC structures, given the contrast between elite forces and men who are known as 'Third Country Nationals' (TCNs - not the host country, not the occupying coalition countries)

¹³ "Bush's Shadow Army," *The Nation*, 4/2/2007 By the end of Rumsfeld's tenure in late 2006, there were an estimated 100,000 private contractors on the ground in Iraq--an almost one-to-one ratio with active-duty American soldiers. See review of Jeremy Scahill's *Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army* www.wor.org/a/087/blackwater-review-en.html

¹⁴ Paul Higate, "Putting Mercenary Masculinities on the Research Agenda", *Working Paper No. 03-09 Dept. of Politics, University of Bristol UK*, quoted by permission, 4. www.bristol.ac.uk/politics/workingpapers/03-09phpaper.pdf -

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p.4.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* p.10, and Peter Singer, *Corporate Warriors: the Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

who are poorly paid, poorly equipped, and lack high quality training. We see a new international male hierarchy where workers recruited by Middle Eastern labour brokers come from countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal and the Philippines and do menial work for Private Security Companies, such as cooking, serving food and cleaning toilets. Other contractors provide soldiers from countries such as Fiji and Uganda and Latin America, who more often undertake high risk physical protection and military support duties. No accountability mechanism exists for public information, so the generally unreported deaths and injury of many hundreds of private military contractors does not reflect on the governments or policies of the US and UK.

PMSCs provide lethal but low-profile functions, carried out by human beings who are not seen or acknowledged. In a surreal reality the same principle of lethal invisibility applies to the use of drones for attacks in the Afghanistan/Pakistan 'theatre' of war. Here is a high-tech, secret weapon, massive robotic bullets (the symbolic phallic shape is inescapable here) which require no pilot, only remote control. Referring to the CIA, a New York Times article states that 'For the first time in history, a civilian intelligence agency is using robots to carry out a military mission, selecting people for killing in a country where the United States is not officially at war'.¹⁷ Those people include the innocent, the men, women and children who are in the wrong place at the wrong time, and their numbers are mounting.

The development of this extraordinary programme is documented by Steve Coll in his book *Ghost Wars*, which contains chapters and headings like "Blood Brothers" and "You crazy white guys").¹⁸ He traces its development from the early 1990s, originally as an arial robotic intelligence gatherer relying on satellite networks for visual and sound transmission. X2 Predator spy planes were used in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s – at 27 feet long and costing \$4.5 million apiece. It was but a short step to armed Predators as unmanned killer attackers which could penetrate targeted spaces with no immediate risk to their 'pilots' who sit in front of screens and operate controls miles away.

The US military now includes 7,000 unmanned drones.¹⁹ In April 2009, a Lahore newspaper *The News* published figures provided Pakistani officials indicating that 687 civilians have been killed along with 14 al-Qaeda leaders in some 60 drone strikes since January 2008 - just over 50 civilians killed for every al-Qaeda leader.²⁰ What Coll depicted the Ghost Wars are now open warfare, i.e. what was Covert in the 1990's is now Overt, with fatal implications for civilians. It surely makes a mockery of

¹⁷ See *Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) - Predator Drone* -4 Dec 2009
topics.nytimes.com › Times Topics › Subjects › U

¹⁸ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to Sept 10, 2001* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 522 - 524.

¹⁹ www.brookings.edu/articles/.../11_robotic_revolution_singer.aspx -

²⁰ www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KF17Df01.html

proclaimed 'hearts and minds' approaches, however much they are believed in and acted upon by genuine soldiers.

Mirroring Polarities and Extremes

National armies have traditionally drawn on a soldiering base consciously defined through acts of bravery, heroism and sacrifice – sons and daughters of the nation who take on the traditional role of Protector and Defender. In the current deep cleavage of global war, the notion of heroic protection is presented but at the same time undermined. The picture given is that of conflict between the US led staunch defenders (of self-proclaimed democratic and neo-liberal ideals) and ideological, (oft-cited religious or 'Islamist') radicals who would tear down the secular order and build something different. We may well ask whether religious nationalists on both sides of the divide invoke masculine divinity to justify actions of war, mobilizing around the perceived or proclaimed violation of sacred place. Here is spectacle which portrays exclusively male violence with the power to deliver death, (just as maleness can also 'deliver' life); an elevation of violence over diplomacy; a blurring of lines between the criminal and the political. It has serious implications for other long running, protracted conflict sites as per Israel/Palestine, internal struggles in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, or within South Asia itself. If violent models of masculinity are hegemonic, what chance is there for considering justice, human security, peaceful social change or the protection of the weakest (men, women and children) in society?

The 're-masculinisation of war' is evident in a myriad of uncomfortable features which appear to echo each other across a manufactured divide:

- The glorification of manly force and killing evident in both the macho PMSC swagger and the zealous bearded, robed warrior.
- The sanitization of death through invisible PMSC casualties (and heroes' funerals for the fallen from national service) on one side, and glorified suicide or jihadist sacrifice on the other.
- One side accusing the other of subjugating women, while the other counters with accusations of defiling and corrupting women.
- Battle by stealth, whether the high-tech drone or the low-tech lone assassin or bomber.
- Marginalisation of the victims, the social cost, the grief and internalization of memory, rage and despair created by indiscriminate violence in communities.
- Invisibility of Women's Constituencies and Voice on either side.

The current re-masculinisation of war captures mass media attention, glorifies macho aggression and creates potential legacies for reaction throughout the future. This sharp polarization of enemy images, coupled with fear, grievance or singular idealism, brings new followers of the same behaviours, replication of fixed 'us' and 'them' attitudes. In a

visual wave from the west, USA or UK through Europe, the central Balkans and eastward, through to Asia and southward, in Thailand or Indonesia, local bus journeys show Rambo-style action films with strong heroes, reactive violence and instant deaths. Computer screens and games throughout the world pick up on similar modeling for boys and girls to 'play'. Meanwhile, the narrative of war in mass media broadcasting conveys men fighting, and bombing, and controlling other men.

But it also obscures the specifics of context and experience in specific, localised conflict sites, each with its own particularities: history, people, poverty, displacement, competing narratives of claim and counter-claim, injustice, or identity, tactics, aspirations, struggle and counter-struggle. Perhaps the scholar and the practitioner need to point out that a smokescreen is in place; that listening, analysis and clear observation are needed if we are to find a way out of a quagmire of competing forces. Perhaps it is possible to re-instate women, men who opt for non-violence, non-combatants/those who suffer from armed aggression, are disabled or dislocated by war; ethical security policies; engagement and diplomacy; and to eventually temper the use of brute force. To do this we must ask what lies behind such extreme presentation; what is shaping this 'given' polarity; and what are the missing intersections between extreme acts of war and the warrior-self, between fighter and brother, sister, wife, parent, child. We must challenge the hegemonic, re-masculinisation of war.