Processing Peace: To Speak in a Different Voice

Meenakshi Gopinath

Abstract

This paper investigates India’s approach to working around the ‘Kashmir’ factor to improve its relationship with Pakistan. The author argues that the Composite Dialogue (CD) framework marked a decisive shift in India’s approach to negotiations from a short term tactical militarist approach to a problem solving orientation in keeping with its self-image of a rising power seeking a place in the sun, through a normative positioning that simultaneously protected its strategic interests. This in the author’s view is an indication that a “peace process” is underway and is likely to yield positive outcomes for not only India but also Pakistan.

Author Profile

Meenakshi Gopinath is the Founder and Honorary Director of WISCOMP and Principal, Lady Shri Ram College, New Delhi. She was the first woman to serve as member of the National Security Advisory Board of India. Dr. Gopinath is a member of multi-track peace initiatives in Kashmir and between India and Pakistan. She has authored among others Pakistan in Transition, and co-authored Conflict Resolution – Trends and Prospects, Transcending Conflict: A Resource book on Conflict Transformation and Dialogic Engagement and has contributed chapters and articles in several books and journals.
India’s real challenge in balancing its potential ‘big role’ with ‘smart power’ comes from its immediate South Asian neighbourhood. With the locus of extremism and violence and the ‘centre for gravity of international terrorism’ moving towards South Asia, the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s initial tolerance of extremist activity from its soil and increasing regional instability, the Indian subcontinent has become particularly salient to world politics from 9/11 onwards. India’s neighboring states remain troubled and crisis ridden and deeply affect its sense of security, economic growth and development. From Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka to even Myanmar, internal crisis and troubled transitions, have long-term regional and global implications which profoundly impact the future role India crafts for itself in a changing world. This is a world, where after the economic meltdown of 2008, the G8 countries are having to contend with the growing salience of the G20. Here India seems poised to play an influential role.

Consequently, India is in search for a new idiom of strategic reasoning that moves beyond tactics to a sustained engagement in its neighborhood that deftly skirts unilateralism or interventionism and frees it of charges of ‘interference’ in the internal affairs of its neighbors.

There is a growing recognition, particularly since the 1990s, that the expansion of democratic values in its neighbourhood is crucial to India’s own future as a multi-ethnic, multicultural nation, especially in the face of the threat of rising religious extremism both within and beyond its borders. The shift to actively promote democratization and political pluralism in the neighbourhood, also reflects India’s position that the practice of democracy is not incompatible with Asian values and that India and the South Asian region has, and can contribute to the enrichment of the democratic idea. The practice of democracy need not be circumscribed by the Western liberal model.

India now seeks a prosperous and peaceful South Asia as integral to its vision of an emerging Asia. To this end, a more proactive effort to build regional ties, and an innovative approach is needed to provide support to smaller and willing neighbors to overcome their internal political crises and focus on development. Support for democratic transitions in the neighbourhood, including facilitating institution building and power sharing among different regions and ethnic groups is seen as integral to this new thrust of expanding circles of ‘non-intrusive’ engagement. In this new focus,
especially on its Western front—in relation to Afghanistan and Pakistan—India has chosen to play this role in concert with the ‘oldest democracy’, the United States.

The “enduring centrality of the Indo-Pakistan relationship to South Asian security” has remained unchanged, despite the other changes since the 1990s including the nuclear tests of 1998, September 11 and its aftershocks, the decline of the role of the former Soviet Union, and the unprecedentedly manifest role of the United States in the region (which also has remained almost constant and intractable).4

Three possible scenarios are envisaged, contingent on the trajectory of this contentious relationship: a mutually profitable engagement providing the engine for economic integration and growth in a developing South Asia; or both countries becoming prime actors in a nuclear tragedy; or, more plausibly, both countries oscillating precipitously between these two extremes. Such possibilities prompt and fuel much of the Western concern about the Kashmir dispute providing a potential nuclear flash point in South Asia. The likelihood of such an occurrence remains hotly debated. Yet being a region where the largest numbers of nuclear powers are in the closest geographical proximity, the challenges for conflict management in the face of a possible conflagration are compelling.

The tortuous India-Pakistan relationship that encompassed three wars in 1947-48, 1965, 1971, and a series of crises – the Operation Brasstacks crisis of 1986-87, the Kashmir crisis of 1990, the Kargil conflict of 1999, and the prolonged border confrontation of 2001-02, failed to bring either country close to its respective goals. Coming close to the brink in Kargil and again in 2001-02, they purportedly held back on the nuclear option, under intense U.S. and international pressure. It has been urged however, that in both instances they attempted a complex game of compellence involving bilateral coercion as well as trilateral pressure (through the global community and especially the United States) to extract concessions from each other. Pakistan wanted India to yield on Kashmir, while India wanted to force Pakistan to withdraw its support to several terrorist groups active in Kashmir.6

The fact that both countries failed in their objectives, and the possibility of recurrent crises still remained open, may have prompted, the ‘leap of trust’ olive branch offer by former Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2003 and President Musharraf’s acceptance to move out of the deadlock, culminating in the much feted Composite Dialogue framework resumed and unveiled in the Indo-Pakistan Joint Statement in Islamabad in 2004.

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5 Ibid, 58-59. The geographical proximity of nuclearized India, Pakistan and China, make South Asia particularly vulnerable. Amid the massive mobilization of India’s and Pakistan’s forces along the LoC (Line of Control) and international border in 2002 evoked deep concern in every major power – from U.S., Europe and East Asia, earning the subcontinent the sobriquet of a ‘nuclear flashpoint’.
Sustaining Dialogue and Rescripting Security: The Composite Dialogue and Beyond

The Composite Dialogue (CD) provided the framework within which it became possible for the first time to talk about a ‘peace process’ between India and Pakistan. As a mechanism for conflict management/resolution, it was unprecedented. From India’s perspective it reflected the decision to move from tactics and brinkmanship towards a decisive strategy of productive engagement with Pakistan. This was followed through by the successor UPA government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh when it came to power in May 2004.

While there had been sustained engagement at the official level between India and Pakistan since 1947 taking place at multiple levels, the Composite Dialogue implicitly sought to broaden the canvas, beyond the ‘core’ issue of Kashmir, build confidence among the highest level of decision making, seeking simultaneously to widen and engender peace constituencies in their respective countries. The political leadership, clearly in this instance was ahead of their security and foreign policy establishments to grapple with the ‘trust deficit’ between the two countries, stake their reputations, and take on the ire of recalcitrant domestic communities and critics to invest in peace. The subjects put on the table reflected a willingness to address all outstanding and contentious issues for a decisive movement forward. The existing ‘dividers’ and potential ‘connectors’ alike were included in the eight subject menu.

The CD marked in a fundamental sense a bend in the road and a genuine willingness to invest in the peace dividend. This was reflected in a new openness to move away from the terms of engagement of summit diplomacy, and the ‘core issues’ preoccupations, which for Pakistan had been the resolution of the Jammu & Kashmir question and for India the end to ‘cross-border’ terrorism indicative of Pakistan’s ‘compulsive hostility’. There was for the first time focus on the structure of the process and not just on the issues and proposals for resolution. In addition, the process of mutual assessment and

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7 These include the Nehru-Liaquat Pact; the Shimla Agreement; the Zia-ul-Haq-Indira Gandhi Joint Commission Agreement, 1982; the Rajiv Gandhi- Benazir Bhutto talks, 1988; the Narasimha Rao-Nawaz Sharif talks, 1991; the engagement between Prime Minister I.K. Gujral and Nawaz Sharif, which paved the way for a Composite Dialogue (CD) and the Lahore Declaration of 1999.

8 The eight subjects include: peace and security including confidence building measures; Jammu & Kashmir; Siachen; Tulbul Navigation project; the Sir Creek marshland; terrorism and drug trafficking; economic and commercial cooperation; and promotion of friendly exchanges.

9 It is significant that three important summits: Tashkent (1966), Shimla (1972) and Agra (2001) each took place following a war between the two countries. Similarly, the Lahore Talks of 1999 took place in the shadow of a looming threat of a possible (but averted) nuclear conflagration. Summits alone without civil society support go only so far in the context of peacebuilding between chronic adversaries.
confidence building among leaders at the highest level of decision making represented the pulse of the dialogue. Sequencing and prioritization was shed in favor of simultaneous movement on issues of contention. Both sides could undertake a series of unilateral but reciprocal confidence building measures (CBMs). It was broadly a dialogue without preconditions set in stone, with the understanding that India agreed to discuss the Kashmir question purposefully and Pakistan promised not to allow terrorism from its soil. The agreement to negotiate Kashmir in an environment free of violence and terrorism was the principle achievement of the India-Pakistan Joint statement of January 4, 2004, that ushered in the Composite Dialogue Process. The accordion was open to take on board creative ideas and thinking ‘out of box’ – as President Musharraf put it – on the vexatious question of Jammu & Kashmir. The emphasis was on a bilateral approach without any direct third party involvement, although the U.S. presence in the region proved a facilitating factor. The investment was clearly in breaching the walls of suspicion and negative stereotyping that had pervaded earlier summit diplomacy. A comprehensive trust-building initiative, which was mutually beneficial, had been flagged.

Despite Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s deep disappointment at the turn of events following his bold attempts at building bridges – “I had gone to Lahore with a message of goodwill, but in return we got Kargil” – and former Pakistan President Musharraf’s statement in an interview in 2009 describing the Kargil War as a watershed that drastically altered the Indian attitude and response and to be open to negotiation on Kashmir, the CD reflected and engendered the overwhelming public sentiment for peace in civil society in both countries. The floodgates opened and the mood was, (in retrospect, perhaps deceptively) heady. Kargil had proved to be, for better or worse, a defining moment in Indo-Pak relations. Again, the 2002 confrontation had established beyond doubt that the role of external powers, the United States in particular was set to increase. Despite India’s steadfast opposition to “internationalizing” disputes between India and Pakistan, South Asian security is in reality internationalized especially after the decisions in both countries to go openly nuclear in 1998.

The period between 2004 and 2007, saw a spurt of multi track processes and an overwhelming groundswell of people to people exchanges. Indo-Pak peace became something of a cause celebre for the civil society community in India and Pakistan during this period. There was a spate of people-to-people contact and exchanges – from chambers of commerce, media persons, journalists, religious leaders, parliamentarians, youth groups, Kashmir groups (from both sides of the LOC and diaspora) scholars, academics, educationists, lawyers, jurists, and a host of civil society activists. In particular, women’s groups that had been the precursors of cross border peace

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12 See Christophe Carle, “International Security in a Nuclear South Asia” op. cit., p. 64
13 It is reported that the Indian missions in Pakistan processed only 30 visas in June 2003, which went up to over 30,000, during the highnoon of the Composite Dialogue. In early 2007, an average of 12,000 visas had been issued for Pakistani visits to India.

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initiatives from the early 1980s, played a significant role in the civil society peace initiatives.14 Through the ebbs and flows of Indo-Pakistan official relations and restrictive visa regimes, women’s groups attempted to sustain the dialogue, although their role largely remained under-recognized in official fora.15

Transcending the fixation on borders, lines of control and boundaries, these groups, brought to their tables a whole range of issues that governments did not or could not address. The role of the Track III Pakistan-India People’s Forum for Peace and Democracy (PIPFPD), South Asia Free Media Association (SAFMA) and Women in Security Conflict Management and Peace (WISCOMP) has been significant in this context.16 The focus of energies was broadly to address the trust-deficit that had plagued Indo-Pak relations, the negative stereotypes, enemy images and threat perceptions17 that had prompted former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to proclaim as early as 1975, “Kashmir will be settled only when we are friends. It will not be settled so long as there is hostility between us.”18 Equally important was the emphasis to be more appreciative of the internal contradictions within each country, the structural causes of conflict and impediments to peacebuilding, compulsions of national politics and fragmentation, and to desist from essentializing internal compulsions or treat essentially fragmented polities as monoliths. This enabled like minded constituencies to build networks across erstwhile boundaries that could create a critical mass. In addition, there was an attempt to get beyond the ‘security dilemma’ and the inherent bad faith model so reminiscent of Cold War (particularly U.S.-Soviet) interstate relations that fuel hostility. These are now beginning to be addressed by international relations scholars, as important

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14 Cross border peace initiatives between women’s groups from Pakistan and India can be traced back to the early 1980s. One of the first contacts between women’s groups was in 1984, when Indian peace activist Kamla Bhasin was invited as a family planning trainer. In 1988 a Pakistani women’s initiative spearheaded by Shirkat Gah studied the Chipko movement in India leading to the first joint Indo-Pakistan conference on environment in Lahore. The Women’s Bus for Peace organized by WIPSA (Women’s Initiative for Peace in South Asia) against the rhetoric of war post-Kargil, attempted to create a space for dialogue, when in 2000, women from both countries representing diverse professional backgrounds, made the 12-hour journey each way, to generate goodwill on both sides. See Smitu Kothari and Zia Mian, eds., Bridging Partition: Peoples’ Initiatives for Peace Between India and Pakistan, (Orient Blackswan, 2010).

15 One such is WISCOMP (Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace) a pathbreaking initiative, that has over a decade, held annual Conflict Transformation workshops for Pakistani and Indian future influentials to develop a growing constituency of peace in South Asia. This network now boasts of over 500 members, who work to stay connected.

16 These groups, women in particular, have been at the forefront of broadening the terms of engagement by incorporating a range of human security issues concerning public and private violence against women, human rights, militarization of the region, perils of nuclearization through text books and the formal education system, fundamentalism of different kinds and the impact on the lives and livelihoods of ordinary citizens.

17 The deep suspicions are based on certain myths about the other country. Myths prevalent in Pakistan are: (a) India has not reconciled itself to the reality of partition. It is determined to inflict damage to the very identity of Pakistan as a nation-state; (b) Its military expenditure and nuclear posture is dictated by an ambition to disable Pakistan’s security; (c) India follows a spurious policy of secularism; (d) It has illegally and with devious motives snatched away Kashmir from Pakistan (to which it did not have a rightful claim). Similarly in India the following myths are prevalent: (a) Pakistan is implacably dedicated to the break-up of India; (b) The Pakistan establishment is not part of the subcontinent, but rather it is part of the Turko-Persian stock; (c) Pakistan is determined to use Islam and jihad as weapons to destroy the basic values of the Indian civilization and democracy.

psychological deterrents to trust which is increasingly recognized as a crucial but overlooked dimension of international relations on peace diplomacy theory.\(^{19}\)

Significantly between 2004 and 2007, there were around 10-12 back channel, and Track II processes that were vigorously involved. One of them, the Neemrana Dialogue, the longest existing Track II process, is reported to have been largely responsible for formulating a solution for the speedy implementation of the much hailed Srinagar-Muzzaffarabad Bus Service connecting people of the divided Kashmir on both sides of the Indo-Pak border. In attempting to catch the wind, India and Pakistan came close to devising a framework for settling their long conflict over Kashmir in secret negotiations,\(^{20}\) but it was put on hold from March 2007 onwards owing to Musharraf’s declining popularity, problems at home, and the chain of events that eventually led to his ouster in August 2008.\(^{21}\) Khurshid Kasuri, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister at that time was quoted as saying that it contained “four big ideas” within which the proposed agreement was discussed. These included demilitarization (the gradual withdrawal of troops from both sides), Kashmiris to be given special rights to move and trade freely on both sides of the line of control, greater autonomy and some form of self governance and a joint mechanism that would link the two Kashmiris, consisting of local Kashmiri leaders, Indians and Pakistanis that would oversee issues affecting people on both sides of the line.\(^{22}\) Such a resolution of the Kashmir dispute was to be the cornerstone of a broad agreement representing a paradigm shift, in changing the basic nature of the problem.\(^{23}\) There had also been substantial understanding on the contested Siachen glacier and one of the most significant movements in bilateral diplomacy towards a

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\(^{20}\) Referred to as the ‘back channel’ the talks were held on a several years by special envoys in Bangkok, Dubai and London. The two principal envoys Tariq Aziz for Pakistan, and S.K. Lambah for India, developed a text on Kashmir called a “non paper” because it contained no signatures or names but could serve as a detailed basis for a deal, See “India Pakistan were close to secret deal on Kashmir”: Report, AFP, Washington, February 23, 2009.

\(^{21}\) In March 2007, as New Delhi and Islamabad were planning a historic summit, Musharraf became embroiled in a controversy for invoking near dictatorial powers to fire the Chief Justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court, triggering unremitting protests by lawyers and activists. With the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007, a popular leader who was set to win in the elections declared by him, Musharraf’s popularity was at an all time low. The historic General Elections, held after much prevarication and attendant protest on February 18, 2008, was an overwhelming vote against him. In addition, the attacks on the Indian mission in Kabul in July 2008 allegedly by terror groups in Pakistan and the terrorist attack in Mumbai in November 2008, dashed hopes of a grand settlement.

\(^{22}\) Excerpted Interview of Former Foreign Minister of Pakistan Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri with Karan Thapar, *The Hindu*, New Delhi, February 21, 2009. In an interview Musharraf reiterated and confirmed this adding that the two countries were close to a solution on Kashmir, Siachen and Cir Creek. See *The Hindu*, New Delhi, July 18, 2009.

\(^{23}\) See “India Pakistan were Close to Kashmir Accord”, *Indo-Asian News Service*, February 22, 2009 http://in.news.yahoo.com/43/20090222/890

Available from http://www.wiscomp.org/peaceprints.htm
resolution of the Sir Creek maritime boundary dispute. 24 Both initiatives were frozen in the diplomatic chill that followed the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008.

Musharraf had persuaded the Pakistan Army to fall in line on the “movement forward” in Kashmir, although, beset with political difficulties he was unable to sell it to a larger constituency at home, owing to his declining clout and political fortunes. The pitch for peace broadly, reflected a realization that given the nuclearized environment “war was no longer an option for either side.” 25 It seemed to be additionally propelled by Musharraf’s own imperatives to be seen as a liberal, modern Islamic leader; to control religious extremism in Pakistan; and be the architect of a ‘grand settlement’ with India. Musharraf’s “out of box” articulation in October 2004 for a proposed settlement on Kashmir had underscored a flexible approach, moving away from rigid and hardened positions and even a willingness to “leave behind the UN Resolutions”, a position that was sensitive to the Indian aversion for a proposed plebiscite. His four-point formula, suggested four stages (a) The recognition of Kashmir as a dispute (b) the initiation of a dialogue (c) shedding of unacceptable solution and (d) securing a win-win position.

Musharraf’s proposal was presented as an attempt to generate focused debate. The formula identified seven regions in Kashmir, two of which are in Pakistan and five in India on the basis of a combination of factors like ethnicity, linguistic homogeneity, religious commonalities, geographic proximity or compactness. As has been shown by Indian scholars, on Kashmir, this is not an easy task since commonalities are difficult to establish in Kashmir, where several differentiated faultlines of ethnicity caste, class religion, and language combine and collide often flying in the face of neat labels of population homogeneity or coherence. 26 ‘Kashmir’ is by no means a monolithic undifferentiated space and defies easy categorization, a fact that has often been overlooked much contemporary writing on the region. 27

The formula also suggested the need (a) To identify the region of Kashmir (b) To seek demilitarization of the identified region and (c) finally change the status of the disputed

24 The issue of Sir Creek – an area supposed to be rich in oil and gas reserves as well as varied biodiversity – is one of the least politicized disputes between the two countries, and as a result considered more amenable to an early settlement. The dispute negotiation process since 1969 concerns the demarcation of the India-Pak boundary in a 96 km long estuary in the Rann of Kutch. Sir Creek was one of the issues in the Composite Dialogue Process. Following the 5th round in 2006, the two sides had agreed on a joint survey and exchanged maps.
25 Kasuri Interview, op. cit, February 21, 2009.
26 See BG Verghese, A J and K Primer From Myth to Reality, New Delhi: India Research Press 2006, and Radha Kumar, Making Peace with Partition (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2005). The parts of Kashmir that suffered most from the 1949 division, as pointed out by Radha Kumar in terms of cultural discontinuity are the border regions of Jammu and Azad Kashmir, Kargil and Baltistan. The people of most of these regions have cross cutting identities.
27 There is a tendency to equate the state of Jammu & Kashmir with the Kashmir valley, and see the Valley as exclusively Kashmiri Muslim. The “Kashmir issue” consequently is framed as a ‘territorial dispute’ between India and Pakistan and also as a struggle for an independent state by the Kashmiris. What or who is a Kashmiri is still mired in confusion. The province of Jammu & Kashmir, on the Indian side, represents a plurality with diverse communities like the Ladakhi Buddhists, the Gujjars, the Bakerwals and the Kashmiri Pandits for whom independence may not be an aspiration at all. Their political choices often foreground, nurturing their socio-cultural identity and my not find resonance, with an overarching homogenous sub nationalism. A lucid elaboration is found in Navanita Chadha Behera, Demystifying Kashmir, (New York: Brookings, 2006).
region either under the auspices of the UN or a joint control or condominium type approach. The idea of ‘soft borders’ gained momentum, even as the Indian Prime Minister elaborated in March 24, 2006 (at the launch of the Amritsar-Nankana Sahib bus service), his earlier stated position on making borders irrelevant without redrawing boundaries and offering a treaty of peace, security and friendship to Pakistan, Manmohan Singh took that further leap of faith saying:  

Both sides (India and Pakistan) should begin a dialogue with the people in their areas of control to improve the quality of governance so as to give the people a greater chance of leading a life of dignity and self respect. Borders cannot be redrawn but we can work towards making them irrelevant - towards making them just lines on a map. People on both sides of the LoC should be able to move more freely and trade with one another..... I also envisage a situation where the two parts of Kashmir can, with the active engagement of the governments of India and Pakistan, work out cooperative consultative mechanisms to maximize the gains of cooperation in solving problems of social and economic development of the region.

Although Musharraf’s proposals are open to varied interpretations, the fact that he was the first Pakistani leader to (a) opt for self governance in preference to self determination which implies change of borders; (b) keep UN resolutions aside; (c) give up plebiscite and independence for Indian Kashmir; (d) desist from demanding any territory for Pakistan; (e) reject the communal (religious) criteria; (f) not demand Kashmir’s secession from India and encourage Kashmiris to talk to New Delhi, was not lost on the Indian establishment. There was a recognition that it was important to do business with whoever was in power in Pakistan, especially one who could bring the all powerful army on board. The democratic credentials of the peace brokers were no longer flagged as an important factor for sustaining the dialogue.

The considerable movement forward on a whole range of issues facilitated by the CD, prompted Musharraf’s euphoric description of the peace process as now “irreversible”. This also reflected the popular mood of floodgates being opened. A young Indian scholar commenting on the presence of thousands of Indians in Pakistan, enjoying the overwhelming hospitality, friendship and warmth of their hosts saw it in no uncertain terms as an indicator of the beginning of social change in India and Pakistan. Eager to see the possibilities of a “peace dividend” there was a desire that the CD not remain one brief shining moment in Indo-Pak relations.

In what can be called as a first breakthrough attempt after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, premiers Gilani of Pakistan and Manmohan Singh of India met in the Egyptian town of Sharm-el-Shaikh, in July 2009 on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement Summit. The joint statement declared that the neighbors would engage with each other even though it did not mean restarting the CD process. Also, the Indian prime minister, at the
cost of much opprobrium back home, strengthened Gilani’s hand to push the peace process by agreeing to include in the joint statement the line that “action on terrorism should not be linked to the CD process and these should not be bracketed”. The two leaders next met at Thimpu in April 2010 during the SAARC summit when the foreign ministers were instructed to meet to bridge the ‘trust deficit’. This led to meetings between the foreign secretaries in June 2010 and foreign ministers in July 2010. Culminating in a meeting between foreign secretaries Salman Bashir and Nirupama Rao in Thimpu in February 2011 where they “agreed on the need for a constructive dialogue between India and Pakistan to resolve all outstanding issues”. They decided to engage on counter-terrorism (including progress on Mumbai trial), humanitarian issues, peace & security, including CBMs, Jammu & Kashmir, Siachen, economic issues, the Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project and Sir Creek, and promotion of friendly exchanges. A few days later Indian foreign minister S.M. Krishna, who was visiting the UN in New York, affirmed India’s commitment. He said the resumption of talks was a “conscious decision” on the part of India. The spirit was taken up at the July 2011 meeting of the foreign ministers in New Delhi, now between Hina Rabbani Khar of Pakistan and S.M. Krishna. Among the positives was a renewed focus on easing restrictions along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, with simplified travel procedures – introducing a six-month multiple entry permit – and increase in frequency of bus services across the LoC. Agreeing that economic engagement would be of mutual benefit, the ministers called for “early establishment of a non-discriminatory trade regime between the two countries, including reduction/removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers”.

It was the environment created by the CD and peace process that opened up the possibility of such significant shifts. Within the paradigm of conflict resolution analysis this could be seen as an attempt to move the engagement away from militarist values and engender constituencies and predispositions to peace. There was an almost open acceptance that people do not always see things the way their governments do.

The idea of a Public Peace Process first articulated by Harold Saunders in the context of the Dartmouth process, and later theoretically elaborated, seems to have entered the consciousness of policy makers for the first time. The five stages involved in this process, namely (1) deciding to engage; (2) mapping and naming problems and relationships; (3) exploring problems and setting the direction for change;(4) forming solutions/scenario building; and (5) acting together – were, for the most part, especially in Musharraf’s proposals, taken on board. The door was open for multi-track engagement, facilitated in many cases, by both governments. There was clearly a concerted pitch to move “beyond intractability”.

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33 Rajya Sabha unstarred question no 536, August 4, 2011, http://www.idsa.in/resources/parliament/ResumptionofpeacetalkswithPakistan04.08.11
37 Ibid, 98-145.
Was the CD the result of a recognition that the conflict was “ripe” for resolution as the Zartman model would suggest? \(^{38}\) The extent to which it revolved around considered acceptance of a *Mutually Hurting Stalemate* (MHS), *Imminent Mutual Catastrophe* or *Entrapment* as incentives to negotiate is difficult to gauge. \(^{39}\) There is little evidence to suggest that the idea of a MHS based on a cost-benefit analysis, consistent with public choice notions of rationality and studies of war termination and negotiation, were at play in the conceptualizing of the CD. The complexities on the ground, the multiple stakeholder positions on the Kashmir issue, and the manner in which events unfolded between 1999 and 2004, did not lend themselves to a likely consensus on these aspects. \(^{40}\)

The desire to explore a ‘way out’ was, however, palpable. Seen through a nuanced lens of ripeness theory, what was at work more than the MHS was the *Mutually Enticing Opportunity* (MEO), where, as pointed out by Chester Crocker, a ripe moment can occur when leaders see a better way of achieving goals than continuing with the costly struggle. \(^{41}\) These include factors such as availability and increasing acceptability of some

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Zartman’s model suggests five major features (1) parties resolve conflicts only when they are ready to do so. At the ‘ripe’ moment they are amenable to proposals that offer a way out. (2) The pain suffered by the parties would push them to a situation where they would be willing to negotiate out of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate. (3) There is a willingness to search for a solution and a shared sense that a negotiated solution is possible, (4) mediation sensitizes and persuades the parties that the conflict is ripe for resolution. (5) Inability to bear the costs of further escalations including material and human costs are indicators of ripeness.


\(^{39}\) The concept of a ‘ripe’ moment centres on the parties’ perception of a mutually hurting stalemate associated with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe. The catastrophe provides a deadline or lesson indicating that pain can be sharply increased, if a way out is not found, since they are locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory. The deadline is painful, even if not to the same degree to all parties. The way out need not be to identify a specific solution, but a clear sense that there is a willingness on all sides to search for a solution.

\(^{40}\) Between 1999 and 2002, while there were two major political initiatives for rapprochement at the Lahore and Agra summits, there were two military engagements in 1999 (Kargil) and 2001-02. There were also concepts like surgical strikes and limited war at play. After Kargil, militancy got revived in the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir. There were also splits within the separatist groups like the divide within the Hizbul Mujahideen. There were also more than two parties to the conflict, making it difficult for MHS to come into play along multiple faultlines. The parties in the Kashmir conflict include (a) India, Pakistan, Kashmiris and non-state actors (b) Kashmiris on the Indian side – Kashmiri Muslims, Kashmiri Pandits, people of Jammu and Ladakh besides the Gujars and Bakerwals. (c) Kashmiris in the valley including, the mainstream and separatist groups (d) the non-state actors in Indian Kashmir especially the Hizbul Mujahideen, other Jihadi groups and the Ikhwans (or the militant turned informers.) (e) In addition the various groups in AJK (Azad Jammu & Kashmir), and the Northern Areas in Pakistan.


\(^{41}\) Chester Crocker, conflict resolution theorist and practitioner, making significant contributions to ‘ripeness’ theory avers that while the correct timing is a matter of feel and instinct, the absence of ripeness does not dictate ‘walking away and doing nothing’. The two strategies to be pursued while waiting for the moment to ripen, (for the practitioner) include *positioning* and *ripening* as adjuncts to ripeness theory. These could also create compelling opportunities for a negotiation and open up new possibilities.
new set of basic ideas, principles and concepts, the gradual disappearance of the parties’ unilateral options and the existence of useful channels through which adversaries can communicate.\textsuperscript{42} Is it then the case that while ‘Summit Diplomacy’ between 1998-2004 focused on the content of substantive proposal prompted in the main by perceptions of MHS, the CD reflected significant shifts in the orientation to conflict management?

At the most visible level was the willingness of the political leadership in both countries to engage with an ‘active’ approach to building trust.\textsuperscript{43} This foregrounded the position that seeking a military solution to the conflict was neither desirable nor practical, nor in the long term interest of both countries.

Recognizing that ‘trust and uncertainty’ are mutually implicated, there was a willingness to cultivate, what Booth and Wheeler call “security dilemma sensibility, involving an ability to get into the counter fears of others transcending security competition”.\textsuperscript{44}

The willingness to take a political “leap in the dark” and the “costly signaling” that this entailed was also much in evidence.\textsuperscript{45} Musharraf faced a great deal of criticism when he was perceived domestically as having given in on Kashmir. Former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore in 1999 was full of symbolism and can be seen as a “leap in the dark”.\textsuperscript{46} After Kargil, it came in for criticism by sections of the strategic community who saw it as a move that made India more vulnerable to the adversary. In attempting to carry forward the spirit of the CD even after the 26/11; Prime Minister Manmohan Singh faced trenchant criticism for the Joint Statement with his Pakistani

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\textsuperscript{42} In their willingness to examine the economic cost of the conflict over Siachen and explore their economic relationship and the potential for progress that cross border trade holds, the countries did signal an enticing opportunity moment.

\textsuperscript{43} I have drawn heavily on the model of trust building developed by Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler in \textit{The Security Dilemma}, 2008, op. cit. The theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of this model, suggest a most apposite perspective for addressing what many believe is the core issue, namely the trust deficit that keeps Pakistan and India locked in adversarial positions.

\textsuperscript{44} Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, describe it as an actor’s intention and capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the potential complexity of the military intentions of others. In particular, it refers to the ability to understand the role that fear might play in their own attitudes and behavior, including, crucially, the role that one’s own actions may play in provoking that fear. Ibid, 7, 28 and 296.

\textsuperscript{45} Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler describe ‘costly signaling’ as a move that is aimed at convincing an adversary that one is serious about cooperation and is demonstrated by exposing oneself to some risks by the act of transmitting the signal (\textit{Security Dilemma}, op cit, 145). These are also signals designed to persuade the other side about the trust worthiness of one’s intentions by virtue of the fact that they are so costly that one would otherwise hesitate to send them.

\textsuperscript{46} Former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s trip to Lahore in 1999 to inaugurate the Delhi-Lahore bus service was seen as a major confidence and security building measure between the two countries. He made a powerful symbolic statement by visiting the Minar-e-Pakistan, the monument that commemorates the birth of Pakistan, also the site, where in 1940; the Muslim League passed the Lahore Resolution demanding the creation of Pakistan. This was as much to persuade domestic constituencies especially militiast members of his right of centre party the BJP, that India has absolutely no intentions of overrunning Pakistan or reversing the verdict of the partition of the subcontinent or changing the borders. After the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, Pakistan’s fear of India supporting a further dismemberment has dominated the strategic psyche in Pakistan.
counterpart Gilani, on the sidelines of the NAM conference at Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt in July 2009.

The reference to Balochistan in the statement was seen domestically as India’s capitulation to the Pakistani allegation of its covert assistance to insurgency in the troubled province. This was touted as a diplomatic failure and “sell out”. A possible attempt by India at fostering trust and to enter into the counter-fear of the other, had to be shelved, as a premature albeit visionary start. The ‘official’ retraction emphasized the suspension of the CD, and resumption, only of ‘limited dialogue’ till Pakistan had brought the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice. India claims to have irrefutable evidence that the people who masterminded these attacks belong to the LeT (Lashkar-e-Tayyeba) and its front the JuD (Jamaat–ud-Dawa) and the JeM (Jaish-e-Mohammed) terrorist groups in Pakistan outlawed by the international community as terrorist organizations. India alleges that they have been provided safe havens in Pakistan and used by the ISI as an instrument of state policy. President Zardari’s now much quoted public acknowledgement in 2009 of Pakistani culpability in “creating” and “nurturing” militants and extremists for short-term tactical objectives, may be seen at one level as attempts to build trust, and send the message of a common threat. It has however given credence to India’s stand, despite the official position to not capitalize on it, or embarrass the Pakistani leadership. In addition, the fact that Pakistani courts had been unable or unwilling to prosecute Hafiz Saeed, JuD’s high profile leader who walks free in Pakistan and is allowed to continue with his ‘welfare’ activities, is a major bone of contention between India and its neighbor from the time of the suspension of the CD.

At Sharm-El-Sheikh in July 2009, the Indian Prime Minister had sought consciously to ‘delink’ Pakistan’s action against terrorism, from movement on the CD. Like the text on Balochistan, this too was suitably ambiguous – to be read as either a tough or flexible stand, depending on which constituency was to be addressed. Under mounting domestic pressure, the ‘official’ position moved gradually towards zero tolerance on terrorism and suspension of the CD till visible action against terrorism was taken that India could cite as reason enough to revive the dialogue. And yet, the commitment for the Foreign Secretaries to meet on the sidelines of a Commonwealth meeting in Trinidad in November 2009 was reiterated.

There are many who believe that despite these periodic derailments there is in effect, a bold grand strategy in India, for continuing engagement with Pakistan. This shared vision of both former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, and his ideologically different successor Manmohan Singh, marks the significant continuity on the ‘big rewrite’ of India’s Pakistan strategy. This ‘big rewrite’, involving a shift from short-term tactics to ‘grand strategy’, was reflected in Vajpayee’s persisting with dialogue even after Kargil in 1999 and the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001. It is also reflected in his successor, Manmohan Singh’s willingness to risk opprobrium and depart from India’s post-26/11 position that it would not dialogue with Pakistan until it was satisfied with


Available from http://www.wiscomp.org/peaceprints.htm
action against those responsible. The decision to engage at Sharm-el-Sheikh marked this shift.48

This can also be read as India’s intention to break away from a Pakistan-centric view of its policy and consciously join a global (U.S.-led) project to stabilize Pakistan, bring it back from the brink and enable it to redefine itself as a modern democratic (Islamic) republic. The threat of the alternative – of Pakistan plunging into chaos is seen as dangerous for the neighbourhood, with its mercurial policy, growing extremism, the threat of nuclear weapons being appropriated by extremist groups, armed, non-state actors and a conventional army of nearly a million that stand out in the Islamic world for being capable of absorbing modern technology.49

Both India and Pakistan have shown considerable restraint in desisting on scoring brownie points on the Balochistan issue included in the Joint Statement. India seeks broad action against terrorism from Pakistan instead of focusing on isolated incidents or to make the arrest of this or that terrorist the ‘litmus test’ of the seriousness of Pakistan’s intentions.

India continues to flag official frustration at Pakistan’s unwillingness to act against the LeT and the JeM despite it providing “concrete information about these groups reestablishing terrorist training camps”.50 On Balochistan, contra the critics, some strategists in India, see it as a potential separatist nightmare for Pakistan, laying it vulnerable to the kind of criticism it has mounted on India’s Kashmir policy and opening for India the option to internationalize the struggle for self determination of the Baloch people, should it wish to, in several fora.51 Both countries, (India in particular) however demonstrated a sensitivity to the shifting nuances of international relations and bricolaged around the issue. Taking cognizance of the drift in Balochistan and the situation getting bleaker by the day,52 the Joint Statement ensured that India gave away nothing in real terms, but only provided the Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Gilani the opportunity to claim a breakthrough with his own hawks.

India in its decision to delink action against terrorism from forward movement on the dialogue process was engaging on two fronts simultaneously. This, even as the Pakistan agencies were attempting to shroud a political issue in legalese by asking for “real time, actionable, accessible and credible information”. While mounting continual pressure on the issue of terrorism and also keeping bilateral channels of dialogue and negotiation open, there was the bold attempt to work to strengthen the position of Pakistan’s elected

48 Shekhar Gupta, “Two PMs, One Big Idea,” The Indian Express, New Delhi, August 1, 2009.
49 Shekhar Gupta, “The Big Rewrite,” The Indian Express, New Delhi, July 25, 2009
51 See Arundhati Ghose, “Stop this Menonhunt,” The Outlook, New Delhi, August 31, 2009, 28.
52 A military operation from 2002 has riled the people of Balochistan against the Federation of Pakistan. The alienation intensified after the August 26, 2006 killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, the venerated face of the Baloch struggle for more provincial autonomy. The largely secular Baloch militants had initially tried to keep the fundamentalist sector of the clergy at a distance. They have teamed with Sindhis and Pashtun groups against Punjabi domination. Before the current insurgency in 2003 led by the Balochistan Liberation Army, there have been four major insurgencies in the region – in 1948, 1958-59, 1962-63, and 1973-77. No package for Balochistan is likely to be implemented without Army approval.
leadership and thereby enable it to grapple with religious fundamentalism and contain the role of the armed forces establishment.53

Pakistan cannot afford to simultaneously deal with so many adversarial situations—one from Islamist elements within, one from the Afghan borderlands, one from India, as well as another in Balochistan where the insurgency is older than Pakistan itself.54 India too has its economic agenda, and its own dynamic towards peace, which an ongoing conflict with Pakistan tends to dampen. The key to the emerging rapprochement, as Pakistani author Shuja Nawaz says in his book, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army and the Wars Within, is the realization inside Pakistan that its biggest threat is not India but internal. He exhorts Pakistan’s ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) and India’s RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) to stop playing their spy versus spy games.55 In this context the United States is engaged in an even handed approach of shadow diplomacy, in balancing India’s concerns and its own dependence on Pakistan in the ‘war on terror’ in its north-western borders and Afghanistan. A ‘gentle nudge’ from the U.S., seems to go a long way, especially in Pakistan, providing both countries with incentive to engage. There is also the recognition that a visible engagement of the U.S. to push the peace process will substantially dilute the leadership in both countries to carry their domestic constituencies.

The ability of the Indian political leadership—despite the massive setback post-Mumbai—to stay the course on the necessity of some form of dialogue with Pakistan, is largely on account of the visible and tacit dividends of the climate generated by the CD. The furor over the reference to Balochistan in the Sharm-el-Sheikh statement is indicative of the blind alleys that jettison peace in the ‘democratic space’ in the garb of an inquisitorial parliamentary opposition alleging a ‘sell out’, a strategic community guarding ‘national’ interest, a foreign office defending diplomatic leverage and a news hungry ‘sound bite oriented’ fourth estate unwilling to accommodate nuance. The real challenge in the Indo-Pakistan equation is to manage the see saw of public opinion, often inflamed or manipulated by forces that have a stake in prolonging the conflict.

The CD attempted to move beyond the discourse of belligerence. There was a Lederachian emphasis on developing opportunities for conflict transformation, both personal and systemic, restoring broken relationships, (which resonates deeply with people divided by the partition of the subcontinent) and encourage multiple roles relevant to different tasks in the progression of the conflict and the peacebuilding

53 Rajiv Kumar, “Whose Side Are We On?” The Times of India, New Delhi, September 9, 2009.
54 The presence of a larger ethnic Pashtun population (resettled ostensibly by the Pakistani army to tilt the ethnic balance in favor of the Pashtuns, to pursue its own strategic depth in Afghanistan) and the existence of Taliban safe havens in and around the provincial capital of Quetta has compounded the security problem. Baloch nationalists allege official support to the Taliban. Huge displacements of Baloch farmers and fishermen and land takeovers for cantonments have taken place under army supervision. Islamabad alleges an ‘Indian’ hand in the troubles, but is yet to come up with concrete evidence. Baloch leaders and diaspora like Wahid Baloch have lamented that India too, despite having acquired influence and power and a proponent of democracy and human rights, has chosen not to take a ‘proactive role in Balochistan’ (The Hindu, July 22, 2009). UN estimates published in December 2006 stated that 84,000, people including 33,000 children had been displaced by the fighting in Balochistan. There have been over 2,000 disappearances of civilians held by armed forces. The Baloch insurgents seek India’s help militarily and in international fora.
process. There was also an attempt to situate the process as impacting lives and futures as opposed to application of techniques for specific outcomes and to engender an adaptive, dynamic and responsive change process.\footnote{John Paul Lederach, \textit{Preparing for Peace} (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 11-23.} It took on board the challenge of the process-structure gap and the interdependence gap in peacebuilding.\footnote{John Paul Lederach, “The Challenge of the 21st Century: Just Peace,” in Paul Van Tongeren, ed, \textit{People Building Peace} (Netherlands: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), 27-36}

The opening up to different constituencies to engage vertically and laterally to expand the constituency of stake holders for the peace process was a significant feature of the CD dividend. The Lederachian three tier pyramid which engages, the top leadership (military, political, religious etc.) the middle range leadership (academics, intellectuals, eminent and respected persons, humanitarian leaders,) and grassroots leadership (local leaders, NGOs, community developers etc.) both within and between societies in conflict across these constituencies approximates what was being attempted.\footnote{See John Paul Lederach, \textit{Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies} (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 39. The “Interdependence” gap suggests that sustainability of peacebuilding requires both horizontal and vertical relationship building and coordination. Horizontal capacity refers to efforts to work with counterparts across the lines of division – focusing on improving relationships by getting counterparts to meet each other, e.g. initiatives that bring women’s groups, NGO workers, political leaders etc. across “enemy lines” vertical capacity is the ability to develop relationships of respect and understanding between higher, levels of leadership, mid-range, grassroots and community levels of peace building. Sustainable peacebuilding requires building synergy between and across levels.} It was an engagement with possibilities. As India’s NSA Shiv Shankar Menon stated, it (1) aimed at moving away from a purely state-centric approach; (2) involved steps that have never been taken before like, the opening up of the Line of Control (LoC) or the traditional trade routes (3) in terms of stakeholders it was both a ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ process – involving, for the first time, the people of India and Pakistan, with an orientation to work at all different levels of state and civil society. (4) It focused on stabilizing the relationship even when threatened by ‘spoilers’ responsible for the earlier blasts in Mumbai in July 2006 and the Samjhauta Express train. It had a three-pronged approach in (a) creating a violence free environment, (b) resolving differences through peaceful negotiations (c) developing cooperative relations by building stakes in the bilateral relationship. This was seen as the only way to make the process ‘irreversible’. The threat posed by potential spoilers was taken on board, including engaging on mutually acceptable options on Kashmir that could be brought into the public domain, once all stakeholders were on board. Efforts were made to broaden the base by involving parties from across the political spectrum. The CD provided a context to examine conventional notions of sovereignty and territory that see borders as walls that hinder connectivity rather than as zones where nations and cultures interact.\footnote{Shiv Shankar Menon speaking at a WISCOMP workshop in New Delhi. See Stuti Bhatnagar, Deepti Mahajan, Manjrika Sewak. \textit{Collaborative Explorations- A WISCOMP Report} (New Delhi: WISCOMP, 2006), 38-43.} Connectivity through telecommunications, advancement of technology, rail links enhancement of trade and commerce and gas pipe lines were viewed as integral to the process. The SAARC was seen as a potential avenue to work around bilateral roadblocks.
The Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline project too was flagged as the outline for a paradigm of South-South economic cooperation and regional political solidarity in some optimistic quarters.  

The Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism set up in 2006, received with considerable scepticism in India and increasingly seen after Mumbai as ill-conceived, was a novel initiative to institutionalize sharing information with a historical enemy, to curb infiltration, and move closer to selling norms for security cooperation against non-state armed groups. It also provided a context for a divider namely the issue of terrorism, to become a connector since both countries are, in fact, adversely impacted by terror in different ways.

The CD stands as an innovative model for conflict management in the South Asian region. Two historically bitter adversaries, broke intransigence with the bigger rival (India) recognizing the limits of coercive diplomacy. India focused on what some analysts have described as normative means to make peace with Pakistan: CBMs, arbitration, negotiation, trade and security cooperation. To this must be added the emphases on public diplomacy and trust building. Equally, an attempt was made to separate the dividers and potential connectors and search for common ground by recognizing differences and acting on commonalities. The CBMs combined both conventional military approaches with those that addressed the aspirations of people on both sides and divided families in particular and the release of POWs (prisoner of war) languishing in each other’s jails for decades. Military CBMs included DGMO (Director General of Military Operations) hotlines and regular meetings of border forces. In October 2007, both sides held the fifth round of expert high level talks on nuclear and missile related CBMs. They agreed to continue with the five year old ceasefire, and signed an agreement on ‘Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons’, and committed to notifying each other in the event of nuclear accidents. The prospect of a weak Pakistan, with the possibility of a radical takeover of government and nuclear leakages to terrorists, the insecurities and threat perceptions generated by the A.Q. Khan phenomenon has scripted Indian policy in this regard. This is reflected in the recognition that India’s defense posture must be consistent with its international standing as a ‘responsible nuclear state’ with low key non-deployed minimum deterrence and in the long term downgrading of capabilities for major conventional war and upgrading border control capabilities. India’s ‘No First Strike’ policy and the voluntary moratorium on testing validates this stand. The launch of India’s first missile

60 The now stalled Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project (approx $7.5 billion) had been flagged with great enthusiasm as one that would bring in enormous economic gains to both countries, as well as initiate a new era of politico economic solidarity. But New Delhi’s fears about an ‘unpredictable’ Tehran and ‘unreliable’ Pakistan, as well as U.S. opposition to the project and its preference for a TAP (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan) pipeline and pricing issues, Pakistan’s lack of institutionalized decision making and strategic capacity for such mega projects, served to put it on the back burner.

India ranks 6th globally accounting for 3.5 percent of world commercial energy demand. Its need is primarily oil and gas. 76 percent of India’s oil comes from imports. Pakistan spends U.S. $3 billion on importing petroleum and petroleum products. Its requirement is set to triple in the next 10-15 years. Both countries stand to gain hugely by cooperation on energy.

61 Radha Kumar, India as a Foreign Policy Actor – Normative Redux, op. cit., 8

62 Ibid.

63 CBMs between India and Pakistan have had a long history dating back to the Indus Treaty in 1960. DGMO communication links have existed since the late 1980s. An agreement not to attack each other’s
capable submarine Arihant in August 2009, had raised concern in Pakistan which sees it as having serious regional implications.

Nuclear anxieties notwithstanding, the relaxation of visa regimes, the visible transformation of the Wagah-Atari border, increased rail and road links, across the Line of Control, the opening of five transit points across divided Kashmir, the revival of the Munabao-Khokhrapar train service, and above all, the Srinagar- Muzaffarabad bus service and facilitation of people-to-people contact had a major trust building effect.

India and Pakistan used the framework of the one historically successful Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, to arbitrate their long-standing, quarter century dispute over the Baglihar dam through a multilateral forum. A tribunal appointed by the World Bank settled the dispute (in favor of India) which was over the building of a dam on the shared Indus Rivers in Jammu & Kashmir. The two countries concentrated on putting in place institutional structures like the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in both SAARC and at bilateral levels, and although trade between the two countries trebled to around $700 million by 2005, SAFTA could not take off and the costs of non-trading remained high for some years. The official bilateral trade between both countries stood at merely one percent of their respective individual global trade in 2005. But the scenario changed after a somewhat cautious resumption of the dialogue in 2011.

In April 2011, the Wagah-Attari ‘trade gate’ was opened with a passenger terminal and a large cargo facility which in effect connects the two Punjabs and the two countries. The neighbors have agreed to issue multiple-entry business visas. The crossing is capable of handling 600 trucks a day and is expected to increase trade. India’s commerce minister, Anand Sharma, also flagged the decision to allow foreign direct investment from Pakistan. On its part, Pakistan has agreed to bury the “negative list of 1,209 items” by the end of 2012 in line with WTO rules. Also on board is Pakistan’s granting nuclear facilities was signed in 1988 and ratified in 1991 and now unilaterally each side has undertaken a moratorium on testing. The missile pre-notification agreement has been scrupulously observed even at times of tension. One point of difference arose since India wanted this confined only to ballistic surface to surface missiles, whereas Pakistan wished to include all types of missiles including cruise missiles.

See Christopher Carle, op. cit, 63

64 Tariq Osman Hyder, “Facing the Arihant Challenge,” The Indian Express, New Delhi, August 13, 2009.

65 The Indus Water Treaty of 1960, allocated the waters of the three Western rivers of the Indus system – Chenab, Jhelum and Indus to Pakistan, while the Eastern rivers of Ravi, Sutlej and Beas to India allowing for some use by the other country in both cases. The treaty does not deprive Jammu & Kashmir of its water resources. It enjoys an entitlement for irrigation and energy which remains largely unused. The Indus basin lies in one of the most arid parts of the Indian sub continent which is also a water stressed area. The fact that heads of the rivers allocated to Pakistan, fall on the Indian side of the Line of Control, and in China, posed problems. None of the stakeholders in the conflict has realized the potential that the Indus Water Treaty offers for enhanced cooperation.


67 Annie Bannerjee, “India to allow FDI from Pakistan, open border post,” Reuters, April 13, 2012; http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/04/13/india-pakistan-trade-fdi-investment-idINDEE83C04M20120413

68 Binne Sharma, “MFN status to boost trade to $8 billion,” Tehelka, April 12, 2012
of the MFN (most favored nation) trade status to India. Pakistan is already on India’s MFN list. This is expected by the end of 2012.69

But the biggest gains of the CD have been on Kashmir. National Security is an emotive issue in South Asia, and both India and Pakistan showed willingness, for the first time to rethink the defining role of Kashmir in their respective national self-images. From a strategic perspective the prospect of a settlement of Jammu & Kashmir without territorial change, underlies the enormous distance that official and unofficial discourse on Kashmir and Pakistan borders have travelled since the early 1990s.70 Making borders ‘irrelevant’ without redrawing boundaries, enabled the reopening of four pre-partition routes, and softening the LoC in divided Jammu & Kashmir and the flow of people and goods by innovations in visa requirements for Kashmir. The historic changes in India’s negotiating position with Pakistan implicit in the Musharraf-Manmohan Singh parleys and pursued in the back channels mentioned earlier was set to significantly alter Indo-Pak ties and the international relations of South Asia. Analysts point to its enormous potential for a post-partition reconciliation between the Hindus and Muslims of the subcontinent which in turn has an impact on political Islam in Asia and beyond.71

While Musharraf’s proposals took cognizance of India’s opposition to territorial change and Manmohan Singh’s response for the “cooperative consultative mechanisms between the two Kashmiris fell short of Pakistan’s suggestion for joint management”, the CD allowed for a substantive finessing and revisiting of the tensions between terrorism and the peace process. On the broad elements of the framework on Kashmir, namely, (a) progressive demilitarization, (b) no change in existing boundaries in Jammu & Kashmir, (c) opening borders for the movement of goods and people, (d) substantive ‘autonomy’ to the respective parts of Jammu & Kashmir and (e) the ‘consultative mechanism’ between the two Kashmir with a specific mandate to coordinate issues such as trade, water resources, tourism environment and educational exchanges – there was some convergence. In terms of the nuances of actual on the ground implementation, divergences remained.

The nature of ‘autonomy’ that would be offered to the Kashmir territories on both sides remains an open question. India’s reasonably successful parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2009 in Jammu & Kashmir and the mandate for electoral processes in the Provincial Assembly elections of 2002 and 2008 (despite pre-poll violence and threats by the extremists) and an unexpected voter turnout even in 2009, in the aftermath of intra state tensions and massive protests over the Amarnath shrine, is presented as a vindication of the country’s position on the democratic space available in Indian Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). Average Voter turnouts for the Assembly Elections were 44 percent and 60.5 percent in 2002 and 2008 respectively and between 39.66 percent and 45 percent for the General Elections to the national Parliament in 2009 and 2004. Street protests largely mobilized by separatist groups like the Hurriyat, and militant organizations did not

69 “Pak to grant MFN status to India by end of 2012,” Hindustan Times, September 22, 2012; http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NorthIndia/Pak-to-grant-MFN-status-to-India-by-end-of-2012/Article1-934137.aspx
71 Ibid, 4.
translate into votes. This has been flagged as declining support for the violence of militancy, despite Pakistan’s efforts to stoke the embers through ‘cross border’ infiltration and terrorism. India argues that Pakistan has done very little to provide autonomy to Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK) and has kept the Northern Areas (Gilgit-Baltistan) in a constitutional limbo.72

Pakistan announced a reforms package to this effect in 2009. The Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self Governance) Order, 2009 promises reforms with maximum autonomy to the people of the region. A “province-like status” – not full provincial status - was envisaged with elected and nominated members, an executive Chief Minister and a federally appointed Governor.73 These initiatives were a definitive move forward although short of meeting all aspirations, as evidenced in protests in the Northern Areas. Ironically, even India protested against the Order, since New Delhi officially claims this area as part of Jammu & Kashmir and an integral part of India. Although given India’s back channel attempts to convert the LoC into an international border, these protests may be pro forma.74 Pakistan also links the region to the Kashmir issue but in contrast to ‘Azad Kashmir’ or PAK, this region also has a distinct ‘non-Kashmiri’ identity.75 The Order took these concerns on board.

Other areas of divergence are over the composition of the intra-Kashmir mechanism and over its mandate. India would like it to remain a Kashmiri body, begin with soft subjects; while Pakistan’s preference largely is for the presence of both countries in the body, with a substantive devolution of powers to this body. Again, while both countries agree on demilitarization of Jammu & Kashmir, but India tying it with the suspension of cross border terrorism and Pakistan insisting that visible troop withdrawal from urban areas, may create difficulties over sequencing.76

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72 The Northern Areas (NA), spread over 72,495 square kilometers has been described as a “colony” of Pakistan. It was severed from PAK in 1949, was not a province of Pakistan and enjoys minimal democratic rights. In May 2004, reflecting, the aspiration for real autonomy or provincial status, the Gilgit-Baltistan Thinkers Forum and All Parties National Alliance (APNA) appealed to the Pakistan Supreme Court to expedite hearings on a 1999 petition, seeking granting of fundamental rights to the people of NA at par with citizens of Pakistan. The territory is under direct rule of the federal government through the Ministry of Kashmir and Northern Areas (KANA). The military had a big role in administrering the region.

73 The Northern Areas are an important element in the Kashmir dispute. It is also of geo-strategic importance. To its North, it shares boundaries with Afghanistan and China’s Xingjian Autonomous Region, to the West is Pakistan’s troubled North West Frontier Province, to its South is Pakistan Administered Kashmir and to the East, India’s Jammu & Kashmir state.

74 India’s protest may be prompted by the growing Chinese presence in the region. The Order is seen as Pakistan’s sop to quell local opposition to the construction of dams in the region with Chinese support - like the Bunji Hydroelectric Project which will generate 7,000 megawatts of electricity. It is believed that China’s high profile investment in several projects including the expansion of the Karakoram Highway and the construction of a dry port on the Xingjian border is behind the Pakistan government’s latest moves, to prevent unrest in the region.

75 Identity has been key to the grievances of the Gilgit-Baltistan people estimated at 1.5 million, who do not consider themselves Kashmiri and have little in common with them. Majority are Shia and a significant number are Ismaili. They belong to several non-Kashmiri ethnicities and speak a host of languages. The renaming of Gilgit-Baltistan in the 2009 Order has perhaps been the one welcome feature.

76 There is an alternative perspective among strategic analysats in India who assert that while the newly elected civilian government in Pakistan retains the process of dialogue and there is a realization that the policy of militancy and subversion in its approach to Kashmir has backfired, the temptation to retain Jihadis
The CD stands out as a unique example of a bilateral conflict management process in South Asia. This is a region where a multilateral approach for negotiations is seldom the preferred first option. Multilateralism is sought, as the SAARC experience demonstrates, only when bilateral negotiations are blocked. India has till recently flagged bilateral approaches for its own strategic reasons. The new strategic thinking in India and the exigencies of global developments may now move it on a more multilateral trajectory. CD, being a work in progress, allows for resonance in SAARC, to carry forward issues around water, WTO and climate change in its engagement with Pakistan. The accordion that CD has opened, could strike new notes linked to human security in the context of regional arrangements.

The public diplomacy that accompanied the CD, enabled civil society organizations to have an impact, in terms of helping evolve official view points. It recognized for the first time the value of incrementalism (dealing with vexed issues incrementally) gradualism (moving from ‘easier’ to ‘harder’ issues) fractionalism (breaking hard issues into manageable clusters) and sealing up (taking some negotiation details to civil society). CBMs are seen as intrinsic to the problem-solving process.

The complexity of the relationship between India and Pakistan was foregrounded and generated a rethink at several levels, especially among scholars and academics on the short sightedness of engaging with Pakistan as a homogenous monolith. The broader, regional and global content to Indo-Pak relations, issues such as Afghanistan, energy routes, the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, international terrorism and its cross border ramifications add layers of complexity to bilateral issues.

The suggestions advanced in India on long term positive engagement with Pakistan are based on lessons learnt on the potentialities and limitations of CD in the post-26/11 scenario. One is to reduce the sole emphasis on official negotiations and maintain open contact with all potential partners across Pakistan so that ‘spoiler’ terrorist attacks that cause the suspension of formal negotiations are not able to jettison the process completely. Another is to stop treating Pakistan as a coherent whole. In managing the bilateral segment of India’s emerging strategy, it is argued that India needs to use ‘smart diplomacy’ to engage more than one internal actor in Pakistan and at many levels. It must take imaginative, unilateral steps to empower moderate voices and build real stakeholders with a greater involvement of civil society. A careful application of moral, political and soft power resources, multilayered employment of diplomacy communication and sophisticated coordination of global, regional, bilateral and domestic means, as essential facets of India’s grand strategy to engage Pakistan is advocated. India should be systematically working, in this view, towards a Pakistan that is at peace with itself and in harmony with the region. The possible futures that Pakistan faces given its many challenges are seen as, a ‘fractured Pakistan’, a ‘fascist Islamist Pakistan’ and a ‘failed Pakistan’. A ‘friendly Pakistan’ albeit seen today as unlikely, nevertheless exists as a possibility, in consonance with Jinnah’s original design for the state: Muslim, Moderate and Modern, its realization depending very much on how the

as the last option will continue to subvert the process of finding a solution to Kashmir. See Ashok K. Behuria, “Pakistan’s Approach to Kashmir since the Lahore Agreement: Is There Any Change?” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 33(3), (2009): 433-449.

inter-state politics in the region and global interests unfold. From a grand strategic point of view, consequently it is in India’s national interest to help Pakistan resolve its terrorism puzzle. For this, a greater deployment of Track-II negotiators is suggested, and a nuanced approach that recognizes the faultlines within the Pakistan polity and society. A forward looking grand strategy should desist in this view from ‘pulp patriotism’ and a reactive diplomacy and demonstrate the vision and mettle of a rising power, by steadfastly crafting a Pakistan strategy that does not allow room for spoilers or terrorist groups on either side to derail peace with its embattled neighbor. This perspective reflects the appreciation that Pakistani polity today is faced with competing centres of power, which make it increasingly vulnerable, and out of the control of even its strongest institution – the army. So, in ‘making sense of Pakistan’, the core problem of these ‘multiple’ Pakistanans demand special attention. Robust, if differentiated, focused but flexible responses, it is averred, must define India’s policy given Pakistan’s fragmented political and social structure. There is also an exhortation that the security establishment, business groups and peacebuilders must work in concert to shape a Pakistan policy that helps it out of its present quagmire. Three integral strands are seen as essential. First, India builds strong defensive and offensive capabilities to deter “asymmetric” attacks by non-state actors which may have the support of some elements of the Pakistani establishment. Second, India reaches out and builds stakeholders for peace in the region without demanding reciprocity. Third, India uses its “soft” power as well to systematically weaken and delegitimize those who are enemies of a moderate Pakistan, and a stable subcontinent. Equally, it is strongly advocated that Indian policies be carefully distanced from the present American role or the larger Af-Pak policy, given the resentment that America (particularly its drone attacks in the North-West Frontier Province) evokes among large sections of Pakistani society.

Many Pakistanis see the U.S. as having forced the present Afghan war on them and this as the reason for their country’s problems. The U.S. is interested in establishing a bigger “strategic footprint” in Pakistan, but the promise of larger grants has not helped win Pakistani hearts and minds, seen as crucial for the success of the U.S. efforts in neighboring Afghanistan. India too expressed concern over the proposed increase in U.S. military aid to Pakistan which it claimed (and confirmed by Musharraf) would be largely diverted for purposes inimical to India. This adds enormous complexity to the India-U.S.-Pakistan dynamic.

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79 Happymon Jacob, “26/11 and India’s Pakistan Dilemma,” The Hindu, New Delhi, January 5, 2009


81 Ibid. A Pew Global Attitudes survey in Pakistan in June 2009, found that an overwhelming 64 percent respondents see the U.S. as an enemy. The survey suggests that there is a strong public desire for better relations with India, even among sections that consider India a major threat.

82 The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 was passed by US Congress in 2010. It authorized the Obama administration to triple non-military aid to Pakistan, translating into $ 1.5 billion over five years. Separately, military aid was also set to increase from the current $ 400 million. A 1 billion dollar U.S. embassy building was also stated with some Pakistanis alleging that it will be turned into a high tech centre for undercover operations. See Nirupama Subramaniam, “Money Can’t Buy You Love,” The Hindu, New Delhi, September 7, 2009.
Given that India-Pakistan relations are steeped in deep symbolism, the real prospects for peace lie in how effectively governments can appeal to public opinion. It is argued that while India must do all to help Pakistan fight terrorism, the test of its ‘resolve’ will be when it does not need to claim rhetorical victories to legitimize moving decisively against terrorism that is directed against India.83

Pakistan too needs to move beyond its sense of victimhood and projection of its identity as a nation being perpetually threatened. This negative construction of its identity, it has been suggested, may well be the cause of its lurching from one crisis to the next.84

The complexity of the Indo-Pak relationship needs to be seen as a multifaceted amalgam of layer upon layer of mistrust and a great deal of sentimentality emerging from the many shared elements of culture. The ‘great divide’ of this potent brew could well be redressed by a new generation of citizens coming of age in both countries, who are freed from the memories of partition and its attendant ‘othering’ to explore multiple identities in a larger regional, South Asian context. A move beyond the emotional and argumentative approach of both countries could well lie, in Ashutosh Varshney’s prescription of a U.S.-Canadian relationship model as a long term vision for both countries, with competitive fervor in various spheres of life – cultural, economic, international and social, rather than the zero sum game of military upmanship.85

Peace in South Asia urgently requires an engagement by both countries to finesse and institutionalize modes of crisis management that could evolve into conflict resolution mechanisms. It also requires for both countries to focus on issues that impact the security of their peoples, in terms of sustainable livelihoods, democratic rights, beliefs, culture and identity and emerging concerns around energy, climate change and water. The CD provides a framework for such a collaborative paradigm shift.

The vitality of people-to-people contacts must continue to fuel the process. As they revisit stereotypes, grapple with issues of identity and politics, ride on nostalgia, curiosity or simple bonhomie they help bring down mental barriers and challenge the sclerosis of security establishments. Multiple tracks of peacebuilding must continue to be at work to ensure the opening up of the sub continental mind, so that the third generation of Indians and Pakistanis exorcize the ghosts of partition that enslaved and imprisoned their forebears.

The need to cultivate the larger constituency for peace in both countries at this juncture is vital. And this in fact has and must remain the essence of the composite dialogue in the coming years. Transferring the entire responsibility on Pakistan to quell terror may

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84 Pakistani scholar, Farzana Shaikh, in Making Sense of Pakistan (London: Hurst and Company, 2009), argues that Pakistan’s identity crisis, particular over its Islamic/Muslim construction has continued to plague the country – its “obsession” with India spurring it to define itself in terms of what it is “not” rather than what it is. As a state burdened with negative identity it is propelled to seek a compulsive parity with India, a country almost seven times its size. Pakistan’s struggle with India is deeply embedded in a painful awareness of its own lack of history, it is argued.
prove tactically beneficial but given its current internal political vulnerabilities could prove both costly and strategically counterproductive for India.
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